A HISTORY OF INDIAN LITERATURE

EDWIN GEROW

INDIAN POETICS

OTTO HARRASSOWITZ · WIESBADEN

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Edwin Gerow

INDIAN POETICS

1. *Introduction*

Speculations on literature are a persistent theme of Indian literary history from its earliest beginnings. The Brahmanical literature may be seen as the exegesis of the Vedic *saṃhitā*, particularly the Ṛk, once the latter had been canonically fixed in the context of the sacrificial performance. The earliest *upaniṣads* present themselves as 'secret' expositions of the purport of certain well-established ritual acts, as codified and rationalized in the *brāhmaṇa* texts. We know how remarkably seminal the *upaniṣads* have been in provoking the most diverse interpretations by later Indian philosophers, who sought once again to "reveal" the sense of those texts in the context of novel religious and social phenomena. The early history of India, from this 'formal' point of view, often seems little else than a series of attempts to readjust a text that had become authoritative to a situation that no longer called for such fixed interpretation. Out of that impasse emerged a new authority, and so the process was repeated, renewed. The history of early India *is*, as often remarked, its literary history.[1]

And this is true also in the material sense that we are vouchsafed little original data beyond the texts themselves; but texts that are typically not concerned with and do not convey the factual data on which we build our histories. The texts are very revealing on the macrocosmic issues of form and purpose, but nearly silent on the microcosmic issues of occasion and authorship. So while we are dealing with a historical problem that disposes of few but literary resources, the literature is certainly one of the least adaptable to historical concerns. The tension is evident in any "History of Classical India"

[1] *iha śiṣṭānuśiṣṭānāṃ śiṣṭānām api sarvatra / vācām eva prasādena lokayātrā pravartate //* Daṇḍin, Kāvyādarśa (KĀ.) 1,3. "Thanks to words alone the affairs of men progress, the words (of the) first learned, or (the) learned thereafter, or even (of) their appendices (students)." Even here the pun is inevitable.

but becomes almost a paradigmatic study in circularity when literature itself is confronted as an historical problem.[2]

Literature used as a or as the source in the study of extra-literary dimensions of Indian culture is at least subject to certain probabilistic checks that are grounded on more 'objective' observation or theory; in the history of literature, however, both the goal: an ordered chronological explanation of individual works and theories, and the presuppositions: distinctive chronological identification of individual works are interdependent and inseparable. The theory of literature that developed on the Indian soil might otherwise provide some independent check on the literature, but is itself exclusively concerned with purposes and forms of literature, and not at all with its occasion: it is, in other words, literary philosophy or aesthetics, rather than criticism. Also the theory of literature little helps the chronological interpretation of literature itself, both because the literature presents itself as largely anonymous and authorless, and because the literature as well as the theory takes for granted that literature, being Sanskrit, is a paradigmatic creation, whose reality is therefore in the relation to the model, or norm, rather than in the accidents of its origin.

It should be very clear then that in attempting to write a 'history' of Indian speculations on literature, we are doing something to the material that is quite

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[2] The two standard histories are P.V. KANE, History of Sanskrit Poetics, Delhi, 3rd revised ed. 1961; and S.K. DE, History of Sanskrit Poetics (two volumes), Calcutta, 2nd revised ed. 1960; both of which were originally published in 1923 (the former as an "Introduction" to Kane's Sāhityadarpaṇa), just a year after the appearance of Winternitz' third volume. No serious work on the subject can be undertaken without their aid, and this essay is no exception. Differing in focus, the two Histories are partly complementary; Kane deals with the intricate and often inconclusive issues of text-chronology; De is more concerned with the history of ideas that may be said to be demonstrated by the sequence of texts (especially his second volume), a theme further developed in his Sanskrit Poetics as a Study of Aesthetic, Berkeley, 1963. Their agreement is our *siddhānta*. Our work is not quite however a résumé of their views; the reader will find little made of the distinction between text and idea: I am trying here not only to summarize the history of the texts of poetics, but to develop through them a sense of the meaning of the terms (*alaṃkāra* etc.) they convey. De and Kane, if they share a fault, both appear to think that text and idea are two different problems, not two necessary aspects of the same problem. From Kane we often seem to get a history of the texts that means nothing, and from De, a sense that the texts are interesting only insofar as they fulfill some predefined potential of ideal aesthetic "progress". If this history differs from theirs it will be in the attempt to discover what the history is about through the writers' arguments themselves; we will not, for example, be able to give *au préalable*, a definition of figuration, and then trace its history, for our history, if it is successful, will end in a notion of figuration, etc. Another ambitious effort, the History of Alaṃkāra Literature, by S.N. DASGUPTA, pp. 513–610 of DASGUPTA and DE, History of Sanskrit Literature (Classical period), 2nd ed. Calcutta 1962, is flawed both by errors of fact and judgement. Cf. the review by M. EMENEAU, in JAOS 71, p. 86–7. See KALIPADA GIRI, Concept of poetry. An Indian approach, Calcutta 1975.

alien and perhaps even incompatible with its essential form. History, in the sense that we will be using the term here, is indeed an imposition of recent Western scholarship on the literature of India, ably seconded now by several generations of Indian scholars who are at least much closer to the spirit and the matter of their subject. It can run the risk of replacing that dimension of the original material most central to its formation: tradition itself, *sampradaya*. Indian poetics *is* a tradition, therefore a self-validating activity.

In attempting to fix a point at which we may affirm with some confidence that an Indian theory of literature exists, it behooves us to identify the kind of literature the theory purports to comprehend. In a trivial sense all written documents are 'literature', and therefore, in a sense not quite so trivial, all Indian literature, insofar as it is traditional, is a theory of literature also (at least of the preceding kind of literature, as pointed out above: the history of India is the history of Indian literature).

The history of Indian poetics (which term we will substitute freely for "theory of literature" henceforth) is rightly thought to begin in some kind of quite circumscribed relation to the literature we call belletristic, i.e. literature as a fine art, *kāvya*.[3]

The distinction of "literature" in this specific sense, from "literature" in its all-encompassing meaning is both a socio-historical problem (for the Indians themselves identify this category only in terms of a certain epoch from which more authoritative 'Vedic' literatures are excluded) and a formal one (for any effort to define belles-lettres seems to presume the discovery that literature, the written (or spoken) word, is a thing in itself, and can be judged in terms differentiable from the criteria applicable to the things it talks about, its content; that discovery is usually reinforced by the insight that literature for-its-own-sake can provoke and is uniquely adapted to a peculiar pleasure not associated with other-oriented uses of language). Later Indian critics never stray far from this central problem: defining the difference *(viśeṣaṇa)* of literature vis-à-vis other conventions of expression, science *(śāstra)* and narrative (*itihāsa* or *kathā*) chiefly. In this, they do not differ materially from their modern counterparts.[4]

But the Indian materials present us with no theory of art for art's sake, which would simplify our task: the first works indubitably impressed with

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[3] Which includes for the purposes of this very general discussion, *nāṭya* (drama)—for this is also in part a verbal art; in what follows, however, the distinction will preoccupy us.

[4] The literature on literary theory in the West is vast: cf. R. WELLEK and A. WARREN, Theory of Literature, New York 1956, and its bibliography pp. 307–47; for some attempt to apply this method to Indian literature see E. GEROW, A Glossary of Indian Figures of Speech, The Hague 1971, Introduction, p. 9–89. On *śāstra* and narrative, see inter alia S.K. DE, The Ākhyāyikā and the Kathā in Classical Sanskrit Literature, in BSOAS, 3, p. 507; L. RENOU, I.C., p. 1358–69, 1517–18.

the stamp of the *kāvya* style, the Rāmāyaṇa and the epics of Aśvaghoṣa[5], are nonetheless also first rate pieces of narrative or apologistic (so-called sectarian) literature. It is simply the case that the first *kāvyas* are also first documents of renascent and self-conscious socio-religious movements: classical Hinduism and Sanskritized Buddhism. Earlier Indian literature is often marked with characteristics we associate with self-conscious literature; Renou would even put the Vedic hymns in the context of poet-*sabhās*, where competition and reward were not functions of piety but of image, metaphor, rhythm and double-entendre[6] (all persistent motifs of Indian poetic creation: witness the later Bhojaprabandha[7] and even contemporary panditic relaxations, *samasyāpūrti*,[8] etc.). Poetic theorists remain acutely aware of the extrinsic purposes and rewards (*kīrti*, etc.) of the poetic act; and except for a few off-beat remarks and ironies,[9] both poets and poeticians seem both to acknowledge and to serve the vital context in which the poet lives and works. *Kāvya*, though it is a kind of language different in itself, is not seen apart from and indifferent to the social and intellectual dimensions of language, or to society itself. If anything, its difference is seen in its preeminence, in its being truly what other language is only *in potentia:* fully exploited expression—whose principle is not subordinate to an external standard—indeed, reflecting the authoritative status of the Sanskrit language. The poetic statement involves us in the model or norm of language at its most self-reflective level; beyond the poem is only silence.[10]

2. *Pre-history of Indian poetics*

The beginnings of *kāvya* have more links with the Veda than they suffer points of difference; indeed it may well be the Veda, understood as Veda, as self-existent utterance *(mantra)* (i.e. reinterpreted in *Brāhmaṇa* and early

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[5] Ca. first century A.D.: L. Renou, L'Inde Classique (I.C.) 820, 444; cf. Nabeeta Sen, Comparative Studies in Oral Epic Poetry and the Vālmīki Rāmāyaṇa in JAOS, 86, p. 397; Sukumar Sen, The Language of Aśvaghoṣa's Saundarananda Kāvya, in JASB 1930, p. 181.

[6] L. Renou, Études Védiques et Pāṇinéennes, passim; esp. I, p. 18; also Kane, H.S.P., p. 326.

[7] Attributed to Ballāla; tr. Louis Gray, in American Oriental Series, vol. 34. New Haven, 1950.

[8] Where scholars compete, more or less *ad libitum*, to complete a verse part of which has been fixed as "problem" *(samasyā)*; the Bhojaprabandha has many examples, including several fabulous ones about Kālidāsa; cf. Keith, H.S.L. p. 344.

[9] Like the famous one of Bhavabhūti: *ye nāma kecit ...*, Mālatīmādhava, 1,8 (Nirnaya Sagar Press ed., Bombay 1936; commented on by S.K. De, Sanskrit Poetics as a Study of Aesthetic (S.P.S.A.), p. 62ff.

[10] See L. Renou, 'Sur la Structure du Kāvya', Journal Asiatique, 1959, pp. 1–114.

Mīmāṃsā exegetics), that created *kāvya* by serving as its model. The *ṛṣis* are also *kavi*.[11]

The first *kāvyas* show evidences of self-conscious organization of language whose delineation and rationalization constitute the matter of the later poetic traditions: too well crafted to be the products of a naive lyricism—just as Renou argues the Vedic poems cannot be folk-romanticism. By definition, then, the first poetics is implicit in the first poetry.

At the same time it would be futile to begin the study of Indian poetics *(śāstra)* with the first *kāvyas*, for that is to confuse our understanding of the literature with the historical problem of India's understanding of its literature; the latter problem surfaces when the self-consciousness in the poetry itself is made the object of study.[12] And it would seem, despite our well-grounded conviction that such secondary literature must have existed,[13] that the production of the first several centuries (0– ca. 500 A.D.) has been irrecoverably lost. The initial conditions of this *śāstra* are thus not different from those of any other Indian *śāstra*.[14]

Despite this, certain terminology, while not testifying to poetic concerns *per se*, does demonstrate some of the links that poetics has with other and more general Indian investigations of literature. We find, for instance in the Nirukta of Yāska, a notion of simile *(upamā)* understood technically in a way that prefigures the usage of those who wrote on the figures of speech nearly a millenium later.[15] Pāṇini also seems familiar with this analysis[16] of the basic figure into four "elements": the subject of comparison *(upameya* or *upamita)*; the thing with which it is compared (extra-contextual: *upamāna*); the property or standard of similitude *(sāmānya*, or *samānadharma)*; and the adverbial or other grammatical indicator of comparison *(sāmānyavacana* or *dyotaka)*.[17]

These early concerns for figuration do not establish a poetic in our sense; rather they testify to the important exegetical and even so-called rhetorical status that the figures enjoy concurrently with their poetic implementation—in all probability the link between a more general notion of *śāstra* (esp. *mīmāṃsā*) and the *śāstra* of poetics. Yāska is concerned with the contextual employment

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[11] Renou, E.V.P. I, p. 26–7; IX, p. 15–16; J. Gonda, Vedic Literature, in this History, I, p. 71; 74; for more fanciful views see P.S. Sastri, 'Ṛgvedic Theory and Treatment of Raṣa and Dhvani', Poona Orientalist, 9, p. 111.

[12] Contra Kane, H.S.P., p. 338, who argues that the existence of poetics is established by the style of poetry.

[13] The earliest texts refer to "predecessors", Bhāmaha to a Medhāvin, for example (2,40; 88).

[14] M. Winternitz, Geschichte der Indischen Literatur, III, p. 4–5.

[15] Citing even a definition of simile: *upamā yad atat tatsādṛśam* "not that but similar to that" attributed to a Gārgya, who therefore must qualify as the first *ālaṃkārika*: Nirukta 3,13.

[16] Aṣṭādhyāyī, 2,1,55–6; 2,3,72; 3,1,10 etc. Cf Bhartṛhari, Vākyapadīya 590 and K.D. Shastri, Bhartṛhari on the relation between Upamāna and Upameya, Viśveśvaranand Indological Journal, 2, p. 87.

[17] De, H.S.P., I, pp. 3–8; Gerow, G.I.F.S., s.v. *upamā*.

of *upamā*, and particularly whether the status of the *upameya* is greater or less than the *upamāna*; Pāṇini needs the grammatical analysis of simile to explain certain grammatical operations that express similes: compounds, deverbative and comparative suffixes, etc. These references are very important in showing us where to look for the intellectual inspiration that later emerged full-blown in a proper poetic: grammar and Vedic interpretation *(mīmāṃsā)*.[18]

Poetics is (in India) a development of an interest in certain kinds of expressive devices that are grounded in language. Some devices are specifically linked to the Sanskrit language (metrics, prosody, alliteration, etc.)—what the poeticians will term *śabdālaṃkāra*; others—*the arthālaṃkāra*, as the simile of Yāska and Pāṇini—are not specific to the language as sound, but concern rather the expressive content of that language (while not being any the less determined grammatically, syntactically: the comparative compounds of Pāṇini). Inscriptional evidence is often adduced[19] from the second century, where "alliteration and other tricks of words" (Kane) are as consciously employed as they are in the 'degenerate' *kāvyas* of the late classical period (Bhāravi and Māgha). But again, this proves no more the existence of a "theory" than would the same observations applied to the ṚgVeda.[20]

A third area of speculation concerning the 'pre-history' of poetics is occasioned by the stray occurrence of certain terms that later are central to the technical poetics, in poetry of an earlier period. Aśvaghoṣa mentions *rasa*;[21] Bāṇa several of the 'figures.'[22] The strongest argument that can be made in this case is that an explicit poetics did indeed exist from which these words were borrowed—an argument that is likely enough; but the argument cannot produce any systematic treatment of these stray terms, and thus is everywhere

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[18] GEROW, Mīmāṃsā and the evolution of Śāstra, article forthcoming, in JAOS.

[19] KANE, H.S.P., p. 336; A.B. KEITH, A History of Sanskrit Literature, pp. 48–51, etc.

[20] Unless the conceits of an artist are everywhere to be referred to a pre-existent inventory—a proposition that denies the possibility of naive or inspired art, or the naive universality of certain kinds of forms. This issue much vexes the Indian tradition as well as modern critics: poetry in its "inspirational" mode is often discussed with reference to the term *pratibhā*; poetics as an instructional mode, via the term *kaviśikṣā*: cf. DE, S.P.S.A., p. 36, 76, and a voluminous literature in the periodicals: T.N. SRIKANTIAH, Imagination in Indian Poetics, in IHQ 13, p. 58–84; G. KAVIRAJ, Doctrine of Pratibhā in Indian Philosophy, in ABORI 5, p. 1–18, 113–32; K.A.S. AIYAR, Pratibhā as the meaning of a sentence, PAIOC, 10, p. 326; Pt K. MURTHY, Observations of Sanskrit Literary Critics on Poetic Imagination, Poona Orientalist, 9, p. 123; V. RAGHAVAN, History of Bhāvika in Sanskrit Poetics, IHQ, 14, p. 787; F.W. THOMAS, The Making of a Sanskrit Poet, in Bhandarkar Commemoration Volume, p. 375; K.C. SHASTRI, Requisites of a Sanskrit Poet, Jour. of the Dept. of Letters, Calcutta Univ. (JDLC), 26, no. 2; KUPPUSWAMI SHASTRI, Alaṃkāra Śāstra and its bearings on the creative aspect of poetry, PAIOC, 4, 2, p. 57. *Pratibhā* and *śāstra* are first opposed by Bhāmaha, 1, 5.

[21] In the compound *rasāntaram*, Buddhacarita 3, 51.

[22] KANE, H.S.P., p. 340.

unable to prove the impossibility of the counter-argument, namely that a conventional but not technical sense is implied by these terms.

The arguments about the origins of poetics tell us in sum very little *about* poetics, save that it is unlikely to have emerged full-blown in the earliest extant works of Bharata and Bhāmaha. They do identify, as we have said, certain persistent contextual relationships of the *śāstra* with other language-oriented inquiry and with notable types of language use (*praśasti*, etc.). These relationships do not materially change in the subsequent 1,500 years of explicit history.

With the first texts, however, emerge genuine historical issues that influence the theory of intellectual development we argue in the *śāstra* itself. These issues can conveniently be subsumed under three heads: the subject matter of poetics; its relation to Buddhism and the Bhaṭṭikāvya; and the question of independent composition vs. compilation. Poetics, when it emerges into (text-)history, involves not one subject matter and method, but reflects several different and radically distinct concerns, whose clarification constitute the historical problem of the first period of poetic theorizing. Only near the close of the first millenium A.D. does a unified theory of the mimetic art emerge (the Dhvani theory).

3. *The historicity of poetics.*

1) In its broadest sense, poetics at its text-inception was concerned with two different subject matters—*nāṭya*, the 'Sanskrit' drama, and *kāvya*, Sanskrit court (esp. epic) poetry. So strongly distinctive are the subject matters, by style, by means of composition, by aesthetic effect that it is only in a nominal sense that we speak of "a" poetics at this period; in fact, there are two poetics, each with its "proper" subject matter and methods (and this continues to be the case even later, though not in the radical sense we dimly perceive *ab origine*). Nāṭya-śāstra, faced with a genre whose means of expression were largely, and perhaps even primarily, non-verbal (*abhinaya*, characterization, setting, etc.) seems to have identified its first problem in the question, "What indeed did (or 'could') the drama express?". And to have sketched a solution (*vide* NŚ 6,7 GOS ed.) in terms of a different kind of emotional response (termed *rasa*) than the emotion *(bhāva)* that is commonplace in every experience.[23] *Alaṃkāra-śāstra*,[24] on the other hand, employs only one means of expression—the verbal—whose expressive capacity is not subject to any naive doubt. Other possible means of expression—even *abhinaya*—have to be conveyed in words. The problem of *kāvya-śāstra* was then seen in differentiating

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[23] Nāṭyaśāstra (NŚ.), chs. VI and VII.

[24] Viz. Kāvyaśāstra, understanding here the specific meaning rather than the generic one that eventually becomes synonymous with "poetics".

that particular expression we call "poetic" from other verbal means, *śāstra* and narrative. And it sought a solution to this problem not in a theory of response but in theory of language that could reconcile grammaticality (for it is language) with a comprehension or an understanding that did not appear to be derived from it. It is taken for granted that in the uses of language we consider normal, the understanding derived from a sentence is founded directly upon the powers of the words or their combination (the respective views of the two Mīmāṃsā schools most cogently at issue here), a relation that can be conveniently termed denotative, on which is based the propositional truth value of the utterance. The distinctive feature of poetry, in this basic sense, lies in its sentences or propositions that are by that standard simply not true, yet which in terms of the knowing purpose of the poet are not only true, but usually are even more striking than the truth.[25] Bhāmaha's mention *vakrokti* (2.66) is an early witness to this mode of thought—but is not in itself an 'aesthetic'.[26]

2) Relation of poetic texts to other known works. The issue does not concern the intellectual relationships between poetics and its allied *śāstras*, but rather the explicit relations between early poetic texts and other works: the Buddhist logics of Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti[27] (for Bhāmaha is widely thought to be a Buddhist on the basis of his father's name[28]); the academic poem of Bhaṭṭi (Bhaṭṭikāvya) that systematically illustrates the same set of *alaṃkāras* given in Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin; and finally whether Daṇḍin is also the author of the

[25] "Striking," rather than "convincing," and in that sense we are everywhere dealing with poetic, not rhetoric. Unless they can convince us that persuasion was a major concern of the Indian poets, historians of Indian poetics should cease using the term "rhetoric" as a pejorative synonym of "poetic." Modern writers who do this are guilty of bad rhetoric, for this is part of an effort to persuade us that no theory of expression concerned chiefly with words can truly be called a "poetic". In contrast to bad poetic (viz. rhetoric) stands good poetic: aesthetic. S.K. De (Sanskrit Poetics as a Study of Aesthetic) is often taken as representative of this view, which is in fact shared, perhaps unthinkingly, by most others—with the notable exception of Hermann Jacobi: ZDMG 56, p. 392; also Ueber die Vakrokti and über das Alter Daṇḍin's, ZDMG, 64, p. 130. See Gerow, G.I.F.S., p. 13ff.

[26] *Alaṃkāra*, a "making adequate", a literal interpretation clarified by J. Gonda, The Meaning of the Word Alaṃkāra, in A Volume of Eastern and Indian Studies in Honour of F.W. Thomas, Bombay 1939, p. 97ff. Bhāmaha testifies to a discussion vivid among his predecessors as to the scope of *alaṃkāra* (1,13–14); he takes a middle ground, defining "ornament" neither wholly in grammatical or in intentional terms. In fact, he may well have been the first to understand the sense of *alaṃkāra* that dominates the later "school", formulating a theory to link *alaṃkāras* of "sense" *(artha)* with those of "sound" *(śabda)*. See also Kane, H.S.P. on The Alaṃkāra School (pp. 372–8) esp. the references, p. 375; H.R. Diwekar, Fleurs de Rhétorique, Paris 1930; H. Jacobi, Über Begriff und Wesen der Poetischen Figuren . . ., Göttingen 1908.

[27] See S.P. Bhattacharya, Neo-Buddhist Nucleus in Alaṃkāraśāstra, JASB, 1956, pp. 49–66; and Kane, H.S.P., pp. 64–6.

[28] Viz. Rakrilagomin; see Kane, H.S.P., p. 83; nevertheless Bhāmaha is criticized by Śāntarakṣita!

Daśakumāracarita and Avantisundarīkathā.[29] Involved in these questions is the toughest chronological problem of the alaṃkāraśāstra: the relative priority of Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin.[30]

3) Two kinds of texts are found in both the *nāṭya* and the *alaṃkāra* traditions: one, by definition older, is the purāṇic and authorless compilation: the Nāṭyaśāstra itself, but also the sections of the Agni-and the Viṣṇudharmottara purāṇas that deal with poetics;[31] the other, works that by tradition and scholarly judgment are the compositions of individual authors.[32] It is clearly more difficult to argue chronology among texts that are *ex hypothesi* not the product of a fixed time; when such texts are interspersed with datable texts, relations become quite complex if not indeterminate. The oldest 'dramatic' text (NŚ) is a compilation (though attributed to Bharata)[33] the oldest two texts of the *alaṃkāra* tradition (B, D) are clearly not. One of the purāṇas (Agni) bears evident relations to B and D; the other seems rather to look to Bharata (or Bharata to it). Given their strict separation of theoretical outlook, the problems of chronology of the dramatic and strophic poetics can to some extent be mitigated by refusing to see them in a single development.[34]

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[29] An excellent summary in KANE, H.S.P., pp. 94–99; see also J. NOBEL, Die Avantisundarīkathā, ZII, vol 5, p. 136.

[30] Infra, pp. 227 ff.

[31] KANE, H.S.P., pp. 3–10, 66–72, and Antiquity of Agni Purāṇa, IA, 1917, p. 173ff.; S.K. DE, Date of the Alaṃkāra Section of the Agni Purāṇa, Poona Orientalist, 2, fasc. 1, p. 15; V. RAGHAVAN, Rīti and Guṇa in the Agni Purāṇa, IHQ, 10, pp. 767–79 (reply to P.C. LAHIRI, Concepts of Rīti and Guṇa in Sanskrit Poetics, Dacca, 1937); S.M. BHATTACHARYA, Alaṃkāra Section of the Agni Purāṇa, Bulletin of the Deccan College Research Institute, 20, p. 42.

[32] A distinction made by the tradition as well: works of the first type are generally attributed to *ṛṣis* or *munis*, indicating a relation to the Veda; the latter to individuals, historical and *laukika*.

[33] KANE, H.S.P., pp. 10ff;. DE, H.S.P. II, pp. 1ff.; M. GHOSH, The Date of Bharata Nāṭya Śāstra, JDLC, 25, fasc. 4, pp. 1–54.

[34] As is often done, when Bharata is judged oldest, because he knows four figures, the Viṣṇu is put next because it knows 17, Bhāmaha next, who defines over 30, etc. (KANE, p. 71); whatever the significance of this 'progression', it is of historical value only given the assumption that augmentation or complication is the only 'historical' process that need be considered; but given the fact that the NŚ. is both a compilation (by 3) and chiefly oriented to the drama (by 1), we adduce a *prima facie* countervailing reason why that text might treat the figures only *diṅmātram*, so to speak. Note the v. l. to NŚ. 16–43 cited in the NSP ed. (p. 260) *alaṃkārās tu vijñeyāś catvāro nāṭakāśrayāḥ*. It is not possible in the compass of this essay to reproduce the intricate arguments that have been advanced in support of various chronologies of early Indian poetic texts. The work of P.V. Kane, by its comprehensive breadth and fine judgment, we take here as the authority, complemented by S.K. De's work of the same name, and of course by various works of V. Raghavan. We will attempt to indicate what we feel to be crucial arguments that divide authorities; we think it important to emphasize the problematical and imponderable character of the ultimate material, which emerges from the lack of agreement of even the most judicious authorities. This is illustrated perhaps too well in the case of the Nāṭyaśāstra. Kane, fully cognizant of the purāṇic and com-

4. *Bhāmaha, Daṇḍin and Bharata: Alaṃkāraśāstra*

It is conventional to begin the text history of Indian poetics with the Nāṭyaśāstra, a *purāṇa* of materials pertinent to the staging of the classical (Sanskrit) drama. In its various recensions (none of its editions can yet be said to be critical) three of its approximately thirty-six chapters deal with the key issues of the two poetic traditions: *rasa-bhāva* (6,7) and *alaṃkāra-guṇa* (16). Other chapters touch on related topics: plot (19), genre (18,20), metre (15), the latter reserved to a separate *śāstra*. By and large the text pertains to dramaturgy in its practical aspect, and thus does not concern us here.[35]

Immediately later writers, Bhāmaha, etc., mention Bharata by name[36]

pilatory quality of the text, concludes that "a work" at least similar to the present NŚ. existed before 300 A.D. (p. 47). Now the only solid evidence for putting it that early is the highly speculative *alaṃkāra* argument: "all ancient writers on *alaṃkāra*, Bhaṭṭi (between 590–650 A.D.), Daṇḍin, Bhāmaha, Udbhaṭa, define more than thirty figures of speech. Bharata defines only four, which are the simplest . . ." (p. 47). Since other portions of the NŚ compilation cannot be put conveniently before 300 A.D., Kane settles for that date, thinking 300 years enough to devise 26 *alaṃkāras*. To comment on this procedure is to demolish it. Positive indications in the poetic sections themselves suggest that the *rasa sūtra* (kernel of chapter VI) had been commented on by 750–800 A.D., by Lollaṭa, whose commentary is given in résumé by Abhinavagupta (ca. 1000 A.D.) and Mammaṭa (ca. 1100). But these two arguments taken singly would separate the beginnings of dramatic and poetic speculation by four centuries! And to bridge the gap an unacknowledged assumption is made: that the diverse portions of the text enjoyed a coherent and coeval development. I cannot see that this is in any way justified.

[35] It is noteworthy that those chapters of Bharata, especially XIX on *itivṛtta*, that bear closest resemblance to our own classical poetics (esp. Aristotle, based also on the dramatic form) are not inventoried by modern writers seeking the origins of Indian poetic theory! Modern historians of Indian poetics do not consider plot an important problem of Indian aesthetics. We wonder whether this is not a function of the things historians are looking for in the Indian poetics. 'Plot' does continue to be a concern of writers on dramaturgy (Dhanañjaya). It is clear that medieval commentators on the drama were quite familiar with its technical analysis. 'Plot' in a way becomes the subject of a sub-section of the later dramatic literature, epitomized by the Nāṭakalakṣaṇaratnakośa of Sāgaranandin (De, I, p. 310). That it did not find its way into "poetics" until Viśvanātha (15th century) indicates the limited character and aims of this enterprise: an understanding of the poetry where plot is not an issue—the strophic poetry of the classical period. Even in its 'epic' guise (Raghuvaṃśa, etc.) the unit of composition remains the individual verse. The story is pretext, a substitute for anthology (also an important mode of "composition"). In time, a true dramatic poetry is written in India, under the impulsion of the *bhakti* cults of the middle ages; the 'poetic' changes in response to this new challenge, as we shall see.

[36] Śāradātanaya distinguishes at least two Bharatas (Bhāvaprakāśa, GOS 45, p. 36), one called "Bharatavṛddha", whose views are evident in our NŚ.; see S.K. De, The Problem of Bharata and Ādibharata, Journal of the Sanskrit College, Calcutta, 1, part 2; H.R. Diwekar, Quelques Sūtras de Bharata, JA, 1935, p. 314 (possibility of a *sūtra* version of NŚ.). The older *ālaṃkārikas* are conspicuous for their lack of deference to Bharata: Daṇḍin even says *teṣām (nāṭakādīnām) anyatra vistaraḥ* (1,30); also 2,367 and Bhāmaha 1,24; see Kane, H.S.P., p. 93.

but appear to associate him with the "other school"; his chapter on *alaṃkāraśāstra* (16) is by most arguments of internal chronology considerably older than the chapters on *rasa*, *nāṭyaśāstra per se* (6,7: see footnote 34). We have for this reason, and because the otherwise oldest datable texts (Bhāmaha, Daṇḍin) are of the *alaṃkāra* tradition, chosen to begin this history with an account of the *kāvya*-oriented poetic.

On this score, Bharata's contribution to the tradition is rather mediocre. His list of only four *alaṃkāras (upamā* "comparison", *rūpaka* "metaphorical identification", *dīpaka* "enlightener", several parallel phrases being each completed by a single unrepeated word, and *yamaka* "word play by means of repetition") treats indifferently figures of imagery, syntax and 'rhyme'. His analysis of *upamā* is immediately abandoned by later writers; *dīpaka* and *yamaka* are subjected to a mechanical analysis that appears to anticipate the worst in Indian *kāvya*, not the best. The list of 36 *lakṣaṇas*, or "characteristics" of dramatic poetry is largely ignored. Only Bharata's treatment of *guṇa* "good quality, merit" and *doṣa* "defect" appear to have struck a responsive chord, and are developed by Daṇḍin and Vāmana especially.

It is disconcerting that the beginnings of *alaṃkāraśāstra* have to be sought in a text on *nāṭyaśāstra*. The Nāṭyaśāstra, as fixed probably in the eighth century, indeed became the creative base of a tradition, beginning with Lollaṭa, of aesthetic speculation on the *rasasūtra*; on the other hand it provoked discussion of dramatic characterization and plot construction—issues that dominate the Daśarūpa of Dhanaṃjaya.[37] But its sixteenth chapter seems to have fallen on barren ground: it was either a late effort to suggest the import for drama of speculations current in the other, *kāvya*-oriented poetics *(alaṃkāra-śāstra)* (much as some *alaṃkāra* texts, Rudraṭa notably, make passing reference to the chief topics of *nāṭyaśāstra*) or, if early, represents a 'poetics' that had apparently to be abandoned (the emphasis on *lakṣaṇa* particularly, absent in any creative way in later works)[38] in order for *alaṃkāraśāstra* to originate. We will deal with Bharata's views on *rasa* in the next section.

The *alaṃkāra*-tradition may then be said to originate in the works of Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin, whose chronology and mutual relations we now discuss.

The Kāvyālaṃkāra and the Kāvyādarśa are remarkably similar in point of view, content and purpose; modern scholarship, attempting to sort out the chronological relation of the two texts, has emphasized the differences rather than the fundamental agreement.[39] Both works have a single basic purpose: to

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[37] Infra, p. 263f.

[38] *lakṣaṇa*: an effort at *ad hoc* characterization, randomly focusing on content, goal, and method; seemingly an empirical list of the characteristics a play may have. See V. RAGHAVAN, Lakṣaṇa, in Some Concepts of the Alaṅkāra Śāstra, Adyar, 1942, pp. 1–47.

[39] See A.B. KEITH, Daṇḍin and Bhāmaha, in C. R. Lanman Commemoration Volume, Cambridge Mass., pp. 167–85, and in general KANE, H.S.P., pp. 78–133, with a detailed résumé of the chronological arguments pro and con, pp. 102–33; also H. JACOBI, Bhāmaha und Daṇḍin, SPAW 1922, p. 210.

define the *mahākāvya*, or *sargabandha*[40] as it was then termed; their method focusses on those qualities of language and thought that impart on the one hand a distinction to poetic utterance in general, but also define the integrity of the utterance that is *mahākāvya*. In point of view, both writers see their subject matter largely in terms of the distinction *gadya: dṛśya* (verbal and dramatic art), relegating drama to the purview of the "other theory" (as above).

Again, in format, the works are remarkably similar, often quote one another or appeal to a common source tradition. The definition of *mahākāvya* is an instance in point. But also they appear pointedly to disagree if not with each other, at least with doctrines espoused by the other: Bhāmaha rejects Daṇḍin's views on *guṇa* (1.31–2) and Daṇḍin's figures *hetu*, etc; Daṇḍin, on the other hand appears to reject Bhāmaha's views on the difference between *kathā* and *ākhyāyikā* (1.23–5)[41] and to argue against Bhāmaha's view that poetry must be *vakrokti* (2.244) allowing *vārtā* or *svabhāvokti* an important place.[42] Bhāmaha may be dated with some certainty before the Buddhist writer Śāntarakṣita (who condemns him) and after Jinendrabuddhi (ca. 700 A.D.), author of the Nyāsa to Kāśikāvṛtti (whom he quotes unmistakably), thus between 700–750 A.D. Daṇḍin's date is less certain, but it seems obvious that he must be a close contemporary of Bhāmaha, whether one reads the close arguments as establishing a slight priority for Daṇḍin[43] or Bhāmaha.[44] No certainty exists regarding the locale of their activity, though a tradition associates Daṇḍin with Vidarbha (Berar).

It is as though a dialogue had developed between the two authors, a difficult assumption perhaps, but one that would account both for their fundamental agreement and the acerbity of their disagreements. Both works begin with the usual attempt to situate *kāvya* in the universe of discourse: patronage and educational prerequisites, languages and other genres.[45] The major thrust of both works follows:[46] a discussion of the distinctive qualities *(guṇa)*, forms *(alaṃkāra)* and debilitating detractions *(doṣa)* of poetic assertion. Poetry is language, and it is language caught in rather small compass: the individual verse forms of the *varṇāvṛtta* metrics; the stanza is its unit of composition, the whole in which its perfection is to be sought,[47] Thus is clarified both the close attention paid to the capacities of assertive language, and the lack of

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[40] Bhāmaha, 1,18ff.; Daṇḍin, 1,14ff.

[41] See S.K. De, The Ākhyāyikā and the Kathā in Classical Sanskrit Literature, BSOAS, 3, p. 507.

[42] Kane, H.S.P., p. 112, 107–8.

[43] So Kane.

[44] So S.K. De, H.S.P., I, p. 62.

[45] B. 1,1–30; D. 1,1–39.

[46] B. 1,31–4—end; D. 1,40—end.

[47] Renou, Sur la Structure du Kāvya, JA 1959, pp. 1–114; D.H.H. Ingalls, An Anthology of Sanskrit Court Poetry, HOS 44, Introduction; Gerow, "Indian Poetics" in Indian Literature, An Introduction, Chicago, 1974.

interest in poetic issues that have more general reference: in content, context, or poet. Issues that emerge in larger frames presume 'works' that transcend in form and purpose their constituent language. Given a poetic culture (based doubtless on the verbal culture that sought pithiness as the very power of speech: *mantra, sūtra*) that knew no works, it is superficial to demand a poetic suited to works—yet many modern writers tax the classical theorists for just this lapse.

There is no disagreement on the central place occupied by figures of speech *(alaṃkāra)*, although Daṇḍin gives far more space to those figures that are defined as regularities of phonetic or phonemic features *(śabdālaṃkāra)* e.g. 'rhyme' *(yamaka)*, than does Bhāmaha; both deal extensively with *arthālaṃkāra*,[48] figures that consist in striking modes of assertion, expression of meaning. The distinction is basic in all subsequent *alaṃkāra* literature. Their differences on this point do not lie chiefly in the kind or quality of figures admitted (despite the overblown controversy on the figure *hetu*) but seem more to be a function of the organization and presentation of the materials. Bhāmaha divides his *alaṃkāra* in four groups that are represented as layers of a traditional development. The first five are the four mentioned in Bharata (ch. 16) plus alliteration *(anuprāsa)*. It is widely assumed that the Medhāvin mentioned by Bhāmaha (2.48) was a writer on *alaṃkāra*;[48a] just as natural is the presumption that the four groups of figures *(anyair udāhṛtāḥ)* represent anterior attempts at compilation, older layers of *śāstra*; Bhāmaha either attests a genuine historical elaboration of figures of speech,[49] or he sought to bolster his own compilation, which may have been one of the first comprehensive efforts to define poetry, by adducing the partial or disjointed character of the subject as formerly treated. Evident is the relation of Bhāmaha's figures to those illustrated in the tenth book of Bhaṭṭikāvya (one must be a calque on the other, but no certain evidence is available either way).[50] Given the Bhaṭṭi-like quality of certain passages in Aśvaghoṣa—five centuries earlier, and long before Kālidāsa, where aorists e.g. are introduced class by class and morphological 'puns' are freely made,[51] it is again only surprising that we have to wait until the 7th or 8th century for a work wherein this knowledge is codified and coherently presented.

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[48] Esp. the paradigmatic *arthālaṃkāra*, simile *(upamā)*: 2,14–65.

[48a] The judgment is ultimately founded on Namisādhu's statement ad Rudraṭa 1,2.

[49] So De, H.S.P., II, pp. 27–31.

[50] Kane, H.S.P., pp. 73–4; De, H.S.P., I, p. 52–6; perhaps the safest conclusion is that of De, who posits another source for both. Even the apparent mockery in Bhāmaha 2,20 and Bhaṭṭi 22,34 can be read either way. See also H.R. Diwekar, Bhāmaha, Bhaṭṭi and Dharmakīrti, JRAS, 1929, p. 825. (Bhāmaha precedes Bhaṭṭi); C. Hooykaas, "On Some Arthālaṃkāras in the Bhaṭṭikavya X", BSOAS, 20, p. 351.

[51] Cf. Saundaranandakāvya, Canto 2.

Daṇḍin, on the other hand, while accepting approximately the same number of figures (and the same figures) as does Bhāmaha, seems rather to explore the variations provided by context and intention that differentiate each figure internally. He notices thirty-two types of simile; lesser refinements of other important figures, *viśeṣokti*, *rūpaka*, etc.[52] This effort to look at figuration in terms of context, in terms of refining the figure to the shadings of context, while interesting, and perhaps closer to 'criticism' than any other early theoretical work, was rejected by subsequent authors in favour of classifications based on the forms of the figures themselves, for it is clear that figures, seen contextually; i.e., in exemplification and not in their abstract capacity to assert, are endless.[53]

Daṇḍin, like Bhāmaha, is aware of the relations among figures in this formal sense: *rūpaka* is a simile *(upamā)* in which the similitude is suppressed:[54] in other words where the similitude, implying difference between the things compared, is posited rather as identity; neither author, however, attempts to follow out the implications of such parentage.

Both authors discuss the category that had come to represent the inverse of "embellishment": defect, or *doṣa*.[55] Just as certain modes of discourse serve to distinguish speech as poetic, so certain deficiencies, both positive and negative, destroy that distinctiveness. The discussion of the *doṣas* is very much tied, of course, to grammatical issues, for lapses of this sort, in a highly artificial language may fairly be said to compromise intelligibility itself. But it is not syntactical fault—the lapse—that retains the poetician's attention; rather it is the faults of exaggeration, of style—that seem functions of trying too hard, and with more energy than skill, for the distinction that is truly poetic: language too ornate to be understood in its plain intention; language so savant as to require *śāstraic* decipherment; language clumsily used so that the powerful engine of double-entendre is not kept under control, etc.[56]

The *doṣas* are not the contraries of the *alaṃkāras*, for the references of the notions are different; the *alaṃkāra* may be seen as a way of achieving a meaning that is suitable and yet not direct; the *doṣa* accounts for countervailing obstacles[57] to the achievement of that meaning. The third category,

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[52] Such as the common tetrad, *jāti, kriyā, guṇa, dravya*; for these figures and other explicit references to figures, see Gerow, GIFS, sub voce, or Gero Jenner, Die poetischen Figuren der Inder von Bhāmaha bis Mammaṭa, Hamburg 1968.

[53] *anantā hi vāgvikalpāḥ*: Ānandavardhana: emphasized by De, SPSA, p. 15.

[54] Daṇḍin, 2,66.

[55] See V. Raghavan, Bhoja's Śṛṅgāraprakāśa, Madras 1963, ch. XV; K.K. Moorty, the doctrine of *doṣas* in Sanskrit Poetics, IHQ, 20, p. 217.

[56] B. 1,37–59; ch. 4; D. 3,127—end (fourth *pariccheda* in some editions). The diffuse views on *doṣa* are, as one might expect, admirably collated and summed up by Mammaṭa, chapter 7.

[57] A notion that takes a new lease on life as the *rasavighna*: obtacle to the awareness that is *rasa*: Abhinavagupta on the *rasasūtra*: GOS 36, p. 280 (see *infra*, p. 264–8).

guṇa,[58] "quality" illustrates the divergence of the two authors. Daṇḍin devotes an important section of his first *pariccheda* "chapter" (preceding his discussion of *alaṃkāra* in 2 and 3) to Bharata's ten *guṇas* or qualities of style, which serve not so much to discriminate poetry from non-poetry (as do the *doṣas* and *alaṃkāras*) but kinds of poetry from each other.[59] Daṇḍin, in this sense, refers to two *mārgas* or styles, to which he gives the geographical designations Vaidarbhī (from Vidarbha, modern Berar) and Gauḍī (from Gauḍa, modern Bengal).[60] The problem of distinguishing one kind of poetry from another, or put more bluntly, of poetry from itself, is, as may be surmised, not a congenial issue in Indian poetics, concerned as it is with the form of poetic utterance in its generality. Daṇḍin's essay in this area is almost a dead issue, being taken up by only one early author, Vāmana, who extends the concept of 'style' and also dilutes it.[61] The importance of the *guṇas* lies in their service as characteristics, as 'plus-features,' of poetry whose alternative is not necessarily non-poetry. In other words, the contrary of a *guṇa* may be and usually is another feature whose presence marks another kind of poetry (rather than non-poetry). Thus *ojas* "vigour" (sp. use of long compounds) marks the Gauḍī style, its absence marks the Vaidarbhī. This model is not universally applicable, but serves often enough to indicate the peculiar place of *guṇa* in the theory.[62] If the 'styles' truly exist, it is (perhaps) as regional habits that have become stereotyped and thus imitable, much as are the scenic Prākrits, as languages. It is not that a character speaking Saurasenī comes from Gujerat, but that Gujeratī has a recognized literary status in expression of certain social or contextual values, all over India. Bhāmaha in contrast rejects the *guṇa* approach as unfruitful, is an unabashed *ālaṃkārika*: his concern is with the form of poetry, not its variations.[63] He is also a precursor of the widely held view that the *guṇas* are three (not ten) (a case of historical reduction?) and are nothing but

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[58] See RAGHAVAN, op. cit. ch. XVI; P.C. LAHIRI, Concepts of Rīti and Guṇa in Sanskrit Poetics, Dacca 1937 (reprint 1974), and Lahiri's search for *guṇa* in various early texts of *alaṃkāraśāstra*: IHQ 6, p. 345; 7, p. 57; 9, p. 448 and 835.

[59] Bharata did not appear aware of this internal differentiation of poetry or drama in adducing the *guṇas* (16,97ff., NSP ed., Kāvyamālā 42). *Mārga* is not mentioned; instead the *guṇas* appear to be desirable in all composition, and do complement the *doṣas* rather than the *alaṃkāras*. But Bharata's use of these terms is often at variance with later tradition.

[60] See S. BHATTACHARYA, *Gauḍī rīti* in theory and in practice, IHQ, 3, p. 376; S.K. DE, A note on Gauḍī rīti, New Indian Antiquary, 1, p. 74 (latter republished in Some Problems of Sanskrit Poetics, Calcutta 1959).

[61] The question is raised again by Bhoja, several centuries later, and by several of his followers, in the context of dramatic poetry; see RAGHAVAN, op. cit., ch. XIV.

[62] Note that the figures are complementary, not contrastive in this sense.

[63] His remarks seem so pertinent to Daṇḍin's peculiar treatment that it is difficult, with Kane, not to accept that he was commenting on it: 1,31–2, 2,1–3 (KANE, H.S.P., p. 112–13).

varieties of alliteration.[64] But while rejecting the usefulness or the importance of a *mārga* analysis of poetry, he does, reimport, in a final chapter—to which no correspondent is found in Daṇḍin—a notion of *sauśabdya*—grammatical appropriateness in poetry—which in general corresponds to the issues a theory of 'style' might help to define. But he does it with specific reference to grammatical authority, rather than to general or stereotyped variations of usage that are ultimately impressionistic or statistical.

This final chapter in Bhāmaha seems not to have provoked a response by Daṇḍin (if Daṇḍin is posterior). And Daṇḍin's heavy emphasis on ornaments of sound *(śabda)* is not present in Bhāmaha at all. Daṇḍin discusses alliteration under *mādhurya guṇa*,[65] and the bulk of the third *pariccheda* is devoted to an exhaustive treatment of *citrakāvya*—or *adhama*—(rhyming *[yamaka]*, visual poetry *[mantra* and *citra]* and conundrum *[prahelikā]*).[66] Alliteration and rhyming are not ignored by Bhāmaha (they are his first two figures, in fact); it is rather the full development in Daṇḍin that is striking, together with the emphasis on poetic forms that seem academic or even decadent. Perhaps Bhāmaha also sought to respond to this kind of interest in grammatical and phonological strata of language, (which he appears to have deplored, along with S. K. De) by refocussing our attention on the true problem of grammar in relation to poetry: namely its helpful character as an adjunct (and its dangerous character if under- or over-developed!).[67] In this context a question is raised regarding Bhāmaha's relation to Buddhism (and to Buddhist logic).

Chapter five is an inquiry into poetic defects that spring from logical fallacies. It is in general an interesting and quite original contribution to *alaṃkāraśāstra*, especially in view of the well-developed (later) view that one type of figuration is defined by the manner in which logical relations (inference, identity, cause-effect, etc.) are misused.[68] There is a limit to the poet's power to set aside universal laws of reasoned discourse, and the test established in later works is the implicit clarity of the resulting understanding, which like Aristotle's probability is a unique creation of the poem that only thereby exists in this world. The poet does not wish to speak nonsense; his ultimate declaration is as rational and reasonable as that of any other man. Poetry does not therefore

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[64] A *śabdālaṃkāra* and Bhāmaha's first *alaṃkāra*; the reduction is clearest in Mammaṭa's ch. 8.

[65] 1, 52–60—prefiguring Mammaṭa's reduction?

[66] Some of which seems to be reflected in the style of the Daśakumāracarita: especially the *niyama* of Mantragupta's episode (ch. 7), no labial stops at all (see Jacobi, ZDMG 40, p. 49). Daṇḍin's 'poetic' seems better to correspond to the poetry of Māgha and Bhāravi. His identification with the poet Daṇḍin rests unfortunately on wholly conjectural evidence: the independently determined congruence of their dates, and the elegance of their styles. Since there is nothing against it, we may as well accept it. See Kane, H.S.P., pp. 94ff. for discussion.

[67] A concern that reappears in the 'recent' strata of Indian poetic speculation, especially in the Citramīmāṃsā of Appayadīkṣita.

[68] Ruyyaka, especially, but also Rudraṭa (qqv.).

lie in the poet's intention as such, but in the unusual means he adopts to declare his meaning.[69] This homily puts poetry properly on both sides of the distinction between logic and illogic, a matter again which Bhāmaha shows familiarity with. But historians have found this chapter curious for another reason: Bhāmaha's logic appears to have reference to the Buddhist logics then current, and therefore tends to suggest that he was a Buddhist, supporting the odd dedication of his work to Sārva,[70] the Buddha. The issue also joins that of his date, for certain scholars[71] identify traces of Dharmakīrti (fl. 643–95) in the arguments, which would tend to confirm Bhāmaha's dating by reference to Nyāsa (making it in other words likely that it is the Nyāsa of Jinendrabuddhi cited in 6.36). But others[72] disagree, and assert that the logic involved can be understood by reference to Diṅnāga. Which would make it possible to put Bhāmaha somewhat earlier. The weight that Kane[73] attributes to Śāntarakṣita's criticism of Bhāmaha's logic in arguing that Bhāmaha was not a Buddhist, appears to rest on the rather shaky ground that one Buddhist never criticizes another. That Bhāmaha uses Buddhist logic (or is familiar with it) is not in itself remarkable: logic as a discipline originated in Buddhist schools of the period.

5. *Vāmana and Udbhaṭa*

The early history of the *śāstra* falls naturally into such pairs. Vāmana and Udbhaṭa in precise and pregnant ways develop the differences that separate Daṇḍin and Bhāmaha (whose basic agreement and apparent debate we have alluded to), do so themselves as contemporaries (ca. 800) and very likely as rivals at the court of Jayapīḍa of Kashmīr (799–813);[74] yet in their works there is no trace of mutual reference or apparent controversy. We will treat them together, for the intellectual development of the Indian poetic tradition depends on the antitheses their works illustrate.

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[69] Intention, *tātparya*, "the that about which" is the focus of a continuing controversy in poetics, and seems to be one of the key points on which the poeticians differ from the grammarians and the *mīmāṃsakas*. In these latter schools a sentential meaning *(vākyārtha)* is deemed relatable to word meanings, but poeticians are unanimous (*pace* Mahimabhaṭṭa) in locating their problem—and the possibility of poetry—in the non-relation *(viśeṣaṇa)* of those two levels. See Mammaṭa 2, 6 and Abhinava's Locana ad Dhvanyāloka 1, 4 (edition: KUPPUSWAMI SASTRI, Madras 1944, p. 110).

[70] Confirmed by R. GNOLI, SOR 27, p. xl.

[71] Esp. JACOBI, SPAW, 1922, p. 212.

[72] G. TUCCI, Bhāmaha and Diṅnāga, IA 1930, p. 142, which is in fact a reply to K.B. PATHAK, Dharmakīrti and Bhāmaha, ABORI, 12, p. 372.

[73] KANE, H.S.P., p. 84.

[74] KANE, H.S.P., p. 146–7; DE, H.S.P., I, p. 80.

In different ways Udbhaṭa and Vāmana represent the first efforts that have survived to encompass or organize the theory of poetic diction under a principle. Both authors, however, continue the major thrust of the *alaṃkāra* or *kāvya*-oriented tradition of speculation. The notion of *rasa*, as in Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin, is referred to, but never as a principle.[75]

No trace of the *dhvani* synthesis is found, through which the *rasa* will be elevated to an all-encompassing principle. *Rasa* remains a subsidiary in the composition of verses, each of which may indeed "have a *rasa*" *(rasavat)* but whose identity as poetry in no way depends on that adjunct, and which indeed must pre-exist[76] the *rasa* that is perceived.

Udbhaṭa is indebted to Bhāmaha, of whom he is the only known commentator (except for D.T. Tatāchārya's "Udyānavṛtti"[77])—recovered in fragmentary form and published by Gnoli—;[78] his list of *alaṃkāras* defined follows that of Bhāmaha. It may be presumed that Udbhaṭa in fact supplanted Bhāmaha, accounting for the near eclipse of the latter (of which a Ms did not come to light until 1906).[79] It may then be asked, in what particular does Udbhaṭa's treatment excel that of his mentor? It might appear that the reason had something to do with the form of the work, whose illustrative verses (of the figures as defined) themselves constitute a portion of a *kāvya* written also by Udbhaṭa (another Kumārasaṃbhava). But in this Udbhaṭa does not innovate, probably taking his model from the relation between Bhāmaha and Bhaṭṭikāvya. No, the answer lies in what Udbhaṭa does not do; the tradition, which preferred him to Bhāmaha, apparently appreciated that Udbhaṭa concerned himself only with *alaṃkāra*; of the other topics giving Bhāmaha's text such a balanced appearance, none is represented in Udbhaṭa's: no discussion of *guṇa*, or *doṣa*, or grammatical purity. It is possible that we are dealing with only a fragmentary text (though it seems complete in its own terms); if the rest has been allowed to lapse by the commentatorial tradition, it only strengthens our point, that Udbhaṭa achieves distinction as an uncompromising representative of the view that *alaṃkāra* is the central issue of the *kāvya*-poetic. The *śāstra* stands or falls on this issue, none of the others have any decisive import.

We are not to conclude that Udbhaṭa had a 'theory' about *alaṃkāra*. He does not even mention Bhāmaha's term *vakrokti* that modern historians have

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75 A verse is *rasavat* "accompanied by a *rasa*", and this accompaniment is admitted as an *alaṃkāra*, among many others. In the NSP Udbhaṭa, some remarks of his commentator, Pratīhārenjurāja, are attributed to Udbhaṭa, including a view that "*rasa* is the soul of poetry". See De, H.S.P., II p. 58–9, and infra, note 132.

76 As the *vakrokti* of Bhāmaha: 2,85 (Tatacharya ed.) *sā* (viz. *atiśayoktir*) *eṣā sarvaiva vakroktir*; *anayā artho vibhāvyate* // . . . *ko 'laṃkāro 'nayā vinā*? and 1,36: *na nitāntādimātreṇa* (reference is to the alliteration in 2,5?) *jāyate cārutā girām* / *vakrābhidheyaśabdoktir iṣṭā vācām alaṃkṛtiḥ*.

77 Tiruvādi 1936; see Kane, H.S.P., p. 81 (we use this edition).

78 Serie Orientale Roma, 27, 1962.

79 Kane, H,S.P., pp. 135,80.

erected into a theory.[80] De's hope that the Bhāmaha *Vivaraṇa* might include a disquisition on this term is not borne out by Gnoli's fragments.[81] Udbhaṭa, on the basis of his extant work, which is nothing but definitions and illustrations of Bhāmaha's *alaṃkāras*, appears to have been the most uncompromising *ālaṃkārika* and at the same time the least theoretical: for him there is no subject of study other than the figures in their concrete differentiability.[82] Indeed, if the older *alaṃkāra* poetic is, as we assert, a study of the capacities of poetic diction, little purpose would be served in expounding a universal theory (such as "ambiguity,") for it is only in variety that figuration constitutes a "universe" of discourse. Bhāmaha's mention of *vakrokti* is a summation, not a 'theory.' It is as tautological as the implied contrast (1.30) with *svabhāvokti* would suggest. Put in another way, telling a poet that he must speak "deviously" does not help us understand what in fact he says. The interest, both for poet and for audience, is in how he does it in practice, not in his intention.

Vāmana and Daṇḍin also are often grouped together as the two ancient exponents of the *rīti* or *guṇa* school of poetics.[83]

Like Udbhaṭa, Vāmana should be seen as a follower who brought not only an analytic interest to the study of poetry but attempted for the first time to offer a rationalization of the subject; unlike Udbhaṭa, rather than singling out a single principle for inquiry, he attempted to find a way of relating in a single organized whole the various principles that had been discussed by his predecessors. He seems most closely indebted to Daṇḍin (rather than Bhāmaha) in the sense that he assigns great importance to the notion of *guṇa*, or "stylistic element";[84] but he differs markedly also from Daṇḍin, not only in trying to organize his subject but in appearing to find in the notion of *guṇa*, and style itself *(rīti)* that very principle that permits the integration of the other principles of analysis (including most particularly *alaṃkāra*) in a holistic view of poetry.

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[80] De, H.S.P., II, p. 250, S.P.S.A., pp. 23ff.; The Vakroktijīvita, Calcutta 1961, Introduction.

[81] Op. cit., p. 36: verse 2, 84 is rather fully commented by Udbhaṭa; the remaining fragments do not appear pertinent to the issue—and the next page of Gnoli's text has already proceeded to 3, 14—suggesting that the Ms discovered is not only defective but incomplete. Cf. De, H.S.P., II, p. 54.

[82] The copious notes of the editor, N.D. Banhatti, of the BSPS edition, 1925 (vol. 79) of Udbhaṭa are useful both for the text, and for situating Udbhaṭa's doctrine.

[83] De, H.S.P., II, ch. III; Raghavan, Some Concepts . . ., Rīti, pp. 131ff.; Kane, H.S.P., p. 379–80 (links explored but Daṇḍin not considered a member of the 'school'; P.C. Lahiri, op. cit., p. 84. On the use and abuse of the terms 'school' in reference to the variations of opinion expressed in different Indian poetic texts, see the strictures of S.N. Dasgupta, H.S.L., pp. 574–7. Much less decisively De, H.S.P. II, p. 32, ft 1.

[84] See V.V. Sovani, History of the *Guṇas* in *Alaṃkāra*, Poona Orientalist, 3, fasc. 2, p. 88; Suresh Kumar, A Note on Sanskrit Stylistics, BDCRI, 24, p. 65; and Raghavan, Śṛṅgāraprakāśa, ch. XVI.

He does this by seeming to develop a chance reference of Daṇḍin (2,367) wherein the word *alaṃkāra* is used in the non-technical sense of "embellishment," into the first effort to define *kāvya* in terms of its special features: *kāvyam grāhyam alaṃkārāt* (1,1,1); *alaṃkāra* is here not Udbhaṭa's "figure," but *saundaryam* "beauty" (1,1,2). By this generalization, he is able to consider any "excellence" that can be linked to the charm proper to poetry, as an *alaṃkāra,* which notion he explicitly develops in defining the relation between *guṇa* and *alaṃkāra* (in the narrow sense) (3,1,1; 2). Out of this synthetic effort emerges the first attempt to characterize the *sine qua non* of poetic diction, in any rigorous way: *rītir ātmā kāvyasya; rīti* represents for Vāmana that collocation of *guṇas* and judiciously subjoined *alaṃkāras* (and implicitly the negative factor of no-fault, no *doṣa*) that produces *saundaryam* (or *śobhā*), the peculiar consequence of poetry, *kāvya.* In this reappraisal are several striking novelties caught in the guise of commonplaces: first is the definition of *kāvya* itself, here attempted for the first time in a form that links the specific verbal dimension of poetry with an effect that is also specific ("beauty"). Bhāmaha speaks laconically *śabdārthau sahitau kāvyam* (1,16) and the only notion he offers as a generalized quality of poetry *(vakrokti)* is clearly in the diction, not in the hearer. Thus Vāmana, in effect, is the first *ālaṃkārika* writer to focus attention on the "aesthetic" effect as something other than a mere understanding of words and to regard this as constitutive of the genre *kāvya.* The effort to synthesize principles in the notion *rīti* is itself unprecedented, and this synthesis is possible only in terms of the notion of aesthetic effect spoken of (*kavyaśobhāyāḥ kartāro dharmāḥ guṇāḥ* 3,1,1). And finally the effort to isolate, in this view of poetry as an organic whole, the "animating principle," the *ātman*—a rather striking departure from the usual manner of seeking to understand the poetic *viśeṣaṇa,* the differentia of poetry. Because poetry in a full account requires more than a theory of language, and must in some sense come to grips with the purposes or intentions of the poet himself, the poetician broadens his inquiry to include the proper effect of poetry, and refocusses the definition in terms of that effect, seen as an organic process of all the elements.[85]

However felicitous the general outlook of Vāmana's work, it must be observed that the detailed working out of his ideas received little or no acceptance in subsequent centuries; his theory is one of the significant dead-ends in the history of Indian poetics.[86]

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[85] See note 69, supra; the scope of the inquiry is still the individual verse: this discovery of the poet's intention suggests more a skill at finishing, at combining, than a full-fledged 'imagination', suited to the explanation of larger poetic wholes. The term *rīti* is pregnant with these overtones: *rīṇanti gacchanti asyāṃ guṇā iti*; *rīyate kṣaraty asyāṃ vāṅmadhudhāreti vā rītiḥ* (Gopendra Bhūpāla *ad* Vāmana 1,2,6, KSS vol. 209, p. 15): *rīti* is the "going" or the "flowing together" of the elements of a poem.

[86] Unless one looks to the impulse, rather than to the result: cf. B. Bhattacharjee, The Rīti School and Ānandavardhana's Dhvani Theory, JASB, 1951, p. 5.

The reason for this is probably to be sought in his crucial but imprecise notion of the relation between *guṇa* and *alaṃkāra:* "quality of style" and "figure of speech." This relationship is, of course, central in his attempt to work out an organic theory of the poetic whole (the whole of poetic discourse). Vāmaṇa appears to go astray on two points, where his very notions of *guṇa* and *alaṃkāra* are influenced by the theory of relation he is trying to work out; it may be said that Vāmana, in being the first who tried to comprehend the elements of poetry in one whole, distorted the parts unrecognizably in the interests of congruence.

In the first place, *guṇa* and *alaṃkāra* are related to each other through their external relationships to *rīti*, the level on which the poetic whole, the proper poetic 'beauty' may be said to be palpable. Both *guṇa* and *alaṃkāra* are judged constitutive elements of that *rīti*, but in different ways. Relying on time-tested analogies, Vāmana speaks of *guṇa* relating to *rīti* as moral virtues (like courage) relate to the man; *alaṃkāras*, as ornaments or embellishments. The former are constitutive[87]; the latter are adventitious, may augment poetic beauty, but do not determine its absence by their absence. In this, the nature of both *guṇa* and *alaṃkāra*, as understood by previous tradition is radically transformed. Daṇḍin, it has been noticed, thought of *guṇa* as a factor enabling discrimination of various styles; there was nothing inherently "good" about a "quality" as such; the absence of a quality might be as crucial in defining a particular "style" as its presence (*ojas*, for example). And poetry is not the same thing as style, in the rather obvious sense that there are at least two possible styles (though Daṇḍin prefers one) neither of which exhausts poetry. By Vāmana's redefinition, a *guṇa* is good in itself *(kavyaśobhākāra . . .)*, and thus its presence or absence determines not a style within the general framework of poetry, but poetry itself.[88] Thus Vāmana's notion of style turns out to be empty, as he indeed admits 1,2,11 *samagraguṇā vaidarbhī.* There is truly only one style, only one *rīti*, characterized by the presence of all the *guṇas*. Though in a superficial way he admits more styles (three) than did Daṇḍin (two), the others turn out to be extreme and defective poetries, characterized by lack of balance (12, 13) and opposed to one another. But the notion of a *guṇa* that discriminates only poetry, only the essence of poetry is very difficult to comprehend, particularly in that the entire preceding discussion of the early *alaṃkāra-śāstra* is cast into limbo. All his predecessors deemed figures of speech forms of utterance wherein the poetic differentia was to be sought. What then becomes of the figures in Vāmana's reevaluation? He redefines them—that had been considered essential—as adventitious, as earrings that one may doff or don without destroying the basic integrity of the

[87] In the sense of the *samavāya* relationship: without virtue there is no man (-liness).

[88] This appears to have been the sense in which *guṇa* was used in the Nāṭyaśāstra as well, where it is opposed to *doṣa*: cf. De, H.S.P., II, pp. 12–16.

face. But the analogy is terribly distracting. If I take away the 'simile' of the Meghadūta, that the cloud is like a messenger, the poem becomes *vārttā*—a statement of fact, which furthermore is wholly preposterous (that *yakṣa* is standing on a hill talking to some cloud!). In the figure is the very credibility of the poem, not to speak of its poetic impact, its 'beauty'.[89]

We cannot of course be so bold as to say that Vāmana is in error in attempting these reevaluations in the interest of comprehensibility; but it will be clear that his view, in its detailed working out, sits very ill with the prevailing direction of Indian theory. He further attempted to systematize (and also here was the first to try it)[90] the domain of figures of speech under a constitutive principle (as opposed to an expressive property that they had in common, like Bhāmaha's *vakrokti*). Accepting the division of figures into those of sound and those of sense, he sought to comprehend all the latter group under the categories suitable to simile 4,2,1—*(upamā)*. The distortions involved in defining hyperbole, or a poetic version of the cause and effect relationship, as simile, can be imagined. As in the case of *guṇa*, the effort to find a constitutive principle of definition, was welcome, and anticipated later developments (Rudraṭa, Ruyyaka and others); but the particular solution offered was inadequate, and quite evidently so. Whether Vāmana was induced to develop his notion of figure as simile because of his general redefinition of figure in relation to *guṇa*, is not clear. It is another point of obscurity that again makes Vāmana a most enigmatic writer.[91]

Vāmana's treatise closes with a chapter on grammatical usages in relation to style, in which he elaborates on the last chapter of Bhāmaha's work.[92]

6. *Rudraṭa*

In the Kāvyālaṃkāra of Rudraṭa, we come to the culmination, in one sense, of the early *alaṃkāra* tradition that focussed on the classical *kāvya*. Rudraṭa carries the penchant for systematic analysis to a more satisfactory conclusion,

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[89] V. Raghavan defends a similar point of view in Use and Abuse of Alaṃkāra in Sanskrit Literature, Some Concepts . . ., pp. 48ff.; though his interest is 'later' focussed on the notion of *aucitya*, "propriety" that the *dhvani* theorists employ to regulate the subordination of the figures (Dhvanyāloka 3,33). *Aucitya* in this sense is often the entree to the topic of the "education of the poet" (*kaviśikṣā*: supra, note 20) as in the Aucityavicāracarcā of Kṣemendra (De, H.S.P., II, pp. 283ff.).

[90] Contra, Kane, H.S.P., p. 153.

[91] An intriguing question is whether these peculiarities may be related in any way to the "other" Vāmana, the well-known grammarian and co-author of the Kāśikā. Like the grammarian, the poetician seems interested in constructing wholes *(upamā)* out of elements (*upameya* etc.) by rules of conditioned applicability. Despite the congruence of dates and views, the identity is rejected by most authorities. Cf. Kane, H.S.P., p. 147.

[92] Kane, H.S.P., p. 83.

and for the first time, includes the topics of *nāṭyaśāstra* that are suitable to *kāvya* (hero, heroine, etc.). Udbhaṭa obviously and Vāmana no less certainly restrict themselves exclusively to *kāvya-śāstra*, and by that fact belong to the very oldest layer of speculation on *kāvya*. Rudraṭa evidences the growing syncretism of poetics, based no doubt on the increasing practical difficulty in keeping the genres distinct.[93] In presenting a theory of *kāvya*, based on *alaṃkāra*, he feels obliged to provide an appendix on dramaturgy. No synthesis is attempted; the major thrust is in development of a traditional view of *alaṃkāraśāstra*. Rudraṭa's work is remarkably anonymous. He mentions no other authors and cites none (his examples, like Udbhaṭa's, are of his own composition). We are reduced to thinking him a Kāśmīra largely because of the suffix *(-ṭa)* on his name. Oddly, his work has been cited in an astronomical text (Utpala on Varāhamihira) permitting rather certain dating in the quarter century before 880 A.D.[93a]

Rudraṭa is the first successful systematist.[94] After the conventional introductory chapter on the purposes and prerequisites of poetry, the next nine chapters offer an account of the topics of the *alaṃkāra* tradition: *guṇa*, *doṣa*, *alaṃkāra*—organized around a theory of figuration. Rudraṭa, in effect, does what Vāmana tried to do, by taking *alaṃkāra*, rather than *guṇa*, as his constitutive principle. In Rudraṭa's account, the 'styles', or the modes of existence *(vṛttis)*[95], as they come to be called *in extenso*, are explained as varieties of *śabdālaṃkāra*—not now reduced to one of the known *śabdālaṃkāras* (as Mammaṭa will do: alliteration)—but considered in effect a sixth grammatical figure.[96] *Rīti*, though it does not fit so well into this neat progression from 'supra-segmental' to the 'syntagmeme' as basis for unexpected repetition, is defined as the effect gained by employing compounds variously (2,3–6). It does not have to do with repetition of given morphemes (pun), but can be thought of as repetition of stem-classes that results from systematically deleting certain kinds of morpheme formants (the inflections of Sanskrit). Rudraṭa, by emphasizing the *guṇa ojas*, is thus able to integrate the *rīti* theory in the wider *alaṃkāra* theory; in this he will be followed by most writers, notably Mammaṭa, who goes even further in denying a distinctive "place" to *rīti* in his system.

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93 In this context the effort of some later writers on *rasa*—Dhanika, Śāradātanaya—to resurrect the distinction between *kāvya* and *nāṭya* on the ground of the "unplayability" of the new (ninth) *rasa*, *śānta*, is most interesting (Bhāvaprakāśa, p. 26, GOS vol. 45).

93a Kane, H.S.P., p. 154–5.

94 See P.K. Gode, The Problem of the Classification of the Alaṃkāras, ABORI, 2, p. 69, and Gerow, G.I.F.S., pp. 35ff.

95 A fourth, *lāṭī*, is added.

96 The other five being neatly predicated on the 'levels' of grammatical analysis: (a) on supra-segmental intonation (*vakrokti*: NB., see GIFS), (b) on recurrences of partially or completely identical phonemes (*anuprāsa*, alliteration), (c) on repetition of whole syllables *(yamaka)*, (d) on congruence of morphemes (*śleṣa*, pun), and (e) on repetition of syntactic (verse) units (*citra*, the "visual" figures).

Rudraṭa's treatment of the *śabdālaṃkāras* is intellectually elegant because of the clarity of the underlying principles of relation. Equally elegantly, he accounts for the *arthālaṃkāras* (7–10), by grouping together figures of assertion according to the natural or logical categories that underlie that assertion:[97] *vāstava* "factual": *aupamya* "similitudinary", *atiśaya* "hyperbol(ic)" and the familiar *śleṣa*, "pun" or more precisely here: "sense-congruence".

Rudraṭa's classification disputes Vāmana's apparent conclusion that all figures are based on simile; it is one thing to say (with Vāmana) that all figures may have or suggest a touch of simile, and another to say (with Rudraṭa) that only some figures involve an assertion that is a simile. Rudraṭa's first category appears counterproductive[98] but the key to its understanding appears to be Rudraṭa's notion "simile", always considered the typical or the most excellent figure (Daṇḍin, and others)[99]. In a fourfold classification of this sort, what is the peculiarity of simile? Rudraṭa's definition as such does not differ materially from that of the tradition: a simile is a relation (similitude) between two things that are different, yet share some aspect of sufficient note to permit us to overlook that difference. Note the logical relations implicit in the very definition: simile is a relation, of two subjects; therefore implying a difference *in re:* yet the relation is specific: partial identity, or identity in property; but all things "have something in common" (if it's only existence or "being"). What is it that identifies the poetic relation of similitude as worthy of note? Here a complex of considerations intervenes: in many similitudes, the relation of identity is indeed the point at issue, the literal content of the observation: potassium is like sodium (in entering into compounds, etc.). The difference between sodium and potassium, though not denied, is not relevant to the aims of the utterance. Such similes are "non-poetic", indeed their purpose is instruction and may be considered scientific. Those of the law-courts, similarly, are persuasive—as to culpability or innocence in this crime. They also bring us to consider what makes a simile "poetic". "My luve is like a red, red rose";[100] the relation of partial identity becomes "striking" in the poetic sense when the difference in subject is not 'irrelevant' or ignored, but transcended—fundamentally relevant; and of course it is the relevance, relation to context, that the poetic simile asserts strongly.

Since the difference of subject is not ignored in poetic simile, the distinctive character of both is recognized: one 'subject' is definitely in context, the *upameya* (Burns' "love", to whom he addresses his thoughts) the other somewhere else (the *upamāna*, the "rose"), brought into context only through the

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[97] Expressed here are concerns that parallel those of the 18th century "universal grammarians", James Harris et al.

[98] Bhāmaha in fact considered "figuration" and "factuality" contraries (1,30): see De, H.S.P., II, p. 49. *Svabhāvokti* is read as non-*vakrokti*.

[99] See V. Sovani, History and Significance of Upamā, ABORI, 1, p. 87.

[100] Robert Burns, 'A Red, Red Rose', stanza 1.

simile, and only because the contrast serves the single purpose of enlightening the proper contextual subject. In Burns' simile the relationship is not stated and must be guessed: bright as a rose, fragrant as a rose, joy-giving as a rose, and so on.

Because the subjects of poetic simile are both same and different, this counter-factuality lends itself to much play and to much intentional variation. Daṇḍin's list of thirty odd varieties of simile are basically the changes rung on the propositional model by varying the temper of the speaker: let us speak as though identical, or if different, reversed, or if not identical, indistinguishable; let us propound the simile to the detriment of one or the other term, etc.[101]

These 'variations' of simile are when sufficiently conventionalized, considered figures in their own right: *rūpaka* is the metaphorical identification of the two subjects (and the consequent deletion of the adverb "like" or its representative: "... noon, the implacable bassoon" ...[102]

It is clear that the four constituent elements of the simile (the two subjects, the relation of similitude, and the adverbial expressor) need not be explicit in every simile: but they can always be supplied, indeed are supplied in the full comprehension of the simile's import. Such observations link the so-called grammatical analysis of simile in the early writers (as Udbhaṭa, followed by Mammaṭa) with the discovery of the *dhvani*-theorists that many similes require a "suggestion".[103] Another important conventional variety of simile is *utprekṣā*, wherein the deleted term is the *upamāna*, the non-contextual subject; here the common property or mode of behaviour is so formulated as to recall that deleted term to mind when predicated of the true subject: so many idiomatic phrases are of this sort that it seems more a matter of colloquial language than of poetry: night falls (like a heavy object), sudden, decisive.

Rudraṭa of course did not discover the relationships between these figures; the vocabulary of analysis is used by every prior writer. But he did indicate clearly that such considerations were basic in our understanding the nature of figuration. He has given a precise meaning to the ambiguous term *vakrokti*, showing the types of contrafactuality that indeed function in the major kinds of figure. And so it is important to inquire what is implicit in his other three categories of *arthālaṃkāra*.

The notion *atiśaya*, exaggeration or hyperbole, appears to involve not the relation between two subjects, but the relation between one subject (perforce relevant) and its predicates; descriptive attributes or verbally designated

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[101] Cf. résumé of RENOU, IC, 1569, presenting the similitudinary content of various figures—but it is a good example of what Daṇḍin has in mind for *upamā* itself.

[102] E.E. cummings.

[103] See K. KRISHNAMOORTHY, Germs of the Theory of Dhvani, ABORI, 28, p. 190. The issue is crucial in the Dhvanyāloka's proof of the *dhvani* and recurs *passim* throughout the first three *uddyotas*.

actions. The underlying 'form' both grammatical and logical is predication: A is B, A Bs (where B is an adjective or verb);[104] the adjunction of simile is of a different sort, involving two subjects (and thus at least implicitly) two predications: it is apposition: inherently more complex than hyperbole, and it may also involve hyperbole. What makes this form poetic is in this case (and the name testifies to the 'deviation' here) quite clear: predication is the basic form of assertion itself: in many views of language,[105] the independent variable of linguistic analysis. Its poetic version is signalled by its falsity. A "skyscraper so tall they had to put hinges on the two top stories so to let the moon go by".[106] But of course it is not a falsity that is capable of being detected in the truth tables; for the falsity, the 'exaggeration' is only apparent, only for effect. For the lie in hyperbole is so framed as to conceal a greater truth, and a truth urgently required by the context: as these skyscrapers are the tallest things that man ever built . . . The ability to formulate these distortions in such a way that they are self-defeating, indeed redound to the greater credit of the argument, reveals of course the poet's basic attitude to, command of, language, and his essential irony.

Under hyperbole would fall many relationships between a subject and itself (or 'its property') that say something pertinent about the subject. The property is larger or smaller than in nature (hyperbole); the property may be separated from its subject, or be many when its subject is one; it may conceal its subject, or it may not be perceptible though its subject is. If the property be thought of as an effect (of the subject as cause) another range of distortions is made possible that impinge on another category we have yet to discuss[107].

By treating *śleṣa* as an *arthālaṃkāra* (as well as the *śabdālaṃkāra)* Rudraṭa takes a lead from Udbhaṭa[108] as well as Daṇḍin, who placed his discussion of *śleṣa* among the *arthālaṃkāra*, rather than in the *śabdālaṃkāra* of chapters I and III. But by generalizing it into a kind of *alaṃkāra* he means something more. It is accepted that if a pun involves no more than a span that can be read as two separate utterances (whether this be by redivision of the words[109], or rereading the same words in different senses[110]) it is is a *śabdālaṃkāra* since its distinctive characteristic is based on a grammatical rather than a rational or propositional feature. Rudraṭa is apparently the first to observe explicitly

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104 But this hyperbole can be confused with *utprekṣā*, for the exaggerated verb-predicate can easily suggest another subject. So Rudraṭa 8,32ff., 9,11ff.

105 Again, James Harris, John Searle ("speech acts"). Mīmāṃsā disagrees, of course: *vidhi*—the injunctive—is basic. Chomsky seems to agree, but is "NP-VP" an assertion?

106 Carl Sandburg.

107 *vāstava*, infra; see Gerow, G.I.F.S., p. 58–9 and Glossary for examples.

108 De, H.S.P., II, p. 56.

109 *Sun's rays meet / sons raise meat.*

110 *Don't labour under a misconception; support abortion reform.* Daṇḍin may have intended only the former type as a *śabdālaṃkāra*.

that there is a further dimension to pun that situates it among the true *arthālaṃkāras*, and indeed (as James Joyce has led us to rediscover) is close to the very form of literature itself: the division of *śleṣa* on morphological grounds assumes that the two meanings resultant are unrelated—that the "charm" of pun is entirely a function of the clever manipulation of grammar, and the unexpected bonus of a second meaning at the very time a first is perceived. But no author of substance uses puns in so lighthearted a manner: in 'serious' punning, the two meanings are closely related, in context, and in effect propound a simile, except that a single language span is used. But the pun, *par contre*, is not simply a simile, though its words express both *upameya* and *upamāna*: the simultaneity of apprehension adds an unmistakable *Glanz und Pracht* to the figure which itself may be thought of (and no doubt was by Rudraṭa) as the exaggeration essential to hyperbole. The apprehension of the similitude is accompanied by a distortion so grave as to become hyperbolic. The distortion applies not to the similitude but to its apprehension.

Rudraṭa has 'explained' the significance of the pun in classical *kāvya*: pun is both the ideal, or perfect figure (from the side of the *śāstra*) for it achieves the maximum density of contextual and non-contextual rapprochment, and in it is realized the poetic difference (when viewed from the point of view of the expressible)—for here the "speaking slyly" (the *vakrokti*) is not a something superadded to a meaning otherwise comprehensible—it is inseparable from that comprehension: there would be no simile without the pun.[111] The density of expression that is characteristic of the classical *kāvya*—the essential inweaving of overtone and allusion—reaches a formal limit in the *artha-śleṣa* that makes of the latter the *lakṣaṇa* of the style itself.

The *śleṣa* is also an ideal by which the skill of the poet and the sensitivity of his audience are put to the test; having understood *śleṣa* and its place in the structure of poetic utterance, it is not surprising that Rudraṭa—the quintessential *ālaṃkārika*—turned away from the *guṇa rīti* dialogue over 'style', as superficial to the study of poetry.[112]

Rudraṭa's purpose in establishing his fourth (in fact his first, chapter VII) category of figuration, *vāstava* "factual" can be guessed from what has preceded. On the surface he has provided a rationale in which the long argument over

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[111] Cf. N. Chomsky, Syntactic Structures, p. 86, where "constructional homonymity" is advanced as a (or the) test of 'linguistic level', which is termed the "central notion in linguistic theory" (p. 11). Few Indologists have accorded 'pun' the place of interest it deserves: Renou, Art et Religion dans la Poésie Sanscrite: le jeu des mots et ses implications, Journal de Psychologie, 1951, pp. 280–5, Keith, H.S.L., p. 351 (brief!); Gerow, On the Pun as Poetry, Journal of the G. Jha Kendriya Sanskrit Vidyapeetha, 27, pts 3–4, p. 79. Cf. also V. Raghavan, Śleṣa in Bāṇa, NIA, 1, p. 214, for a more textual approach.

[112] Classical Indian theorists, concerned with the inward force of the language itself could not reasonably be expected to dwell on accidental conventions of an already conventional language.

svabhāvokti[113] can be resolved. It is a figure (agreeing with Daṇḍin) but of an essentially different sort than those captioned by *vakrokti* (agreeing with Bhāmaha). The force of the fourfold classification leads us to define as *vāstava*, figures that involve neither simile nor hyperbole (thus occupying the polar position to *śleṣa*, which involves both). But how can one speak of a figure that appears to involve neither of the constituent elements of figuration? Have we expended our cleverness only to define a null category?

The answer is in Rudraṭa's propositional calculus that in fact underlies his treatment of simile and hyperbole, as mentioned. The propositional form underlying simile is association or apposition; that of hyperbole is predication. Both involve sentences of the type: A is X, and differ basically as to whether X is a noun or a qualification.[114] But the relations of similitude *(aupamyam)* and *guṇaguṇibhāva* (relation between quality and object) do not exhaust the repertoire of propositionally utterable relationships: and whatever there may be among the latter that are capable of the peculiar distortion that makes for poetry, will have to be considered also poetic form, an *alaṃkāra*. Among these "other relations" is cause and effect, and Rudraṭa concerns himself here with poetic versions of causation *(hetu)*. More interesting are the figures of accumulation (as opposed to adjunction) (*samuccaya* "accumulation", *parikara* lit. "entourage", a figure in which the adjectival qualifications are multiplied; *et alia*). Repeated references to the contextual associations of an event for example, 'suggest' the event. It is not clear whether Rudraṭa in these matters is directly responding to a *dhvani*-based theory, or whether out of such discussions may have sprung the problematic of the *dhvani* itself. It is also quite possible that Rudraṭa is considering such 'accumulations' as evidence of relations other than cause and effect, relations such as "inference", often based on a notion of cause and effect, and championed by Mahimabhaṭṭa as an alternative to accepting the *dhvani* as an independent function *(vṛtti)*.

Among the *vāstava* figures is Daṇḍin's *jāti*: where the accumulation is that of minute pictographic detail and the "suggestion" is that of a complex natural moment frozen in words (as the hawk swooping on the piece of meat in the cāṇḍāla courtyard)[115]. Discussion whether such *svabhāvokti* "characterization of a natural or typical individual" is poetic or not misses the point: the picture itself, though natural (but the understanding in any figure is 'natural') is a peculiar word-product: its frozen completeness a function of the epithetical density of the language, here far from (deviating from) imprecise descriptive prose. It is as though accuracy itself were 'unnatural'.

It is Rudraṭa's accomplishment, not only to have provided a comprehensive and systematic account of the figures (De ii, p. 62), but to have shown the

[113] See V. Raghavan, History of Svabhāvokti in Sanskrit Poetics, in Some Concepts . . ., pp. 92ff.

[114] Including the verb, of course.

[115] Ingalls, An Anthology . . ., 1150, and discussion pp. 326–8.

stringent conditioning imposed by the functions of language on poetic discourse. It is this topic that is taken up, and developed separately by the *dhvani* theorists—and is a preoccupation that persists to the very close of the creative period of the *śāstra* in the 18th century, a topic that in one way or another overshadows the discussion of the figures that gave it birth, throughout the subsequent history of poetics.

At this point it will be necessary to sketch the development of the other poetics—the *nāṭyaśāstra*—highly speculative though it is, up to the emergence of the *rasa-dhvani* theory, for, in terms of theory, the *dhvani* for the first time seeks to formulate a truly integrated view of both *alaṃkārakāvya* and *rasa-nāṭya*, via which, of course, the *dhvani* itself is presented (also for the first time) as a comprehensive successfully poetic principle.

7. *Nāṭyaśāstra: Rasa in dramatic criticism*

The term *rasa* is well attested in early Indian literature in the allied senses of "sap/essence" and "taste"—both notions are deeply imbued with overtones of 'liquidity', inasmuch as both the sap, the 'essence' of plants, etc., is liquid, and the capacity to taste takes that peculiar form of 'liquidy' as its object (as, for example, in sugar cane), so that *rasa* is even seen in the physical theories as the very differentia of the liquid element ('having taste' marks the liquid as, e.g., 'having smell' marks earth and 'sound' marks ether *(ākāśa)*). Citations of the objective reference of *rasa* go back all the way to the Ṛgveda, where, not unexpectedly, it often designates the "essence" (scil. "power", in German "Kraft") of the *soma* plant; the subjective reference (to "taste") goes back at least to the Śatapathabrāhmaṇa (*sarveṣāṃ rasānāṃ jihvaikāyanam:* e.g. 14,5, 4,11 in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka).

The question of when the specifically aesthetic flavour of *rasa* first appears in the literature is disputed. For *rasa* to have the dignity of a technical term—a precursor of its subsequent destiny—implies in some sense the development of a technical aesthetics in which the terms might function.

The oldest work to concern itself (in some way) with the *rasa* as a definable aesthetic principle is the Nāṭyaśāstra of Bharatamuni—a compendium on the theatre and the dance which is usually dated not later than the 6th century, but may contain elements as old as the 2nd B.C.[116] It is thus roughly contemporaneous with the great flowering of dramatic and other literature under the patronage of the Gupta kings (4th–6th centuries), and it reflects the cultural and aesthetic realities of that flowering.

Taken as a whole, the sketch of *rasa* in the Nāṭyaśāstra suggests strongly that the *rasa* developed its first 'aesthetic' overtones in the context of the

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[116] Supra, note 33.

Sanskrit dramas of the classical period. It emerged first as a principle in debates about the nature and function of drama as a discrete genre. It was not at first propounded as a universal principle—at least the texts give us no leave to this speculative conclusion—but rather in some sense as a specific differentia of one well-established and highly valued genre. It is, in terms borrowed from Indian logic, introduced as the *lakṣaṇa*[117] of drama: an invariably concomitant attribute of the drama which thus serves (in the first place) to designate or mark drama apart from all else (as the dewlap does the genus cow). What else the *rasa* is, or may be conceived to be, probably originates in speculation about the reasons for that invariable relationship, and is thus inextricably linked to the nature of the drama as an art form of distinctive purposes and properties. The *rasa* does not begin its career either as a psychological principle or even as an aesthetic principle—if by this we mean a universal principle—but as a critical principle.[118] As the effect of a drama is as much a function of its complexity, as its unity, there is not one *rasa*, but eight: those emotional responses that are sufficiently universal to serve to organize an entire drama.[119]

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[117] Supra, note 38: though the term is used in different senses, its progression of meaning is clear from these examples. The 'logical' use is much more rigorous.

[118] But while the drama declines as an art form, its principle in effect becomes an aesthetic of all art: 'art' is dramatized while drama loses its culturally distinctive character.

[119] The eight *rasas* enumerated by Bharata are: *śṛṅgāra* (amorous), *hāsya* (comic), *karuṇa* (pitiable), *raudra* (violent), *vīra* (heroic), *bhayānaka* (terrifying), *bībhatsā* (disgusting), and *adbhuta* (wondrous), to which a ninth, *śānta* (peaceful) and others are added later. The literature on *rasa* is quite large; this notion is rightly thought to be both central and specific to the Indian theory of art. Most accounts of *rasa* however concentrate on its psychological or metaphysical import, rather than its strictly 'aesthetic' significance; a good portion of the history of Indian poetics is however devoted to explaining just how and in what contexts a notion as apparently innocent as "taste" can have such a functional overload. One such effort, that tries to emphasize the aesthetic issues underlying the multiplicity is my article Raśa as a Principle of Literary Criticism, to be published in the Proceedings of the Honolulu Conference on Sanskrit Drama in Performance, eds. R. van Meter Baumer and J. Brandon.

In my judgment the best single account of the *rasa(s)* in psychological and literary terms is still M. Hiriyanna's essay Art Experience, published in a collection of essays of the same name, Mysore 1954. The standard texts on the Sanskrit drama all devote space to *rasa*, particularly in light of the metaphysical and theological overtones of Abhinavagupta's classic account of the *rasa's* origin and nature (infra, p. 264–8 and notes). In much of the literature it would seem that *rasa* is a single thing, an entity (following Abhinava's account of it as a principle, something of this is inevitable); the question of the multiplicity of *rasas* seems not to have excited much interest, though it is on this level that the aesthetic implications are clearest: each drama realizes one of the eight *rasas*—not "the" *rasa*. One such study is that of H.D. Sharma, *Hāsya* as a *rasa* in Sanskrit Rhetoric and Literature, ABORI, 22, p. 103. The question of multiplicity is raised chiefly around the new or ninth *rasa*, *śānta*, reflecting a controversy patent in the texts themselves (in what

The hypothesis that we formulate is not original—though some of its applications may seem so. S.K. De asserts[120] "... Bharata's treatment would indicate that some system of Rasa, however undeveloped, or even a Rasa school, particularly in connexion with the drama, must have been in existence in his time." He spells out the implications of restricting the *rasa's* origin, by noting the existence of other critical theories or schools where the *rasa* was not cultivated: "As Dramaturgy was in the beginning a separate study, from which Poetics itself probably took its cue, the Rasa doctrine, which sprang up chiefly in connexion with this study, confined its activity in the first stage of its development to the sphere of dramatic composition and exerted only a limited influence on poetic theories."

The *rasa* should be understood then, in its earliest form, not only as an integrative principle, but as a distinctive feature, of the dramatic genre. That it occurred first in the context of the drama is a crucial, rather than an incidental, factor in its definition.

The *rasa* appears an external factor to the drama, seen as a work of art: a medium of experience, emotional awareness, "taste" that is first and foremost in or of the audience; no similar need to go beyond the work is felt in the early poetics devoted to strophic poetry *(alaṃkāraśāstra)*; (though with devotional lyricism, such a need did become an obvious enough addendum)[121] instead the work is analyzed structurally in terms directly relevant to the dimensions of the language that underlies it: word as sound; word as meaning and intention; symbolic and metaphoric statements (images) that achieve truth through essentially non-literal means. The drama appears to require more than this, in the first place, because it is structurally so disparate, in effect, a composition of structures, or a complex structure. Each of the structures may well be—indeed is—analyzed in the course of the Nāṭyaśāstra's treatment: the strophic poetry which figures so prominently (but only as an element) in the drama is discussed in terms strikingly similar to its non-dramatic analysis in chapter XVI; the language of gesture *(abhinaya)*, whereby the dance element becomes immediately expressive, is minutely analyzed; costuming and stage arrangements (spectacle) are treated; seven chapters discuss music and song (28–34, of the 38 chapter text);[122] other essential aspects of dramatic language

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sense can "inaction" be "dramatic"?). *Śānta* is needed precisely because the *rasa* theory in time englobes other literary forms: the epics, esp. the Mahābhārata, once they are determined to need a *rasa*, can have only this *rasa*. See V. Raghavan, The Number of Rasas, Adyar 1940; J. Masson and M. Patwardhan, Śāntarasa and Abhinavagupta's Philosophy of Aesthetics, Poona 1969; E. Gerow and A. Aklujkar, On Śāntarasa in Sanskrit Poetics, JAOS, 92, p. 80. The *dhvani* theory, which we discuss in the next section, so intimately involves and reinterprets the *rasa*, that much of the literature will be more appropriately noted there.

[120] De, H.S.P., II, p. 18.

[121] See Gerow, Indian Poetics, in Indian Literature, an Introduction.

[122] Renou, I.C., 1580.

are treated: metre, dialectical variation, intonation (the figures are included in this part of the *śāstra* (15–17)); more pertinently perhaps—from an Aristotelian point of view—the questions of characterization and plot or "action" (*itivṛtta*: 19). These aspects of the drama are exhaustively analyzed, sometimes with scholastic subtlety—as when the plot, seen as the attainment of a goal, is divided into five states *(ārambhādi)*, which serve as basis for distinguishing their proper subjective representations *(bījādi)*, which by various combinations give as many as 64 subjunctures *(aṅga)*—a veritable formal ossature beside which Aristotle's 'formalism' pales.[123]

The structure of Bharata's text suggests, as Renou[124] and others have noted, a primary organization of the subject into four elemental topics *āṅgika* (or, representation by use of the body), *sāttvika* (emotions and sentiments), *vācika* (use of language) and *āhārya* (the "external" aspects: costume, lighting, rouge, stage, etc.). Of these, the 'sentimental' involves chiefly the extraformal, emotional impact of the play, and of course, in terms of the audience's consciousness at the time of or as a result of, the play. Judging from the list of topics figuring in the 'complex' play, the *rasa* may be one among many—a fragment of a whole as are the rest (as the grouping into four suggests). And, indeed, the list of topics with which the sixth, or *rasa*-chapter begins, reads like a dictionary of terms, among which *rasa* has no special status, a mere component. But here, as often, the Indian passion for cataloguing reveals a deeper purpose. Bharata seems interested in the *rasa*—as component—precisely because it offers a rationale for stating the unity of this complex form which is the play: an organizing mode which turns the elements, when properly perceived, into parts; and further, in virtue of that organic reevaluation, can be said to constitute the end, or purpose of the play.

The end is not only a result, but a principle of organization which accepts, indeed requires, material to organize, but which more importantly, modifies that material in precise ways to conform to the expectation of the end as purpose. Thus the *rasa* is a mood, an emotional consciousness, wherein all the disparate elements of the play, language, gesture, imitations, scenery, coincide, and are understood after all not to be disparate;[125] but also the *rasa* is the principle which accounts most successfully for the kind of reality that makes the parts dramatic. The elements, though closely related to those in the 'real' world (of concrete experience)—as the moon in the Vikramorvaśīya to the

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[123] See S. Lévi, Le Théâtre Indien, Paris ²1963, pp. 30–62; M.C. Byrski, Sanskrit Drama as an Aggregate of Model Situations, Proceedings of the Honolulu Conference, I.

[124] Ibid.

[125] Hence the importance of the cooking analogy: NŚ I, pp. 287ff. (GOS. vol. 36). In the cooking process discrete, unrelated 'elements' are composed into a whole, conveying a single taste, which, as soon as it is tasted, is revealed to be the purpose of the process.

'real' moon are not simply fictitious, but are 'real' in a different sense—have a reality that only drama can sustain, that in turn defines its mode of distinctive being. Thus Bharata can say *na hi rasād ṛte kaś cid arthaḥ pravartate*[126] meaning by *artha* the subject, or *vastu* of the drama—its congeries of elements—for the *rasa* is their end, in composite; but it also defines the mode of being of that composite *tatra vibhāvānubhāvavyabhicārisaṃyogād rasaniṣpattiḥ*.[127]

"The *rasa* exists or is produced from (we would prefer "as") a combination of (its elements, which are already conceived in their dramatically determined mode of existence, denoted by the technical terms) *vibhāvas* "causes of emotion, e.g. the persons and circumstances represented", *anubhāvas* "effects, consequences or external signs of emotions" and *vyabhicāribhāvas* "transitory states (of mind etc.)" ".[128]

But also the *rasa* is not only a result, and the components are not only causes (as reflected in the popular derivation of *bhāva*—'concrete emotion' "*evam bhāvā bhāvayanti rasān* . . ."[129] *Bhāva* is also the first level apprehension of the concrete elements of the play: Rāma as manifesting such and such a particular emotion in such and such a context. There is an element of reciprocal 'causation' in which the *rasa* itself can be said to be "cause" of the play: as the final cause explaining why it was put together in such and such a way[130] the *rasa* is the organic 'root' of the total variety of the play; and its disciplined form, just as a single "essence" underlies the transformation of seed to tree to flower to fruit (to seed).[131]

Because the *rasa* is conceived as a mode of apprehension that is both immediate (in the theatre) and more general than verbal apprehension (for verbal apprehensions are one element only of the complex that is the play), its implicitude in every element of the play makes it quite inappropriately stated as the function of word imagery alone. That would collapse the evident generic distinction between poetry and drama at its most crucial point: the means of expression. The best that can be said of *rasa* in the context of verbal (poetic) expression is that it is an aspect or element thereof. And it is in this way that the other 'original' school of criticism has treated it: an as *alaṃkāra* of speech:

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126 Op. cit., p. 272 (prose between 6,31 and 32).

127 Ibid. This remark provides the occasion for Abhinava's extensive comment in the Bhāratī (supra, note 119, infra 264–8), translated by Gnoli (SOR, 11). For one of the rare views from the other side see B. Śrīnivāsabhaṭṭa Sāhityaśiromaṇi, Rasopāsana (in Sanskrit), PAIOC 4, fasc. 2, p. 65.

128 Terms worthy of discussion in their own right; we note here only that what is intended is the congeries of discrete representations—both conditions *(vibhāva)* and consequences *(anubhāva)* that the audience accepts as 'dramatic' and related in *rasa*. See my "Indian Poetics", op. cit.; De, H.S.P., II, p. 20; P. Regnaud, Rhétorique Sanscrite, Paris 1884, pp. 266–356.

129 Op. cit. p. 293.

130 This argument seems to be understood by Abhinava as a *pūrvapakṣa; atra codyavādī svāśayam unmīlayati* (ibid.).

131 Op. cit. 6,38; p. 294.

rasavat.[132] In the dramatic context, the ultimate rationale for the use of such and such a poetic verse is in the *rasa* of the play; but from the point of view of the verse, abstracted from the play (and many verses were not written in the context of a play at all) the critical concerns of image-analysis predominate (how the verse conveys its poetic meaning) and the *rasa*-element, if accounted at all, is necessarily reduced to a subordinate position, for the *rasa* is not the end of (verbal) utterance (as such). It may well, and often does, accompany utterance.[133]

Likewise, taking our reference in Aristotle's Poetics, because the *rasa* is conceived as an emotional apprehension implicit in every element of the play, and not a change, or modification of emotion *(katharsis)*,[134] it functions as an end and is a result in quite a different way: it does not 'happen' in the course of the play, but is there constant and immovable, subject only to apprehension. The plot structure which is judged suitable to realize that awareness is thus also quite different: instead of a concern with peripeties or turning points (dénouement) we find a concern for modes of sustenance, revivification through contrast, ultimate reintegration *(phalaprāpti)*. But these are matters not germane, except perhaps as illustration, to our present concerns.

As a critical principle, this *rasabīja* we see sketched in the laconic text of Bharata functions in three important ways: it distinguishes *nāṭya* from the poetry of which *nāṭya* is largely composed; it serves as an organic principle in terms of which the integrity of the drama can be understood; and is also the result of the drama, its "end", understood as a state of awareness peculiar to the drama—distinct from normal worldly consciousness.

8. *Rasa and bhakti: the Dhvanyāloka*

The second stage of theory concerning the term *rasa* is marked by the epochal work of Ānandavardhana (9th century).[135] We see a definite change of emphasis and a progression of concern from capacities of genre, to their ultimate reconciliation in a single theory of expression. It is noted on the one hand that though many aspects of the drama involve non-verbal expression

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[132] Supra, note 75. See M. Hiriyanna, The problem of *rasavad alaṃkāra* PAIOC, 15, p. 267.

[133] On the curious notion of the "appearance" of *rasa*, see S. Bhattacharya, *Rasābhāsa* in Sanskrit Literature, PAIOC, 7, p. 47.

[134] See C. Kunhan Raja, Aristotle's Katharsis and Bharata's Sthāyībhāvas, Adyar Library Bulletin, 12, pp. 1–16.

[135] De, H.S.P., I, pp. 101–2; There were writers on *rasa* between Bharata and the Dhvanyāloka; none of their works have survived. But Abhinava gives an admirable résumé of their views in the course of developing his own doctrine: see infra, p. 264–8. T. S. Nandi, The origin and development of the theory of rasa and dhvani, Ahmedabad 1973.

(as gestures, scenery, etc.), so too, in an important sense, does verbal expression itself: that is, without trying to sound overtly paradoxical, the expressive goal (or "sense") of verbal art is often not the same thing as the expressive content of the words and sentences employed. In effect, the meticulous analyses of poetic utterance and poetic imagination that were the business of the *alaṃkāra* school, seemed to come to precisely this conclusion: insofar as utterance can be considered 'poetic' (the genre distinct), it must involve, as an essential element, some such détour in the usual or normal apprehension process—a *vakrokti*: an understanding that the refined mind grasps as a result of the word heard or read, but not directly by means of it.

We seem to be moving towards a view that generalizes art through a theory of expression (or perhaps more precisely, of "non-expression"). It remained for Ānandavardhana to draw these matters together.[136]

But the theory does not develop in a vacuum. The interest in elaborating a theory whereby one can unify the arts (or at least drama and strophic poetry) should presuppose some strategic event occurring in the arts themselves which at least suggests the opportunity for such a rapprochement. It is not difficult to link what we know to have happened to Sanskrit letters in the post-Gupta and pre-Islamic period with the theoretical reevaluation that we find full-blown in Ānandavardhana. With the collapse of the stable, wealthy, and sophisticated Gupta monarchy, and the time of troubles that ensued, Sanskrit drama lost both its audience (never more than the society of sophisticates attracted to the imperial courts and cities) and its means of support (what we presume to have been societies of wealthy literati—and of course the king himself).[137] Local kingdoms (Harṣa) rose to prominence in various regions, but the cultural stability on which this highly artificial art form depended was destroyed. The later reputation of Bhoja, King of Dhārā, as liberal patron of science and the arts reads almost like a desperate and forlorn fantasy on how times ought to be—and once were (in the classical age)—but the 'reality' is now dependent on the whim of one man, in one minor court.[138] Dramas continued to be written, but we presume, were rarely performed—which is to say in plain language that drama was deprived of its chief distinctive characteristics, and reduced to the status of a written art. The writing of drama, deprived of the medium in which the drama comes alive, came increasingly under the dominance of the poetic styles, where ornate metaphor, difficult language, and unplayable (non-dramatic) stories dominate. But oddly enough, as drama ceased to be a living

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[136] The vexed question as to whether the author of the *kārikā* portion of the Dhvanyāloka was also Ánandavardhana is of almost no doctrinal significance, nor even of much historical significance—inasmuch as no trace of separate influence of the *kārikā* text is preserved. Abhinavagupta accepted different authorship; so does Kane, after a meticulous review of the arguments: H.S.P., pp. 162–199.

[137] See B. UPĀDHYĀYA, Royal Patronage and Sanskrit Poetics, Poona Orientalist, 1, fasc. 2, p. 13; S.N. DASGUPTA, H.S.L. Introduction, pp. c-cxvi.

[138] Supra, note 7.

art form, and was brought more and more into conformity with the rather academic style of the non-sophisticate pundit, its distinctive principle was being used as the basis for explaining the growing rapprochement of genres. 'Popular' forms of the drama survive shorn of their literary dimension: the various classical dance-forms that exploit the *abhinaya* of the drama. One apparent survival of the drama is the Kuḍiyāṭṭam of Kerala.[139]

On the side of strophic poetry, changes too were taking place, reflecting the new contexts in which poetry was used. We see growing devotionalism, and the employment of song, and also music, even marked shifts away from Sanskrit to various vernaculars. Poetry was becoming de-sophisticated (though poetry on classical lines continues to be written in an increasingly academic and un-'courtly' vein, paralleling the drama); its socially alive forms did move with the times, and came under the sway of social, inevitably popular religious, movements that were seeking new ways to express their needs. New metres, showing the impact of regular musical beats, rhyming on 'modern' lines emphasizing simple couplet phrasing so typical of song, crept into Sanskrit from the popular levels (Ardhamāgadhī *dohas* of the 8th—9th century Jain canon) achieving a complete, and for later generations, standard formulation in the one poem of Jayadeva, the Gītagovinda (12th century).[140])

The question of the genres is posed anew with all its vigour, and it is to Ānandavardhana's credit that he not only reevaluated poetics, but redefined its subject matter. The principle of non-literal intention (common to both dramatic devices and to verbal means) is found to be the third, and most characteristic function of language—*dhvani*, or "suggestion"; and that subject matter which *dhvani* is suited to express par excellence, is *rasa*. So poetry, seen as expressor, has won the status—not so much of one means of expression among many,—but *is* that means wherein the capacity of language to express is most fully, multi-valently realized; and the integrative quality of the drama, since it can never be expressed, literally, but only suggested (expressed non-denotatively), becomes the proper or typical content of that poetic capacity. The genres are downgraded to "external" classifications, and at the same time, essentially non-verbal arts, such as music and painting, can equally well be considered art, since their distinctiveness is also a matter of externals (sound, colour).

The importance of Ānandavardhaṇa's Dhvanyāloka can be understood in three ways:[141] (a) in relation to *alaṃkāraśāstra*, it offers an explanation of the

[139] See CLIFFORD R. JONES, Literary and Epigraphical References to the Cākyār-s, Custodians of Sanskrit Drama in the Temples of Kerala, Proceedings of the Honolulu Conference, I.

[140] See A.D. MUKHERJI, Lyric Metres in Jayadeva's Gītagovinda, JASB, 1967, p. 232.

[141] K. Krishnamoorthy, to whom we owe the only English translation of the Dhvanyāloka (Poona Oriental Series 92, 1955), has also devoted much effort to the theory of *dhvani*. See his Essays in Sanskrit Criticism, Dharwar 1964, and A critical estimate of Ánandavardhana's Dhvanyāloka, NIA, 8, p. 194.

vague notion of *vakrokti* (Bhāmaha) founded on a general theory of signification (rather than on a survey of the types and contexts of figuration)—it thus ties poetics into the concerns of Indian linguistic speculation; (b) in relation to the *nāṭyaśāstra*, the Dhvanyāloka offers an explicit, expressionistic, account of the *rasa* in poetry, for the first time going beyond the impressionistic analogies, founded upon the largely non-verbal context and technique of the drama;[142] and (c) it links the notions of *rasa* and *alaṃkāra* in a single coherent, if synthetic, theory of literary aesthetics.

It is the latter contribution that is most apparent to the historian: after the Dhvanyāloka, the tradition of Indian poetics appears by and large to be a single tradition, with authors either confronting, or revising the basic propositions of the Dhvanyāloka.

The Dhvanyāloka proper, a work of the late 9th century, is probably only the commentary on the *kārikā* verses, which are usually assigned (even by the Indian tradition, including Abhinavagupta) to a nameless Dhvanikāra, who may then be placed a century or two earlier. Controversy still rages on this point and there can be no settled conclusion.[143] Despite the weight of evidence favouring two authors, it is odd that the *kārikā* text, if so much earlier than the *vṛtti*, received no notice whatever in any author before Ānandavardhana. Like many of these arguments, the issue is purely chronological, and does not in any clear way influence our interpretation of the whole text, which we henceforth treat as one.

The Dhvanyāloka is something of a *tour de force*. It solves a range of problems that had arisen in certain lines of speculation by adducing principles borrowed or adapted from others: however syncretistic, its achievement must be traced not only to this happy confluence of principle, but to its recognition of the changes in the poetic context that appeared to demand a new type of speculation.

Put briefly, the linking of *vakrokti* and theories of signification (Mīmāṃsā chiefly) takes place via the notion of *dhvani*,[144] lit. "sound" or "echo" (often a synonym of *śabda*), here interpreted as an expressive function inherent in

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[142] See A. Sankaran, The Theories of Rasa and Dhvani, Madras, 1929; also De, H.S.P., II, ch. 5.

[143] Supra, note 136, and K.A. Sankaran, The Authorship of the Dhvanikārikās, PAIOC, 3, p. 85 (Ānandavardhana); S. Bhattacharya, Dhvanyāloka and the Text of the Dhvanikārikās PAIOC, 6, p. 613; K.G. Varma, Different Authorship of the Kārikāgrantha and the Vṛttigrantha of Dhvanyāloka, NIA, 5, p. 265; H. Jacobi, Introduction to his excellent German translation of Dhvanyāloka, ZDMG 1902, p. 405ff.; K.C. Pandey, Abhinavagupta, ²Varanasi 1963, pp. 202ff. (accepts identity of authorship); K. Krishnamoorthy, Authorship of Dhvanyāloka and Ānandavardhana's date and works, IHQ, 24, p. 180, 300.

[144] L. Renou, Le dhvani dans la poétique Sanskrite, Adyar Library Bulletin, 18, p. 6; K. Krishnamoorthy, Germs of the Theory of Dhvani, ABORI, 28, p. 190; K. Kunjunni Raja, Theory of Suggestion in Indian Semantics, ALB, 19, p. 20.

language and different from other recognized functions *(vṛttis)* (chapter I);[145] the *rasa* is linked to poetic diction via a meticulously worked out set of examples that show the *rasa* expressively functional in every discrete stratum of linguistic analysis, from phoneme *(varṇa)* to argument (*oratio, prabandha*) (chapter III). The important, if understated, points in this exposé, are two: the *rasa* is in all language universally, and not merely in terms of the speaker's intention or the hearer's wit; and also, that the *rasa*, unlike any other postulated expressive content *(artha)*, runs through the entire gamut of linguistic discreteness: unlike "intention" *(tātparya)* it may be determined in a single phoneme (though the examples really involve morpheme ambiguity, as the *-au* is the locative singular ending of both *i-* and *u-* stem nouns); unlike "denotation" *(abhidhā)* it may be determined in strings of propositions (*mahāvākya*, or *prabandha*)—finessing even the Prabhākara view that a single *vākya* is prior in understanding to its component "words".

The core of the Dhvanyāloka is its second *uddyota* (chapter II) in which the sub-types of this novel expressive function, *dhvani*, are discriminated on the basis of its nature (vis-à-vis the other expressive functions or *vṛttis (abhidhā, lakṣaṇā,* and according to some *gauṇī* and *tātparya)*[146]) rather than its linguistic tokens. By "nature" of course is centrally involved an appeal to meaning *(artha)*, but since in one sense the "meaning" of any function is the same, that sense being content *per se* (as my "love" for Juliet can be expressed literally, or by indirection, or by suggestion without modifying the fact), the distinctive quality of "meaning" as competent to characterize *dhvani* and only *dhvani* will have to do with its mode of apprehension. It is this issue (captioned *śabdabodha* in the later treatises) that situates the poetic problem crucially—in an area distinguished on the one hand from the linguistic token of expression *(śabda)*, viewed as means in the instrumental sense, and on the other from content, or *artha* in the external sense. The Dhvanyāloka, in defining a new area for poetic speculation, has really done little more than reinterpret a long-standing concern of the Mīmāṃsā; it is in this area, where the Vedic injunctions, the optative or quasi-optative tokens are synthesized according to principles of coherence and intention, into *mahāvākyas* competent to refer to the gross content of the Veda, namely the obligatory sacrifices and other ritual acts of the Vedic tradition, that the peculiar and indeed irreplaceable function of the Mīmāṃsā is to be located.[147]

How the mode of apprehending a *dhvani*-based meaning differs from that of another *vṛtti* is largely explained in terms of the other *vṛttis*, which are taken for granted. Only two primary expressive powers are universally re-

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[145] L. Renou, On primary and secondary meanings in Sanskrit (in Hindi), Hindianuśīlan, special number, Prayāg, pp. 298–304; K.K. Raja, Indian Theories of Meaning, Madras 1963.

[146] K.K. Raja, op. cit.

[147] See Gerow, G.I.F.S., pp. 48–50. The first problem that Mīmāṃsā has is justifying its own reasonableness: *adhikaraṇa* 1: *svādhyāyo 'dhyetavyaḥ*.

cognized in the word; one of course is denotation *(abhidhā) ex hypothesi*, the other covers that range of usage where there is comprehension (*ergo* a power operating) in the presence of an explicit malfunction of denotation: secondary or metaphorical signification: *lakṣaṇā*, as in the standard example "the grandstands are cheering", which joins an inanimate subject with an animate-only action, or the older Mīmāṃsaka problem "the rocks are swimming; the trees attend on the sacrifice". These examples are interpreted in various ways; it will be obvious that *lakṣaṇā* presumes *abhidhā*, in principle (for it is its failure that occasions the problem), and that also in fact *abhidhā* is used, for "grandstands", "trees", "rocks" etc. are all understood in rather the way Aristotle defined metaphor, as *tatsambandhi-*, something satisfying logical and denotative requirements having a relationship with the thing named: people in the grandstands; the water is moving so fast that the rocks appear to be moving upstream; so enchanting is the sacrifice that even trees (though inanimate) appear to be following it. Many kinds of relation are possible: connection, opposition, or (as the third example shows) attribution of contrary or similar qualities. An *a fortiori* argument *(arthāpatti)* appears to be involved.

The *dhvani*, in function and terms, is the other meaning that may be attested along with one or the other preceding types; but since it is other, it cannot be explained as having come to be through the same process as the base type, but must in fact involve the base type in its mode of apprehension. The *dhvani* then is a kind of 'tertiary' apprehension compatible both with the presence *(vivakṣitavācya)* and the absence *(avivakṣitavācya)* of denotation (this alone suggests that *dhvani*, if the genus is admitted, cannot be identified with *lakṣaṇā*). The former is 'based on' *abhidhā*; the latter, on *lakṣaṇā* (1,13 Comm.).

How this other meaning is possible is the issue raised in chapter I of the Dhvanyāloka; its resolution is both traditional[148] and philosophical[149]; that possibility, in chapter II, is grounded on a theory of the expressive function that links the domains of *kāvya*—viz. *alaṃkāras*, with *nāṭya*—and its differentiae, the *rasas*. A *dhvani* or suggested meaning based on but different from *lakṣaṇā* *(lakṣyārtha)* is either derived from the *lakṣitārtha* (the case of sarcasm, for example) or is compatible only with its opposite (irony).

The type of *dhvani* that is not incompatible with and hence founded on the primary expressive function *(abhidhā)* is the key both to the understanding of the Dhvanyāloka and to an appreciation of its unique syncretism. Its two varieties are discussed in the bulk of chapter II: 2,2–19; 20–30. The inescapable problem in positing a verbal function called "suggestion" consists in demonstrating that the further meanings we apprehend (and indubitably do) in poetic (and certain other) utterances are uniquely dependent on verbal operations (viz. grammatical) rather than on some other-levelled mental function, such as logic or dialectic.

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148 As present in any *kāvya*: 1,13ff.
149 As implied by former theories of poetry: 1,1ff.

Psychologically the problem is quite the reverse, for it appears that this 'poetic' domain is far more natural to language than the scientific and univocal uses that in high culture forms assume more importance. Both historically and in terms of everyday usage (where practical concerns are not paramount—as in the banter of working-men) poetry (Homer, Veda) seems prior, and it is denotation *(abhidhā)* that later is 'discovered'. The needs of explicitude are perhaps first felt as traditional conflict resolving systems are raised to the level of self-conscious legal systems (Solon, Manu).[150]

The contention that one of the natural functions of language is associated with poetic and non-declaratory utterance in effect resolves the historical-scientific paradox, but it remains a mere contention unless it can be shown that there is an essentially different mode of apprehension associated with 'poetic' as opposed to 'scientific' meaning. Instead of an abstruse discursive argument the Dhvanyāloka offers here one of the boldest reductions in the history of Indian aesthetics, one that in its concrete simplicity fuses the heretofore separate 'schools' of *kāvya* and *nāṭya* poetics. The best way to show that there was a difference in manner inherent in poetic comprehension would be to show that there is a distinctive kind of meaning otherwise inapprehensible. Instead of "manner" based on the presumption that all concrete "meaning" (or content) is indifferent to the modes of its apprehension (a common sense view that holds the univocal proposition "I love her" not different in content from its poetic counterpart, the poem), we argue content; and it is asserted that the one content that can never be apprehended through a declarative or denotative utterance is precisely that that had heretofore been reserved to the study of *nāṭya* as its differentia: the emotional response to the work of art, the *rasa*.

The *rasa* is an affect in the psychological sense, is therefore a content only in a secondary sense, as requiring a substantive or primary content (actions, character, words) as the basis of response; it cannot therefore be a part of that basis in any real sense. While I can say "love", I evoke no sense of "loving" by so doing; that takes the play: situation, excitant, consequence: a sense of the ineluctible human presence.

The content, so to speak, of drama, is integrated into poetic as establishing *a fortiori* the mode of apprehension most proper to poetry. The affective response is thus linked with the non-denotative utterance: not accidentally, as an attribute of a content itself poetic[151], but essentially, and simultaneously with the content that is apprehended through other modes and thus is not (as such) poetic. The co-existence of poetic *(dhvani)* modes of apprehension with others (*abhidhā* etc.) thus becomes not an obstacle to the theory, but a token of the complexity of language and of the paradigmatic essential character of poetry itself.

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[150] An idea suggested by my colleague, James Redfield.

[151] *rasavad alaṃkāra.*

What happens to drama in this reduction? Is it meant that drama becomes the "best" poetry? We noted that the Sanskrit drama, shorn of its sophisticated patronage, its stable milieu ravaged by frequent social upheavals, became increasingly a literary form. Such a genre-reduction is not intended by Ānandavardhana; for him at least, it is a form of *kāvya* that deserves the accolade "best"—that form wherein the *dhvani*-function is itself the chief object of interest, where it—(by a not unambiguous application of the Mīmāṃsā notion of "primacy" *prādhānyam)*—may be said to be the "main" or chiefly intended mode of apprehension involved. One must speak of "primacy", for given the analysis of speech, the *dhvani* cannot come unalloyed by other functions. Where the *dhvani* as function is primary, its most characteristic content, then, the *rasa*, is by definition what the best poetry is about; since the content, in this case, is proper to the function, its apprehension is simultaneous, instantaneous (*asaṃlakṣyakrama* [2,3]); but because *rasa* is an affect it is always accompanied by a content that can properly be said in some sense to be indicated (that is to say a content in the usual sense, a "meaning"). While not asserting that this true content overwhelms the *dhvani* (the case was covered under the first division of suggestion, where the meanings of the two functions are separable and *dhvani* is subservient), the theory nevertheless allows that this prior content (usually either a state of affairs, *vastu*, or a figure of speech, *alaṃkāra*) be apprehended also, which is to say, not at the same moment (*saṃlakṣyakrama* [2,12]) as the primary *dhvani*, and hence inevitably, as a function of the *dhvani*. Thanks to this proviso the character of the utterance as *dhvani*-primary is not affected, and the richness of the resultant poetry is enhanced by reconciling the *dhvani* with the multifarious content of poetry. The theory of tripartite verbal function *(abhidhā, lakṣaṇā, dhvani)* would if pressed appear to terminate in the paradox that the best poetry (where *dhvani* is the function and *rasa* the "content") cannot have any prior content at all, or at best will have a merely adventitious content (in the sense that an affect needs logically some basis). While this would neatly turn the original view of *rasa* in poetry on its head (where the *rasa* was the adventitious element: *rasavat alaṃkāra*), it does not satisfy the justified common-sense notion that the prior content *(vibhāvas* and *anubhāvas* in *nāṭya; vastu* and *alaṃkāra* in *kāvya)* is somehow crucially related to the poetic message and effect. The theory of Ānandavardhana, by espousing a grammatical doctrine of signification, and by defining the many-levelled structure of meaning in language, is able in this most crucial "type" of poetry—*rasa-dhvani*—to relate affect and content directly, as optimally functioning language. The denotative level persists and is not cancelled; a further "content" is suggested via that denotation, which suggestion turns out to promote primarily the stable *rasa* as well.

The Dhvanyāloka appears to bring *kāvya* under the aegis of the dramatic *rasa* theory; but in fact it does the reverse: *rasa* is reduced to a peculiar kind of content in an overarching theory of poetry, a poetry that *ipso facto* is

dramatic poetry. Culturally, this development coincides not only with the collapse of *nāṭya* as a performance-medium, but with the emergence of new styles of poetry, sung and danced, that are still associated with the devotional cults of medieval theistic Hinduism. By offering an intellectually serious defence of dramatic poetry, the Dhvanyāloka bridges the gap between classical and medieval; terminates the former and becomes the basis for later speculation.

The key to this revision, reflecting the change in content and style of the poetry, is the new concern for capacities of language *(śakti, vṛtti)*. By adaptation of the old grammatical doctrine of *abhidhā* and *lakṣaṇā*,[152] Ānandhavardhana was able to relocate the poetic problem in the widest context of language use—to see poetry as language itself—rather than in the circumscribed area of forms of assertion *(arthālaṃkāra)*. Though the basic hypothesis of the two approaches is not all that different, involving a preference for non-denotative utterance, the former leads us in the direction of emotionally dominant poetry (*rasa* and dramatic poetry) while the latter seems unable to transcend the probably too sophisticated notion that *śleṣa* is the summum of poetic expression. In any case, speculation on the *vṛttis* of language becomes a central concern of later poeticians—beginning with two writers who denied the function *dhvani* itself: Kuntaka and Mahimabhaṭṭa.

9. *After the Dhvanyāloka*

Indian poetics, after the Dhvanyāloka, changes its focus substantially without radically modifying the structure of its problematic. Instead of 'schools' of poetics, wherein we find addressed the problems of aesthetic comprehension of distinct genres of expression *(kāvya, nāṭya)*, we are confronted with a set of discrete problems that every author, in some way, attempts to resolve. A certain amount of syncretism is evident; yet in the main, the basic intellectual antitheses of the pre-*dhvani* poetics (if we include the *purāṇas*) continue remarkably vigorous.

(a) The interest in *alaṃkāra*, or briefly, in the formal expressive repertoire of the poet, as practitioner of a different and uniquely intelligible kind of language, continues through a group of writers who not only dwell on figuration to some extent (Appaya Dīkṣita, Jagannātha) but are greatly concerned

[152] One of the earliest works on this subject, the Abhidhāvṛttimātṛkā, of Mukula (teacher of Pratīhārendurāja, q. v.), was in all likelihood known to Ānandavardhana (De, H.S.P., I, p. 74). It influenced later writers, including Mammaṭa, who wrote a similar work (op. cit., p. 148). By this time it already seems that poetics is a subject reserved to Kashmir. See S.P. Bhattacharya, Impress of Kasmiri Śaivism on Alaṃkāraśāstra, Journal of Or. Inst., Baroda, 1, p. 245.

at identifying in grammatical and logical terms that dimension of language that makes figuration possible (Mahimā, Kuntaka). Though the *dhvani* as a function is not universally accepted by this group, all the writers confront the issue of grammatical or syntactic function *(vṛtti)* and attempt to define "poetry" in non-emotional *(rasa)* terms.

(b) The neo-*rasa* psychologists. The *rasa* likewise survives—in a form not restricted to genre analysis (the Dhvanyāloka seems effectively to have terminated this type of reasoning in India)—but rather is generalized as a principle of appreciation by a brilliant series of writers—Abhinavagupta (commentator on both the Dhvanyāloka and the Nāṭyaśāstra (Locana, Abhinavabhāratī)), Śāradātanaya, Rūpagosvāmin and others who recognize poetry as a kind of meaning carrier with a unique effect on the receptive mind *(sahṛdaya)*. The concern is not so much with expressive device as with the whole in which the poem makes sense: these writers explore links not with grammar and *mīmāṃsā* exegetics, but with reality theories and the prescriptive morality of the Indian socio-philosophies, especially Vedānta.

(c) The pre-*dhvani* 'purāṇic' tradition (if it may be so dignified)—recognized in the compilations of the Viṣṇudharmottara and Agni Purāṇas—also continues in a much more sophisticated vein in the works of Rājaśekhara and Bhojarāja—works so bizarre that they are difficult to include in the history of any subject, especially poetics. They seem to be inclusive encyclopaedias of poetic lore without any overall attempt at coherence, or even organization. They deal with many topics not considered by more conservative writers, and Bhoja especially testifies to a kind of reckless aggrandizement of the subject that is nevertheless of extraordinary value for its novel approach and commentary on other (often non-poetic) subjects. Though huge, these works can also be breathtakingly reductivist—witness Bhoja's effort to reduce all *rasas* to one: *śṛṅgāra*, love.

(d) A large number of works remain that do not easily fall into these groups: works that are encyclopaedic, yet propound at least verbally, a theory of the unity of artistic expression—often *rasa*. These works by subject are most clearly related to the pre-*dhvani* poetics—treating of the entire range of previously defined issues: *doṣa*, *guṇa*, *alaṃkāra* (always a major topic), *dhvani* and *rasa*—even *rīti*. The *vṛttis* also figure prominently. It is of course not their subjects that make these works novel, it is their point of view. The deservedly famous Kāvyaprakāśa of Mammaṭa both originates this style of poetic, and serves as a model for the later practitioners (though with considerable variation): Ruyyaka, Hemacandra, the Vāgbhaṭas, Viśvanātha.

It would not be correct to designate these strands of post-*dhvani* poetic speculation as 'schools', for the emphases presume an interwoven content that forms a common background for most authors. Concern for *alaṃkāra* is implied both by an interest in *vṛtti* and in the systematic writers; *rasa* is analyzed both by the psychologists and *paurāṇikas*—and included within the scope of the systematists.

The lines of inquiry that we have classified in a-c above emerged from a period of intense speculation of nearly two centuries that followed the writing of the Dhvanyāloka. The works were often of men who not only were contemporaries but who knew each other and reacted to each other. Though each problematic finds its adepts in later centuries as well (Jagannātha, Rūpa, etc.), the issues were at least defined in this early seminal period of response: Rājaśekhara, Abhinavagupta, Kuntaka, Bhoja, Dhanaṃjaya, Mahimabhaṭṭa and others confronted the import and growing fame of the Dhvanyāloka. It is possible to see our group (d), as the (inevitable?) systematists' response to this period of fermentation just described.

Other works remain that seem less "poetic" than pedagogical: inventories of figures and other technical terminology (Candrāloka of Jayadeva) or frankly practical advice to the academic poet: the *kaviśikṣā* works typified by the Aucityavicāracarcā of Kṣemendra. The former have often achieved great popularity, especially when commented upon (Kuvalayānanda of Appayadīkṣita); the latter owe much to the atypical Kāvyamīmāṃsā of Rājaśekhara.[153]

10. *Rājaśekhara*

The Kāvyamīmāṃsā[154] is the first datable work to follow the Dhvanyāloka. No more striking contrast is found in the history of Indian poetics. Many writers express doubt that the Kāvyamīmāṃsā is properly considered a 'poetic' work at all[155]; the fame of the author, and what is rarer, the definite historical personality he has acquired, make it impossible to exclude him. The work is in the purāṇic tradition of poetic speculation, and marks the emergence of Agni-Purāṇa-like anecdotalism into respectable academic format; though Bhoja is not uniquely indebted to Rājaśekhara, he may be said to have carried the style-format to its 'logical' (scil. anti-logical) conclusion. Rājaśekhara, like other authors, is copied extensively by Hemacandra[156].

Rājaśekhara, who quotes Ānandavardhana, is himself cited in the Yaśastilaka, dated about 960 A.D.; his literary activity is thus quite tightly circumscribed to the first half of the tenth century, and probably to be associated with Yuvarāja I of the Kalacuri dynasty in Cedi. He is known chiefly as a poet, author of four extant dramas, including the Prākrta Karpūramañjarī. His command of Prākrit is unexcelled; he seems also to have developed consider-

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153 De, H.S.P., II, p. 291.

154 See V. Raghavan, Rājaśekhara and his Kāvyamīmāṃsā, Journal of Oriental Research, Madras, 37, p. 1ff.; also the excellent French translation (with Introduction) by L. Renou and N. Stchoupak (Cahiers de la Société Asiatique, 8, 1946); résumé Kane, H.S.P., pp. 209–10.

155 E.g. De, H.S.P., II, p. 297.

156 De, H.S.P., I, p. 118.

able interest in the circumstantial variety of the India of his time—a trait he shares with Kālidāsa: his knowledge of geography is remarkable. Furthermore, he seems to have been quite interested in himself, preserving more biographical information in his works than is normal; and finally, we might say, his crest-jewel was his wife, the famous Avantisundarī, whose poetry he cites with respect.[157]

The Kāvyamīmāṃsā, though an extensive work of 18 chapters[158], does not deal directly with those topics that had come to be considered central to the poetic problem (*guṇas*, *alaṃkāras* or *rasas*)—the problem of *kāvya*—rather it is chiefly devoted to the *kavi*, or poet himself, which leads De to consider it a work simply of *kaviśikṣā*[159], a work on the education or training of the poet. While the contrast is inevitable, the Kāvyamīmāṃsā is far more than just 'advice' to the aspiring poet[160]. The Kāvyamīmāṃsā is that *rarissimum opus* in the Indian tradition that concerns itself with the circumstances of an activity rather than with the product of an activity; given the normative thing-to-be-created (it seems to say) what kinds of arrangements are conducive to that end? From daily schedules to the appropriateness of plagiarism (also dealt with in Dhvanyāloka, 4th uddyota[161]), it measures the author against the presumed standard and result of his work. This work is concerned then with the prerequisites of poetry, rather than with poetry *per se*, and provides us a valuable insight into the Indian version of a distinction that much vexes us: the psychology of individual poetic activity. But far from seeing the work emerge from a 'free' play of independent subjectivity, the Indian 'psychologist', to whom the work is given in a set of normative expectations, proceeds to tie down the 'subjective' component in an almost Pavlovian manner. From this point of view, Rājaśekhara is an absolutely essential contributor to the formulation of the Indian poetic tradition, more valuable for his rarity and iconoclasm. In effect, he develops into an entire work that usual and conventional prolegomenon of *śāstra* wherein the purposes (money, fame, etc.) and prerequisites *(pratibhā, vyutpatti, abhyāsa)* of poetry are stated.[162]

Pratīhārendurāja, ca. 925–950: Though known only for his commentary on Udbhaṭa, this writer seems to have held independent views on the role of *rasa*, and to have been an important teacher in the Kāśmīra tradition.[163]

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157 KM. (GOS 1), p. 16; KANE, H.S.P., p. 211–6.

158 As are most purāṇas!

159 II, pp. 291ff.

160 DE, S.P.S.A., p. 76.

161 A key problem in a tradition where inspiration is less of a desideratum (though necessary) than acceptance of a norm (unavoidable). See K. KRISHNAMOORTHY, Ānandavardhana's treatment of Pratibhā in relation to Dhvani, ABORI, 31, p. 143.

162 Kāvyaprakāśa 1 *inter alia*.

163 Though usually distinguished from the roughly contemporary Bhaṭṭendurāja, Abhinava's guru: KANE, H.S.P., p. 205; DE, H.S.P., I., p. 74; contra, K.C. PANDEY, Abhinavagupta, pp. 74, 142.

Himself a student of Mukula, the first writer on the *vṛttis*[164], he had for a long time the distinction of having his view on the preeminence of *rasa* incorporated into the text of Udbhaṭa's Kāvyālaṃkārasārasaṃgraha[165]. He was apparently one of the first writers to attempt to reformulate or reapply the conclusion of the *dhvani* theory (which he fully accepts) to the older poetics, specifically the view of *rasaprādhānyam*. Several other ideas expressed in the Commentary identify him as a novel, and important writer, but quite unreliable as an interpreter of Udbhaṭa. He seems to have migrated from his native Koṅkana to Kaśmīra to learn the *alaṃkāra śāstra*, illustrating the central place of Kashmir in the speculation of this period.[166]

11. *Kuntaka and Dhanaṃjaya*

Kuntaka. Kuntaka makes no direct reference to the doctrine of the Dhvanyāloka. His work is one of the most independently conceived in the history of Indian poetics. It may be considered not so much a reply to the *dhvani* theory (as Mahimabhaṭṭa's) as an independent effort to deal with the same problem: the grammatical basis of non-literal utterance; Kuntaka's solution, though unique, is considerably less radical than that of the Dhvanyāloka, indeed seems to summarize admirably the presumptions of the early *alaṃkāra* school: taking the term *vakrokti* "evasive speech" from Bhāmaha, Kuntaka elaborates the notion of non-literal utterance in two parallel ways that in effect generalize the claims of the *ālaṃkārika* theorists without limiting the argument to *alaṃkāras* only. In effect, the *alaṃkāra* method is here applied to the entire range of poetic concepts, including *rasa*.[167]

In the first place, Kuntaka links the *vakrokti* quite carefully to its effect (in this way seeming to respond to a *rasa*-concern) on the audience, using such terms as *vicchitti*, *vaicitryam*, making clear that a "striking or charming apprehension" is a principle that must qualify the bare figure as non-literal speech: he thus 'solves' the problem that much taxes the older *ālaṃkārikas*: for figures have many non-poetic exemplifications and even poetic ones can become stylized and quasi-literal ("he hit the nail on the head").[168] In the other direction, Kuntaka finds the notion of 'figure' too narrow a base for a grammatical explanation of *vakrokti*. Figures, in the older school were, if *ārtha*, propositions of a certain sort, and thus fell under the grammatical category of

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164 Supra, note 152.

165 Ed. M.R. TELANG, Kāvyamālā, 1905, p. 77; cf. DE, H.S.P., II, p. 59; I. p. 77–8.

166 DE, H.S.P., II, p. 58.

167 De's "Introduction" to his edition of the Vakroktijīvita is essential, esp. pp. xv–lxi (third edition, Calcutta 1961).

168 The idea is adumbrated at Dhvanyāloka 1,16.

the sentence *(vākya)*; if *śābda*, they were treated primarily as unnatural regularities in phoneme *(varṇa)* recurrence or feature recurrence. Only a few figures, for example, could be said to involve the morpheme (*lāṭānuprāsa*, a variety of alliteration). Using the six-fold Pāṇinean cum Mīmāṃsaka analysis of utterance into levels or constituents: *varṇa* (phoneme), *padapūrvārdha* (or *prakṛti*, stem), *pratyaya* (affix), *vākya* (assertion, sentence), *prakaraṇa* (topic) and *prabandha* (work or composition), he demonstrates the *vakrokti* in every conceivable dimension of utterance.[169] His quarrel with the *ālaṃkārikas* is thus not one of principle, but one of generality. He continues to deal with *vakrokti* in contextual terms (audience, *vidagdha* ("clever, knowing"); and grammatical scope), and does not confront the basic question of expressive capacity itself: *vṛtti*. In the Dhvanyāloka this second issue is faced squarely, and despite its elegance and sensitivity and exemplification, Kuntaka's work was judged uninteresting by the later tradition[170].

Dhanaṃjaya (924–996). Just as Kuntaka is in one way the end of the older *alaṃkāra* tradition and at the beginning of the neo-*alaṃkāra* speculation, this writer seems to occupy an analogous place in the older *nāṭya*-centered *rasa* tradition. His Daśarūpa(ka) is an admirable summary of just those elements of the *informe* Nāṭyaśāstra that concern the form and aesthetic purpose of the drama. It has for all later writers replaced the *śāstra*. It deals, in four chapters, with the topics (broadly speaking) body or plot *(itivṛtta, aṅga)*, character (*nāyaka* etc.), genre (the ten types of *rūpaka*, *nāṭaka* etc.) and aesthetic response (*rasa*, *bhāva* etc.). One is aware of both what the Daśarūpa does, and what it does not. Missing is the entire range of problems having to do with production: *abhinaya*, elocution *(alaṃkāra)*, staging—establishing rather positively the sense in which the dramatic art had become *kāvya* by the 10th century. Likewise, Dhanaṃjaya seems uninfluenced by the specifics of the *dhvani*-theory (postulating *dhvani* as a function to unite *kāvya* and *nāṭya*), while being quite aware of the present improbability of separating the genres. He rather accepts Bhaṭṭanāyaka's *bhāvakatva* as the function whereby *rasa* is conveyed in *kāvya* (according to his commentator Dhanika, a close contemporary[171]—being a kind of surrogate to the *prima facie* functionalism of the Nāṭyaśāstra *per se*, whereby *vibhāvas* etc. (the visible actions and scenes of the play) provoke the sense of *rasa* in the audience.[172] In other words, the

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169 Cf. Rudraṭa's treatment of the *śabdālaṃkāra*, supra.

170 Recovered only recently by De (supra, note 167); Kuntaka was probably a contemporary of Abhinavagupta, whose Locana on Dhvanyāloka was instrumental in promoting the *dhvani* theory, to the eclipse of other points of view (Kane, H.S.P., pp. 235–6; De, H.S.P., I, p. 128). Both were likely Kāśmīra (the title Rājānaka), but few scholars see evidence that they knew each other's works.

171 De, H.S.P., I, p. 123–5; probably Dhanaṃjaya's younger brother, and not as Jacobi thought (Göttingische Gelehrte Anzeigen, 1913, p. 303) a mere pseudonym. His commentary *ad* 4,37 is at issue here.

172 Ibid. *ad* 4,36.

problem that the Dhvanikāra presumed to deal with is not yet in focus: the need to formulate a comprehensive principle of expression for *nāṭya* and *kāvya* was not admitted.[173] Dhanaṃjaya has some distinction in not being from Kaśmīra, but from central India[174] at the court of Paramāra Muñja.

12. *Abhinavagupta (ca. 1000 A.D.).*

The investigation of the relation between concrete structure ("form") and the *rasa*-awareness is the aesthetic *chef d'oeuvre* of the Kāśmīra Śaivite Abhinavagupta,[175] and is chiefly expressed in his long commentary on the *rasaniṣpatti-sūtra* of Bharata[176]. His predecessors had put forth theories that would establish the relation in some determinate way. Abhinava sums up these theories (most of which are otherwise not independently preserved) as an introduction to his quite radical view that no determinate relation is expressible, for the *rasa* is more real and more persistent than any of its so-called causes—has been there all along, in other words.

The first theory mentioned is that of Bhaṭṭalollaṭa,[177] who espoused the commonsensical view that the conjunction *(saṃyoga)* of structural elements, which he took to imply "with the *sthāyibhāva*" was the cause *(kāraṇa)* of the *rasa* (as effect: *kārya*). Two stages in this cause and effect theory are recognized: first the preconditions *(vibhāva)* of an emotional experience (including stage set, characters, poetic phrases, etc.) combine to generate the notion of the concrete emotion involved (love, anger, pity, etc.); then this last, by combination with the external consequences of the concrete emotion (*anubhāva*—fainting, stuttering, tears, shouting), through the medium of temporary emotional states *(vyabhicāribhāva)* (sadness, hope, joy, etc.)—becomes the *rasa: sthāyy eva vibhāvānubhāvādibhir upacito rasaḥ.*[178]

[173] Dhanika explicitly rejects the view that *śānta rasa* is possible in drama. He is thus still faithful to Bharata, and not convinced of the propriety of the generic collapse implied by the Dhvanyāloka. See K.C. Pandey. Dhanañjaya and Abhinavagupta on Śāntarasa, PAIOC, 12, p. 326 and supra, note 119. The Daśarūpa has been translated with an Introduction by G.O. Haas (Indo-Iranian Series, New York 1912) but his views are "unreliable" (De, H.S.P., I, p. 124, 126).

[174] Mālava: De, I, p. 121.

[175] See K.C. Pandey's monograph Abhinavagupta (2nd ed.) Varanasi 1963, for a detailed account of his life and thought. Pandey's views often suffer exception however by our authorities, Kane and De.

[176] Supra, note 127; GOS edition, vol. 36, pp. 272–87: translated by R. Gnoli, The Aesthetic Experience according to Abhinavagupta (SOR vol. 11). Cf. also S.K. De, The Theory of Rasa, in Some Problems . . ., pp. 177ff. and M. Hiriyanna, "Art Experience", Mysore, 1954 (supra, note 119), also K.C. Pandey, Abhinavagupta's Theory of Meaning, NIA, 5, p. 241.

[177] See J. Prabhakara Sastri, Lollaṭa's Theory of Rasa, JOIB 15, p. 157; Abhinavabhāratī, p. 272; De on this section of the Bhārati: H.S.P., II, pp. 117–138.

[178] Ibid.

The second theory (of Śrīśaṅkuka)[179] recognizes the inadequacy of the first (in Abhinava's eyes) and goes beyond it to a better formulation. The notion of cause-effect is really too powerful to explain the emergence of *rasa*-awareness. It presumes a realistic determination (thus ignoring that the play is in an important sense a 'fiction' whereas its 'effect' is real) and more importantly is subject to constraints of logical necessity which simply do not hold in the case of fiction, where we often have causes without effect and effects without cause. Śrīśaṅkuka replaces *kāryakāraṇabhāva* (relation of cause and effect) with the familiar notion of imitation *(anukaraṇa)* according to which one may infer the *rasa* from the wholly fictive portrayal on the stage. *Rasa* is, in fact, this inference ("a state of knowing") based on imitation. This notion, though clear enough to have dominated Western aesthetics for 2,300 years, is unsound, according to Abhinava's teacher Bhaṭṭatauta,[180] because it too is overtly realistic, and also psychologically untenable. In no true sense can it be said that any of those involved in the drama—the audience, the players, or even the critics—are imitating anything. "Imitation" involves an awareness that one is not something else (which one imitates), and this kind of awareness, according to Tauta (and implicitly approved by Abhinava) is wholly incompatible with the kind of awareness that proceeds from the drama—an awareness characterized by a thorough immersion in the events of the play, so thorough that the audience, the players—even the 'critics'—lose all sense of their separate psychological identities (as being a member of the audience, or a person so-and-so, or being here and now) limited by individual and concrete needs, hungers, memories . . .). So long as the audience remains on this 'false' level of awareness, the events of the play will seem disjoint from his life, "out there"—a representation of reality: the awareness of the play remains discrete and other. So 'imitation' really explains what is unsuccessful in the play rather than what is successful. This paradox can be overcome only by recognizing the elements of the play as already determined in this overwhelming sense of absorption which we all recognize in ourselves as transcending concrete experience and selfconsciousness. In effect, the events of the play are not even understood as such-and-such (Rāma, the historical king, etc.) but are already reformulated in this specifically dramatic awareness as "What Rāma has in common with ourselves: lover, husband, aspirer after beauty . . ."

Bhaṭṭanāyaka, though earlier in time than Tauta[181] and not in the *guruparamparā* of Abhinavagupta, already seems to have expressed the positive implications of Tauta's criticism of *rasa* as imitation[182]: that the structural elements enter into consciousness already as generalized (in the sense spoken of

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[179] Ibid. p. 272–3; his view seems to have been the "common-sense" view in India, too: cf. Daśarūpaka 1,7.

[180] Ibid. p. 274–6: *asmadupādhyāyāḥ*.

[181] De, H.S.P., I, p. 41; pp. 111–12.

[182] As recounted by Abhinava after discussing the views of his teacher: p. 276–7.

above: (*sādhāraṇīkṛta*), and that the percipient state of the audience, players, and the like, is in effect their common experience (expressed via the Indian notion of *vāsanā*, or incipient capacity to experience some thing as such-and-such[183]) their capacity to love or hate—shared with all men in virtue of their being human—and not their loving or hating this or that person (determined love or hate, or what is the same thing, circumstantial love and hate, where time and place are crucial factors in the realization). Which is to say, in effect, that the *rasa* is a form of general emotional consciousness, similar to the *ātman* itself (and like the *ātman* rarely experienced as such but rather as determined personally and temporally). The play becomes a unique medium for the statement of "pure" emotional consciousness[184]—still the *ātman* is not experienced in its wholly pure state, but is still coloured by shadings of general emotional oppositions: love: hate, etc. But Nāyaka's attempt to formulate a generative relationship between structure and effect *(rasa)* in terms of his insightful psychology is unacceptable to Abhinava, for Nāyaka attributes a novel function to the play *(bhāvakatva)*, in order to "explain" why the *rasa* is what it is in the audience. Here he has to resort to second 'function'—whose only purpose, apparently, is to express the *rasa* as a product of the first, in that sensitized audience. He calls it *bhogīkaraṇa*—making susceptible to enjoyment. Further these functions appear to apply to the play only for Nāyaka still clings to the *ālaṃkārika* view that *rasa* in *kāvya* is a subordinate element only: *kāvye 'ṃśatvaṃ na rūpatā*[185]. The circularity and imperspicuousness of these novel "functions" hardly need comment. The "new" function, *bhogīkaraṇa*, merely restates the problem, by verbalizing the difficulty as its own solution: that the *rasa* is enjoyment no one doubts, but how does enjoyment come about? come out of what is often quite hateful, and by definition philosophically neutral and generalized?[186]

Abhinavagupta accepts the negative elements of Tauta's criticism and Nāyaka's positive résumé, while trying to give a more convincing rationale for the effective relation (in the dramatic as well as the poetic context) of these quite remarkable abstractions.

Instead of positing a new 'function,' the transition from concrete awareness to *rasa* (which, following Tauta and Nāyaka, we accept as generalized emotional consciousness) is clarified by examining the role of a temporal process in this

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[183] In the Vedānta, explaining the vehicle of transmigration: Nāyaka however, having adopted a special function *(bhāvanā)* operating in just this sense, does not need the *vāsanā*: Abhinava *ad* Dhvanyāloka 1, 1 p. 78–9 (edited by S. Kuppuswami Sastri, Madras 1944).

[184] This creative capacity of the play is called *bhāvanā*, a "function" peculiar to the work as art, and also accepted by Dhanaṃjaya.

[185] Abhinava *ad* Dhvanyāloka, ibid., p. 78. Thus *bhogīkaraṇa* may implicitly be another effort to account for the 'peculiarity' of drama (cf. the *śānta rasa* controversy: supra, note 119). See also De, S.P.S.A., pp. 59–61.

[186] Nāyaka was influenced by the Sāṃkhya: De, H.S.P., II, p. 124, 183; but this 'explanation' resembles more a *mīmāṃsaka* arguing an *apūrva*!

'realization.' All of the previously examined theories, realistic or idealistic, have taken for granted the consequence of the *rasa* experience. And indeed there is a sense in which the play causes the *rasa*—as prior cause and posterior effect. But Abhinava asserts that the truth of the relationship is obscured rather than clarified by considering the matter on this level primarily—for as long as *rasa* is considered an effect, that is to say, determined in a temporal process, its being will be wholly inexplicable; rather, we must turn the play upside down to understand it—the *rasa* is more real than the play which 'caused' it.[187] We may have to resort again to the convenient Aristotelian distinctions: the play is not a 'cause' in the sense of an efficient cause, but rather is a precondition, whose relationship to the 'end'—the *rasa*—is merely hypothetical; the play is a cause then only in the sense of the material cause, and it displays the necessity of any potential in relation to the actual that is its goal and realization. All that seems to happen—in the theatre—is that the play permits the spectator to clarify the implicitude of his emotional propensities—propensities which he brought to the theatre with him and which he will take away again; for these emotional dispositions are the very ground of his sentimental or worldly life—they are what make it possible to feel such-and-such in the context of this or that determinate situation.[188] Of course these propensities are present in everyday life as well—in this sense the play does not seem to differ radically from the world we live in—and the peculiar character of art resides only in the manner of determination; from this derives the uniqueness and the clarifying strength of the play.

The effect on criticism of this effort to bring all art forms (specifically the two canonical written forms) under a universal principle that is a non-denotative state of awareness was profound. Instead of a disciplined search for structural principles, practical aesthetics took on more the character of establishing the *rasa* in terms of this or that set of circumstances. Structural considerations were relegated to the status of adventitious concomitants, which could be expounded by list as well as any other way. The integrity of the work lay in its having a *rasa*, that is, in the successful combination of the circumstantial structures to awaken or otherwise bring to consciousness the *rasa*; But the *rasa*, by definition not a product of, or otherwise strictly dependent on, its structural preconditions (for *rasa* is found even in the phoneme: *varṇa*!) is seen, from the point of view of its truth, not of the work at all, but of the soul where it truly is. Art then, structurally or elementally defined, is no more than an excitant: the differences of one art form or another (since they

[187] It is, as we say, an affect. K.L. SAHAL, Objective Correlative and the Theory of Rasa', Calcutta Review, N.S. 2, no 2, p. 237, looks at the curious parallelism with T.S. Eliot's notion.

[188] Hence the importance of the discussion of the "obstacles" to aesthetic awareness: Abhinavabhāratī, ibid., p. 280–81: in general links with the world impede or cancel this transcendent *(alaukika)* state. The core of Abhinava's reply to his predecessors in establishing his own doctrine is on pp. 279–286.

are all brought under the notion of *rasa*) are as such less important than the fact that it is the genus art. For it would seem a consequence of the theory that *rasa* is manipulated in a certain way: it "awaits" the work of art as it were. Contrast the way the emotional effect *katharsis* is according to Aristotle specifically determined by the plot structure: arising from, and therefore presuming the very essence of the story:—development; turning point; dénouement.[189] The *rasa*, though it does arise from the 'story' does so only in the tautological sense that without the story we would have no drama, etc. The *rasa* arises from all the elements, or more accurately, from their combination. Efforts to assess this combination *(saṃyoga)* were directed more toward the end (the *rasa*), and inevitably fell into discussions of this or that element as contributing to the end; of course, not every "combination" will work; the proprieties and contrasts that are successful continue to be explained via the old notions of *aṅga*, etc. borrowed from Bharata. But whether we call them poetry, or drama, or music, or dance—even painting—the determinants as such work indifferently: the awakening structure, however essential in concrete terms (for without it we would not have the *rasa*: Aristotle's relation of material to final cause) is defined not only as adventitious, but in truth, as not existing—in the sense that persistent awareness of the structure as such constitutes an obstacle *(vighna)* to the plenitude which is *rasa*. A plenitude that suggests to Abhinava, a theologian of note, the analogy between *rasāsvāda* and *brahmāsvāda*, which differ only in terms of the 'impermanence' of the former. The door is thus opened to theological interpretations of aesthetics, or more importantly, to aesthetic interpretations of theology.[190]

13. *Mahimā, Bhoja, Rudrabhaṭṭa*

Mahima(bhaṭṭa). Perhaps a generation later, 1020–50, than Abhinavagupta and Kuntaka, and also by his title (Rājānaka) a Kāśmīra, Mahimā (Mahiman) is the first writer known who explicitly takes to task the *dhvani* theory of poetic interpretation. The *dhvani* (ignored totally by Mahimā's contemporary Bhoja) did not, it seems, gain immediate acceptance; it was only at the close of the period we have labelled "controversial" that the *dhvani* assumed the decisive place it has had since.[191] But it is also true that the importance of *dhvani* as function *(vyañjanā)* is superseded by its content of preference: the *rasa*. Later writers speak not so much of *dhvani* as the soul of poetry[192] as

[189] Supra, note 134.

[190] See M. Hiriyanna, Indian Aesthetics, PAIOC, 1, p. lv, where these notions are related to the *jīvanmukta* ideal; on Rūpa Gosvāmin, see infra, p. 284–5.

[191] Due less to Abhinava than to the 'popular' Kāvyaprakāśa.

[192] Dhvanyāloka 1,1.

they do of *rasa* as the ground of aesthetic pleasure[193]. The argument whereby *rasa* was generalized as content of all written art is overshadowed by its conclusion: and this Mahimā in no way disputes. In fact, he may be said to have been the first to assert it.[194]. Mahimabhaṭṭa accepts the primacy of *rasa* while disputing Ānandavardhana's account of how it comes to be.

Mahimabhaṭṭa focuses attention on the function *(vṛtti) dhvani*; his acceptance of the substantive conclusions of the Dhvanyāloka[195] is motivated by an eristic determination to replace the *dhvani* with another function *(anumiti)*. The work has very much this negative tone. Its three chapters are devoted to a refutation of *dhvani* (and several other 'supra-literal' concepts, among them, *sphoṭa*[196]), the argument being overall an indirect one: of all the posited ways to comprehend suggested meanings in poetry, none can withstand criticism, leaving only *anumiti*, "inference" (presumably recognized by all Hindus at least) as a possible explanation.

The second chapter deals again negatively with poetic flaw *(doṣa)*—only as an elaborate introduction to a further attack on the Dhvanikāra's definition of *dhvani*, which will be shown to violate all the canons of good composition! The final chapter goes through all the examples alleged in the Dhvanyāloka to illustrate *dhvani*, and reexplains them through *anumāna*) inference.

Mahimabhaṭṭa's purpose in fixing on inference as an alternative to *dhvani* is not clear, or clarified by his own statements. He seems to be returning to the position attributed to Śrīśaṅkuka, and effectively disposed of by Nāyaka, Tauta and Abhinavagupta.[197] But these refutations are not dealt with; indeed Viśvanātha more or less repeats them in his turn when demolishing the *anumiti* of the Vyaktiviveka[198]. They reduce to the problem of designating a *vyāpti* in "poetic inference", without which necessary concomitance the syllogism of inference will not have validity.

Bhoja. The equivocal position of Bhojadeva in the history of poetics has been admirably catalogued by Dr. V. Raghavan.[199] Like Rājaśekhara, with whom the period of post-*dhvani* uncertainty begins, Bhoja seems uncommitted to any traditionally defined view of the subject. (In many details of organization, his works seem to owe more to the atypical Agni-Purāṇa) than to any

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[193] *yo 'rthaḥ* (scil. *rasaḥ*) *tasyānvayāt kāvyaṃ kamanīyatvam aśnute*: Bhoja, Sarasvatīkaṇṭhābharaṇa, 5,1 (Rāghavan, Śṛṅgāraprakāśa p. 425), cf. *vākyaṃ rasātmakaṃ kāvyam*: Sāhityadarpaṇa, 1,3.

[194] Cf. Dhanaṃjaya, Bhaṭṭanāyaka, supra.

[195] Cf. Vyaktiviveka (KSS 121, 1964, p. 47): *artho 'pi dvividho vācyo 'numeyaś ca.*

[196] Op. cit., p. 61.

[197] Supra, pp. 264–8.

[198] SD (NSP ed. Bombay 1936), pp. 262–71 (5,4–5); cf. De, H.S.P., II, pp. 197–9.

[199] Bhoja's Śṛṅgāraprakāśa, Madras 1963. The work is also essential for situating the general context of poetic theory in which Bhoja finds a peculiar place. See also the edition of G. Josyer, Mysore 1955–74; four volumes.

recognized authority; yet Bhoja cites and is intimately familiar with the definite views of more early poeticians than any other writer.[200] He is the author (a dubious distinction!) of the "largest known work on Sanskrit Poetics"[201], the Śṛṅgāraprakāśa (now edited by G. Josyer but chiefly known through Raghavan's "précis"—perhaps the world's longest précis!), yet he ignores the revolutionary notion of his day, the *dhvani* doctrine of Ānanda! His date, which is certain, is in part fixed by accepting the traditional identification with Bhoja, King of Dhārā, known to have reigned between 1010 and 1055[202] and himself subject of much poet-lore (especially as concerns his liberality to the arts.[203])

An hypothesis that partly orders this jumble of conflicting evidence might be that the *dhvani*-doctrine had not got much beyond Kashmir even by the time of Mammaṭa, and it was likely the popularity of the Kāvyaprakāśa that indeed carried it to the rest of India. Bhoja might thus fairly be said not to have known of the *dhvani*, rather than ignoring it.[204]

Bhoja's works, the Sarasvatīkaṇṭhābharaṇa and Śṛṅgāraprakāśa (on poetics) we have called *paurāṇika*, not only because of the links to the Agni-Purāṇa, but in view of their nature, as being uncritical compilations of the most diverse views. De has put it well "The learning which this work parades, though extensive, is ill-assorted and uncritical, its ideas lacking in system and its expression in preciseness."[205]

The doctrine of Bhoja that most retains the attention of later writers is not his tripartite organization of the *alaṃkāras* (borrowed from the Agni-Purāṇa) or his elaborate classification of the *guṇas* (*pace* Vidyānātha[206]); rather he is the first writer (with Mahimā perhaps) to state *rasa* as an all-encompassing principle of composition. He is much concerned with bringing *nāṭya* and *kāvya* together under the same rubric[207], but seems to attempt this through the wholly unprecedented *reductio* of considering all eight (or nine) *rasas* one: *śṛṅgāra*, 'love'. Two aspects retain our attention: in the first place, the argument (if so intended) is a *non sequitur*, for the multiplicity of *rasas* (as such) was never intended as a differentia of the dramatic genre; on the other hand, though the *rasa* of *kāvya* is often *śṛṅgāra* (Kumārasaṃbhava), the reduction

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200 Raghavan, op. cit., ch. 28; Kane, H.S.P., p. 258.

201 De, H.S.P., I, p. 136.

202 Ibid.

203 See note 7, supra.

204 De, H.S.P., II, p. 206; but Bhoja may already have been known in Kashmir! (I, p. 146–7): if mentioned by Mammaṭa: KP 10, verse 505 (ĀSS 66, p. 531).

205 Vol II, p. 211.

206 Ibid., footnote.

207 Much of the ŚP. is based on the NŚ.: chapters XII–XIV and XXIIff., which also form the basis for Rūpa Gosvāmin's later treatment of *bhaktirasa*. See De, Bhakti Rasa Śāstra of Bengal Vaiṣṇavism, IHQ, 8, p. 643–88 and S. Bhattacharya, Bhoja's Rasa: its influence on the Bengali Rasa-śāstra, JOIB, 13, p. 106.

appears to confuse statistics with principle.[208] At the same time he elaborates the number of 'subsidiary' *rasas* (not eight or nine, but twelve in total). Is the emphasis on one *rasa* intended chiefly to organize his own vast work? (The shorter Sarasvatīkaṇṭhābharaṇa is not as clearly committed to the singleness theory). In any case, as De remarks, the views of Bhoja, the last *paurāṇika* and perhaps the precursor of the real encyclopaedism of Mammaṭa, were ignored almost totally, while his fame increased to fabulous proportions.

Rudrabhaṭṭa. According to modern authorities, this author is not to be confused with Rudraṭa.[209] His Śṛṅgāratilaka is certainly an unlikely work to be attributed to the archetypal *ālaṃkārika*! Devoted exclusively to the dramatic *rasas* (including *śānta*!), it is an important production in its own right, being in effect the first work that singles out this one topic for exhaustive treatment (anticipating the *rasa*-writers of the 14th century (Vidyānātha and Viśvanātha)); it is conventional—quite unlike the Śṛṅgāraprakāśa,[210]—novel chiefly in attesting to the growing influence of the *rasa*. Rudrabhaṭṭa's date is uncertain, "before 1100 AD".[211]

14. *Mammaṭa*

Mammaṭa's Kāvyaprakāśa—probably the most influential single work of Indian poetics[212]—marks the end of the period of uncertainty that followed for nearly two centuries the composition of the Dhvanyāloka. The renown, in many ways merited, of this work is probably due to two causes—it appears to have offered the decisive and convincing interpretation of the *dhvani*-theory (based on Abhinavagupta), henceforth considered in some sense valid; secondly, it originated (and served as model for) the genre we have termed "systematic". It is true that the works of Bhoja and Rājaśekhara to a certain extent merit this designation also, but they really do little more than bring into relief the genuine accomplishment of Mammaṭa: his "system" is not based on atypical or idiosyncratic principles (Rājaśekhara's attempt to give a socio-history of poetry *(kāvyapuruṣa)* and Bhoja's odd celebration of *śṛṅgāra* and his equally bizarre classification of *alaṃkāras* and *guṇas*), but on a careful and faithful reading of his predecessors' works. In a way the KP seems less systematic than the uncompromising but erratic monolith of Bhoja,

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208 *bhāvānām uttamaṃ yat tu tac chṛṅgaṃ śreṣṭham ucyate /*
iyanti (iyranti?) śṛṅgaṃ yasmāt tu tasmāc chṛṅgāra ucyate: Bhāvaprakāśana, p. 48 (GOS ed.).

209 See KANE, H.S.P., pp. 156–59 for an account of the controversy, and the *siddhānta*.

210 Based much more clearly on Nāṭyaśāstra.

211 KANE, ibid.

212 DE, H.S.P., I, p. 156; see DE, "Mammaṭa's Kāvya Prakāśa" in Some Problems . . . pp. 108–130.

for it precisely attempts to comprehend and integrate the various extant doctrines of Indian poetics in the light of one of them, the *dhvani* theory—a task that is bound to leave a number of ragged edges if pursued honestly. (So a better term than "systematic" might be "synthetic"). Given the fame of his work[213] the date of Mammaṭa presents more difficulty than is expected at this relatively late time. Its lower terminus is somewhere between 1135 and 1150 A.D., established by citations in Ruyyaka's Alaṃkārasarvasva and general certainty regarding Ruyyaka's date. But its upper terminus (with the same degree of certainty) is more than a century earlier, between 1005 and 1015 A.D., established by Mammaṭa's quoting the Navasāhasāṅkacarita and his frequent mentions of Abhinava. Anything more precise rests on a single reference to Bhojanṛpati[214], the fame of whose liberality may have spread to Kashmir during his lifetime.[215] The verse is in the style of a standard *praśasti*, and of course may not refer at all to King Bhoja of Dhārā.[216] But if this flimsy evidence is accepted, Mammaṭa's work may at least be dated, within a roughly 75–100 year period, between 1050 and 1135.

By his title and name (Rājānaka Mammaṭa), he is likely a Kāśmīra, and is a worthy propagator of the distinguished local poetic tradition. As we have implied, it is probably Mammaṭa that made Kāśmīra poetics Indian poetics.

The form of the work indicates its novel character. Rather than being an argument in favour of or against a particular view-point, it attempts to justify many different points of view—it attempts to integrate in a positive way at least the conclusions of several antecedent poetic theories, under the general rubric of the *dhvani* theory (chapters IV–VI). But even the *dhvani*, faithfully rendered in terms borrowed from the Dhvanyāloka, is 'integrated' into a larger frame of reference, provided by the theory of verbal functions, *vṛttis*, now accepted as *siddhānta* (chapters II–III, "signifiant et signifié"). Mammaṭa's eclecticism is demonstrated in his 'definition' of *kāvya* (often criticized as being a hodge-podge characterization rather than a definition) "*tad (kā-*

[213] The unparalleled interest of the tradition (Bibliography: De, H.S.P., I, pp. 154–177!) is not shared by modern critics, who generally regard Mammaṭa as the beginning of the 'decline' of Indian poetic thought (De, S.P.S.A., p. 46). The few attempts to confront Mammaṭa's system are referenced *ad loc.* in the following notes. Mammaṭa is also the author of a work on the *śabdavṛttis*: the Śabdavyāpāraparicaya (De, H.S.P., I, p. 156).

[214] See 10, 505; other references: De, H.S.P., I, p. 146.

[215] *Regnans* 1010–55, De, H.S.P., I, p. 136.

[216] "Bhoja" is the name of a region as early as the Mahābhārata; the term is a common epithet of kings (as early as Aitareya-Brāhmaṇa: MW, p. 767. The verse occurs in the text very close to the traditional point—end of *parikara alaṃkāra* (ĀSS ed., p. 541)—assigned to the end of Mammaṭa's contribution to the text, the remainder completed by Alaṭa (De, H.S.P., I, p. 149; or Alaka, Kane, H.S.P., pp. 271ff.). But the division point is far from certain and we may not be dealing with Mammaṭa at all. See H.R. Diwekar, The dual authorship of the Kāvyaprakāśa, JRAS, 1927, pp. 505ff.; R.J. Jain, Authorship of the portion from the *parikara alaṃkāra* . . . PAIOC, 12, p. 331.

vyam) adoṣau śabdārthau saguṇānalaṃkṛtī punaḥ kvāpi" (1,4ab: ("poetry is (a mix of) word and sense free from fault, sometimes provided with qualities and sometimes lacking ornament"). The definition, it is clear, fits Mammaṭa's overall purpose very well, and anticipates the structure of his book: *Doṣa* (fault, being any generalized detraction from the comprehension that is poetic suggestion) is dealt with in chapter VII; *guṇas* are treated in VIII, and *alaṃkāras* (of *śabda* and *artha*) are defined in IX and X. The latter topics are reduced to the status of ancillaries, which do not define poetry (the task of chapters IV–VI) but rather detract from (in the case of *doṣa*) or augment its constitutive charm *(guṇa, alaṃkāra)*.[217] Poetry *per se* is defined in 1,4ab; its internal divisions (differentiated strictly in grammatical terms, according to the *vṛttis*, yet assuming the status of evaluative concepts) are stated in 1,4cd–5: where *vyaṅgya* (the suggested sense) predominates, we have the highest type, termed *dhvani* (a type of poetry) (treated *in extenso* in chapter IV); where *vyaṅgya* is important but not primary (is an ancillary to the *vācya*, or literal sense) we have poetry of subordinated suggestion (*guṇībhūtavyaṅgya*—treated in chapter V; all these terms are taken verbatim from the Dhvanyāloka), and finally, poetry lacking *dhvani* (*śabdacitra*: chapter VI, the shortest in the Kāvyaprakāśa)—uninteresting to Mammaṭa, though he allows it as poetry (probably contra Ānandavardhana) inasmuch as the use of figures of speech *per se* (without any trace of ulterior meanings, as in the case of the verbal figures *yamaka*, etc.) is generally allowed to have a certain kind of charm that marks the utterance as different from ordinary speech. And Mammaṭa is an inclusivist: several principles operate simultaneously to englobe as much of the preceding tradition as possible.

Mammaṭa thus seems to be the *dharmaśāstrī* or *mīmāṃsaka* of the poetic tradition: it is he who in fact has formulated poetics as a *śāstra* (internally coherent, and externally comprehensive) out of the various strands of local traditions and theories that had come each in their own way to be viewed as inadequate. And as elsewhere in India, the 'correct' solution is that one (during the synthetic or śāstraic period) which saves most, is permissive and yet faithful to the now recognized broader needs of universalization.[218] Mammaṭa's particular contribution to doctrine was very limited, but it can be seen that this is not a serious criticism of his accomplishment, which was to define a form of study and a curriculum in poetics that has persisted to this day.

The one area of poetic interest—despite the implication of the Dhvanyāloka[219]—that is not integrated into the *śāstra*, is that of the old dramaturgy *(nāṭyaśāstra)*. On this side his solution was clearly incomplete, and several

217 Note the clever adaptation of a view that Vāmana so lucklessly upheld—as well as (the notion of *doṣa* modelled on *vighna* of Abhinava).

218 As in the case of the older Vedic tradition, when it became clear that an all-India standard of ritual practice was required: hence, *mīmāṃsā, dharmaśāstra.*)

219 And even against the example of Rudraṭa, whom Mammaṭa follows whenever possible in books 9 and 10 (see V. Sukthankar, in ZDMG, 1912, p. 478).

later writers (Viśvanātha, most notably) sought to bring that matter too under the rubric provided by the Kāvyaprakāśa. In effect this is one of the major themes of the later history of Indian poetics among the syncretistic writers.

The first three *kārikās* of chapter I respond to, in very abbreviated terms, a favourite concern of the early tradition: the external context of poetry viz. its matter *(svabhāva)*, its utility *(prayojana)* and its prerequisites *(hetu)* 1,1–3. The rest of the book is concerned with its "form" *(svarūpa)* and thus may be said to constitute a tolerably more accurate account of the *kāvya-puruṣa* than Rājaśekhara ever imagined.

15. *The post-Mammaṭa period*

The post-Mammaṭa poetics is not as barren as De would have it[220] but it does presume as its standard the Kāvyaprakāśa version of the *dhvani* theory. That more and more appears to be copied from earlier texts is interesting, but of little significance, except to intellectual traditions like our own that place a higher value on originality than on truth. The major works of the six or eight centuries following Mammaṭa each have a peculiar contribution to make to the general history of the *śāstra*, even though they do not often try to set it on its head.

Ruyyaka, author of the Alaṃkārasarvasva, and reputedly of several other works on poetics, including a commentary on the Vyaktiviveka[221] was again a Kāśmīra, whose period of major activity can be rather precisely dated as 1135–50 A.D.[222]. He wrote a commentary on Mammaṭa, showing among other things the immediate fame of the Kāvyaprakāśa—at least in Kashmir. Ruyyaka's canonical work (Alaṃkārasarvasva) may have been only part three of a three-part work devoted to the examination of *dhvanikāvya* on lines resembling chapters IV–VI of the Kāvyaprakāśa.[223] If so, it constitutes a revision in Mammaṭa's scheme, and as De thinks[224], was probably inspired by Kuntaka's treatment of *alaṃkāra* rather than Mammaṭa's. Even without this hypothesis, Ruyyaka's interest in *alaṃkāra* seems determined by different principles than Mammaṭa's, and is not at all what might appear on the surface, a throwback to the pre-*dhvani alaṃkāraśāstra*.

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[220] De H.S.P., II, p. 215.

[221] De, H.S.P., I, pp. 182–4.

[222] Kane, H.S.P., p. 285.

[223] De, H.S.P., II, p. 229; the lost "Alaṃkāramañjarī", corresponding to chapters IV and V *(dhvanipradhānyam; guṇībhūtavyaṅgyam)* is not thought to be Ruyyaka's by Kane, H.S.P., p. 401. The Alaṃkārasarvasva is one of the few post-Mammaṭa works to benefit from a good Western translation: H. Jacobi, in ZDMG, 1908, three parts. See his Introduction, pp. 289–94.

[224] De, H.S.P., II, p. 230.

(Ruyyaka is as committed to the *dhvani* and the theory of *vṛtti* as was Mammaṭa); he uniquely among the older writers has a sense of the historical place of his own work, gives an encapsulated version of the "schools" of thought to which his work responds[225]. In Mammaṭa's view *alaṃkāra* is an adjunct; in line with the old analogy, figures may be put on or off—like a woman's jewelry—enhancing with their presence but (never cancelling by their absence, the basic beauty of the poem or the woman. Such a view is not easy to reconcile with the older *ālaṃkārikas* passionate concern for figuration as formally defining poetry, and Ruyyaka sets out to bring Mammaṭa and the older tradition into accord on this important point. His concern in dealing with a vast range of figures (over 80) is to show each one as involving essentially some aspect or element of the distinctive charm that differentiates poetic utterance generally. He uses the term *vicchitti*, recalling the doctrine of Kuntaka. While this distinctive charm is not itself a form of suggestion (*dhvani*) nor based upon it (assuming indeed the context of Mammaṭa's book VI, *citrakāvya*), a link is here being forged between the ideal of figuration in Mammaṭa, the *dhvani* of the Dhvanyāloka and the *vakrokti* of Vakroktijīvita. Although certain figures were long recognized as involving essentially an element of the *dhvani*[226], it is Ruyyaka who attempts for the first time, following a principle advanced by Kuntaka, to generalize that insight to all figures. In some figures, the words used actually suggest a second meaning, and it is that relation that constitutes the "figure"; clearly the figure is a "form" of *dhvani*[227]. In other cases a figure may be "suggested" by another explicit figure (as *upamā* by an explicit *dīpaka*). But in every figure, if properly so called, some remarkable comprehension must result, a comprehension that differs from the plain sense of the words, and marks the intellection as different from inference. In many cases it is just the juxtaposition of ideas so improbably associated that the mind is forced out of its usual paths to seek a new or revised understanding of the relationship, what they can have in common. ("The professor winked at me so hard that his face was like a concertina with a hole in it"[228]). *Vicchitti* as used by Ruyyaka seems to designate this movement of the mind that may not involve any new apprehension at all (and is thus not *dhvani* strictly speaking), but simply a revised and 'novel' insight into what is.[229] It would be easy to argue that it was in fact a *dhvani*) this may have been Ruyyaka's strong conclusion, though (in ironic confidence) he leaves it to our insight, observing only *tasmād vyaṅgya eva vākyārthībhūtaḥ kāvyajīvitam ity eṣa pakṣo . . .*[230]

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[225] As an Introduction to his work, pp. 3–19 of the Kāvyamālā (35) edition.
[226] E.g. Dhvanyāloka, 1,13. Mentioned are *samāsokti, ākṣepa, viśeṣokti, paryāyokta*.
[227] Also, AS., p. 19.
[228] Joyce Cary, The Horse's Mouth.
[229] Cf. AS., p. 61–2, on differentiating figures; also Dhvanyāloka, ibid.
[230] AS., p. 14.

Ruyyaka's other major contribution to the *śāstra* now evolving responds to the problem of its extension (as the former attempt to relate *alaṃkāra* to *dhvani* might be said to involve a principle of unification). He has, following Rudraṭa, given an account of the standards of classifying figures that has not been improved upon since, and makes clear the limited internal structure of the figurative universe.

Accepting the time-honoured distinction between figures of sound and those of sense, which he does not change essentially, Ruyyaka attempts to analyze the figures of sense *(arthālaṃkāra)* according to similarly structural principles. The fourfold division of Rudraṭa is only partially accepted; other principles are expounded. Ruyyaka however mentions only briefly the criteria used in his classifications; we are dependent on his commentators and on our own intuition to discover the rationale of many of the distinctions.

According to Jacobi's summary, which is literal,[231] the *arthālaṃkāras* are divided into nine classes, of which one ("similitude") is further subdivided according to the intended character of the difference (i.e. whether the difference between the two terms "compared" is intended to be cancelled (as in *rūpaka*) or reinforced *(vyatireka)* or maintained in identity (as in *upamā* itself)). The first type is itself subdivided (continuing the good Advaita terminology) according as the identification takes place by superimposition (*āropa*, as in *rūpaka*) or by deletion (*adhyavasāya*, as in *utprekṣā*; the "object" of comparison is deleted, leaving only its manner of acting or being), or in a way, by both, where the deletion of term serves to suggest a further adjunction or comparison (as in the sometime *śabdālaṃkāra dīpaka*). Ruyyaka is not beholden to the tradition in many of these details, nor in his overall conception. Not only are some *śabdālaṃkāras* reevaluated (as *dīpaka*, taking a signal from Dhvanyāloka), but some of the criteria of earlier systems are fused in new configurations. *Atiśayokti*, for example (one of the four basic terms in Rudraṭa's system) appears here both as a simile (with *utprekṣā* in the *adhyavasāyagarbha* section) and as a type of *virodha* (contradiction); "exaggeration" in other words is now being examined in terms of its intent, rather than in its propositional form. And its importance to the structure declines markedly.[232]

The Vedānta base of the analysis is clear; here too "intent" plays the crucial role; poetry in a way recapitulates the "errors" of worldly perception, which of course are based on wrong-will (the "this is mine" paradigm). The remaining varieties of *arthālaṃkāra* figuration appear to be more traditional. Ruyyaka appears indebted to the *dhvani* analysis (this too would in part account for the 'intentional' character of his system); instead of the statement of a relationship (viz. similitude) between two subjects, the poet may intend in some cases the discovery of one of the subjects (through the other): certain of

[231] ZDMG, 1908, pp. 626–7.

[232] Again, the reader is referred to Gerow, G.I.F.S. for definitions and examples of these figures.

the *dhvani*-based figures, *samāsokti* and others are found here. The suggestive function *(vyañjanā)* alone can be appealed to; in the types of similitude instanced above, both subjects are referred to in some way or other (through a property etc.).

In other cases, the poet's intention may dwell on relationships other than similitude. Chief among these is the contrary of similitude, contradiction or incompatibility *(virodha)*. Many figures can be so understood (many involving incompatibilities of logic, as in Rudraṭa's analysis). But the logical or sequential aspect *per se* is not given much prominence here.

The next four types of figuration in Ruyyaka appear to involve the notion of groups of things (as opposed presumably to the foregoing three classes, which dealt with two things *(upameya, upamāna; prākaraṇika, aprākaraṇika)* only). And the notion of group does imply at least the possibility of sequence, and hence argument, logic. Various kinds of arrangement are considered: of words (*śṛṅkhalābandha*: the *mālā* figures of Mammaṭa), of terms or conclusions (the two figures *kāvyaliṅga* and *anumāna*, where a logical operation appears to be central), of meanings (*padārtha* as opposed to *pada*: a group of figures based on conventional relationships at the sentence level, syntax *(vākyanyāya)*); finally, of things or referents (*lokanyāya*, where the issue is not so much on the internal or grammatical relationships among several words or their meanings, as on the external arrangements of things themselves—as when two things are said to be at war with one another, or to have fused *(pratyānika, mīlita)*); the emphasis is on the things themselves rather than on their relationship, hence we appear nearly to have returned to the domain of simile.

The final two classes of figure appear to reflect interest in the *vṛttis* or functions of signification as elements in defining or capturing the *dhvani* in the figure. The Dhvanyāloka has argued that the third function[233] may relate to figuration in various ways, as subordinate or as principal; as having a figure or merely a state of affairs *(vastu)* as its *vyaṅgya*, etc., but no effort was made to investigate these matters in specific figures, except in an *ad hoc* and illustrative way. Indeed Ruyyaka's second class of figures appears to correspond closely to the Dhvanyāloka's distinction of primary: secondary; in all of them, suggestion seems involved as a subsidiary element crucial to the form of the figure (which is the main thing, or principal[234]).

Subsequent discussion of the relation of *dhvani* (as subordinate) and figuration seems to have made clear that other principles might also be involved. Not only is a meaning *(artha)* capable of evoking another meaning (all the figures of Ruyyaka's second class fit here), but elements of discourse other than

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233 *vyañjanā*, or *dhvani* (the latter word used loosely both in the sense of function and the result of the function (a kind of poetry)).

234 In *samāsokti*, it is the meaning implicit in the 'irrelevance' of the figure that I focus on: "suggestion" functions to realize the figure and not vice versa)

meaning may cause the apprehension of another meaning[235]. Lastly even the *rasa*, the *dhvani* par excellence, which cannot be evoked directly (viz. by *abhidhā*) in any way at all, may nevertheless sometimes not be the principal, even where it is cognized. Its cognition is proof of the operation of the third function, *dhvani*; but that cognition is sometimes subordinated to the apprehension of a concrete meaning (as in *rasavat*, where the relations expressed in the figure are primary, and the mood it evokes only secondary.) Cases where a *rasa* or a *rasa*-type element emerges as a secondary consequence of figuration are treated in Ruyyaka's ninth class. So taken with the second class, Ruyyaka's eighth and ninth classes (appendices perhaps resulting from discussions of the *vṛttis* that took place among poeticians as well as from the effort to treat *rasa* more consistently within the figurative universe) explore the range of possibilities that the third function may subtend to the *śabdārtha* of discourse: it may be grounded either in meanings or in other components of the linguistic spectrum (even sub-linguistic, if gesture be admitted); it may itself become a content (an *artha*) (as a *rasa*), but perhaps still subordinated to other functions (or itself as function?). Ruyyaka's treatise stops at just the point where the exploitation of the third function for its own sake (*rasa* poetry par excellence) might be said to have found opportunity. Ruyyaka has thus suggested an opening for Viśvanātha, to complete finally the major gap in Mammaṭa's encyclopaedism: incorporation of the entire *rasa* theory (not just its *kāvya* portion) into the poetic *śāstra*.

Vāgbhaṭa I and II. Two writers on poetics are identified by this name. Both are Jainas from Western India. It is convenient to group them together with Hemacandra, though the date of the second Vāgbhaṭa is very imprecise: ... "later than 1150 A.D. He probably flourished in the 14th century".[236]

The Vāgbhaṭālaṃkāra is a short work, dating from ca. 1125–43[237] whose chief originality is its final chapter, devoted entirely to *rasa*. The topic of characterization *(nāyaka/nāyikā)* figures prominently. Vāgbhaṭa may have been the first author to look for a way of dealing with the more dramatic aspects of the *rasa* theory within the structure of the developing *śāstra*.[238] The rest of his work is brief, and except for that, conventional. He discusses the purposes and prerequisites of poetry (I), emphasizing *pratibhā*; the language of *kāvya* and its defects (II), the ten *guṇas* (III), and the *alaṃkāras* (IV: four of *śabda* and only 35 of *artha*), in addition to the final chapter on *rasa*.

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[235] Gestures, phonemes, contexts: elaborately dissected by Kuntaka, whom Ruyyaka follows here, in defining his eighth class *(gūḍhārthapratīti)* which includes both *vakrokti* (narrow meaning) and *svabhāvokti*! Beautiful!

[236] Kane, H.S.P., p. 296.

[237] Ibid., p. 287.

[238] Apart from Rudraṭa, whose work preceded the flowering of the *dhvani* theory, and does not reflect the preeminent place that *rasa* has had in poetic speculation since. See also Rudrabhaṭṭa.

Vāgbhaṭa II, author of the Kāvyānuśāsana (not to be confused with Hemacandra's work), follows nearly the same pattern as his predecessor, save that his second chapter includes the *guṇas* (reduced to Mammaṭa's three) and that his third and fourth are reserved to *śabda* and *artha alaṃkāras* respectively (six of the former and 63 of the latter.[239])

Hemacandra, 1140 A.D.[240], the well-known polygraph, sums up the tendency of this Jaina interlude. His work is perhaps the most eclectic of this period, whose spirit is often dominated by eclecticism.[241] Without committing himself to any doctrine (even the *rasa/dhvani*) Hemacandra succeeds in giving a circumstantial account of the various topics of *alaṃkāraśāstra,* and also, of the *nāṭyaśāstra*. His work approaches, in other words, the standards of modern critical scholarship. The two Vāgbhaṭas, too, while not adherents of the *dhvani* viewpoint, reflect its influence. Hemacandra gives one of the most comprehensive accounts of the dramatic *rasa* theory in the post-*dhvani* period, and thus sets the stage for Viśvanātha's more orderly reintegration of the *śāstra.*

Historians make much of Hemacandra's "lack of originality"[242] despite his Jaina emphasis on *pratibhā.*[243] He borrows not only ideas, but the words they were couched in, and thus truly lays himself open to the charge of compilation. In balance though, his net was very broad, especially in the area of illustrative verses (some 1500 from various authors), and he seems to have possessed also a comprehensive skepticism rare among Indian *śāstris.* In the eight *adhyāyas* of Kāvyānuśāsana, Hemacandra deals with a slightly augmented version of the Vāgbhaṭa framework: purposes and preconditions (*pratibhā)* (I), *rasa* (II), *doṣa* (III), *guṇa* (IV), *śabdālaṃkāra* (V), *arthālaṃkāra* (VI), characterization (*nāyaka* etc., VII), and the wholes and parts of *kāvya* (VIII). The episodic character of this list is evident. Despite the importance of *rasa,* it is not associated explicitly with the definition of *kāvya*[244]. Instead it is thought of in somewhat the same way as were the figures in the *dhvani* theory: as an additional result of the facultative employment of *guṇas* and *alaṃkāras*! The treatment of the *rasas* in terms of *vibhāvas* resembles Bharata, yet other topics related to the *nāṭya* aspect of the *śāstra* are dealt with in quite another chapter (VII). Overall, the Kāvyānuśāsana resembles the works of the Vāgbhaṭas, chiefly distinguished by its two appendices on characterization (VII) and on genre (VIII)—which incidentally provide the formal umbrella in terms of which a unified theory of the art might be worked out—but is not.

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[239] KANE, H.S.P., p. 295.
[240] KANE, ibid., p. 290.
[241] See V.M. KULKARNI, Sources of Hemacandra's Kāvyānuśāsana, **JOIB, 14,** p. 148.
[242] KANE, ibid.; DE, H.S.P., II, p. 243.
[243] KA, (Kāvyamālā 71), p. 5.
[244] Ibid., p. 19.

Vidyādhara, Vidyānātha and Viśvanātha. In the early fourteenth century, three writers of similar name, all from southeastern India, bring the encyclopaedic tendency to that state of completeness of which it is capable, by incorporating, once and for all, the theory of dramatic plot and character into the *kāvya* tradition. Of these, the Ekāvalī of Vidyādhara differs least from the model of Mammaṭa, save that the examples are all from the hand of the author himself, and constitute a *praśasti* of his patron, King Narasiṃha of Utkala (Orissa). He accepts the *dhvani* theory, attempts to counter the arguments of those who deny it, and seems to differ from Mammaṭa on few points of doctrine, save a certain reliance on Ruyyaka in his account of the figures. The chief excellence of the work lies in its increasingly systematic character[245] and its noteworthiness is in part a function of its being commented upon by the lucid Mallinātha[246].

The Pratāparudrayaśobhūṣaṇa of Vidyānātha, presents itself also as a *praśasti*, of Pratāparudradeva, King of Ekaśilā (Warangal) in Telengana.[247] The reorientation to *nāṭya* is more evident here, the *praśasti* of the third chapter is itself a small *nāṭaka* rather than the usual flattering *kāvya*. The work's organization also reflects the shift: its nine chapters concern, in order, the hero (*nāyaka*) *kāvya*, the drama par excellence (*nāṭaka*), *rasa*, *doṣa*, *guṇa*, and the final three *alaṃkāra* (*śabda*, *artha* and mixed). This is a reworked scheme, and Vidyānātha's apparent purpose is to relate *kāvya* and *nāṭya* through the notion of character (*nāyaka*, or hero)[248]—rather than through *rasa*, which is still a "content" of the third function, *dhvani* or *vyañjanā* (though it is assigned a separate chapter). "Character" as a principle of analysis is rare enough in the history of Indian poetics to deserve some emphasis.[249] The context of the work of course cannot be ignored: emphasis on *nāyaka* is also subtle flattery of his patron, a demonstration of the essentially model character of the political leader. Like Vidyādhara, treatment of the figures often follows Ruyyaka; but an even more important influence on Vidyānātha seems to have been Bhoja: his chapter on the *guṇas* (twenty-four in number, reversing Mammaṭa's tendency to reduce them) is based thereon, as well as certain of his views relating to the preeminence of *dhvani*[250]. Likewise, the third chapter, on and illustrating *nāṭaka*—as the best type of drama—is based on the Daśarūpaka.

In all these areas Vidyānātha is a true encyclopaedist, drawing on varied sources (as Bhoja), yet submitting them all to a single framework of inter-

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245 De, H.S.P., II, p. 235.

246 The Tarala; Kane, H.S.P., p. 293. See P.K. Gode, A note on the historico-literary importance of Mallinātha's commentaries, PAIOC, 3, p. 63.

247 Reigned to 1323 A.D.: Kane, op. cit., p. 294.

248 See S. Lévi, Le Théâtre Indien, pp. 62–86; S. Lienhard, Typen der Nāyikā im Indischen Kāvya, WZKM, 52, p. 386.

249 De is so interested in the theme of the decline of aesthetics that he takes even innovations of this period as signs of confusion: H.S.P., II, p. 235–6.

250 *gāmbhīrya* of poetry is its *dhvanimattā*: De, ibid., p. 237.

pretation (like Mammaṭa). With Vidyādhara, Vidyānātha's most individual view (nevertheless) appears to be in his account of *kāvya*,—perhaps a reflection of his attempt to see character as an organizing principle—a principle other than the aesthetic response of the audience. The twin notions of *śayyā* and *pāka* ("repose" of words; "maturity" of sense) are developed[251]. Functionally this view presents itself as opposed to the traditional *ālaṃkārika* notion that levels of signification—often simultaneous, as in pun *(śleṣa)*—are the richness and "quality" of poetry; instead there appears here, sketchily at least, the odd-for-India proposition that there is but one truly suitable way of saying what it is you mean: this unique fit of words and sense is the *śayyā*, or "repose" of words in their full accomplishment; looked at from the point of view of the meaning thus expressed, *ipso facto*, more completely expressed we have *pāka*: maturity of expression.[252] This curious excursion into what looks like a Western notion of "style", associating quality with uniqueness and inimitability of expression, should be seen, I think, as a rather late attempt to objectify language, to define in the language, rather than in the hearer, those qualities that determine poetry. The *dhvani*, though in its origin no less objective (as a *vṛtti*), was in the process of being replaced (see Viśvanātha and later writers) by its "content", the *rasa*, as a functional notion in defining poetry, and poetics, as understood by Abhinavagupta, was in fact an aesthetic psychology. Vidyānātha, regarding the latter development as inevitable, if not desirable, felt nevertheless constrained to offer some criterion whereby it would still be possible objectively to distinguish *kāvya* and *nāṭya*: to define in *kāvya* some principle analogous to the 'hero' of drama that gives to each poem its objective uniqueness. It is disconcerting to us that one of the main themes of our criticism is here sketchily suggested, almost as an appendix.

Viśvanātha's Sāhityadarpaṇa, probably the second best known Indian poetic text, is taken by subsequent tradition as the culmination of these efforts to widen the scope of poetics, and systematize it anew.[253] Viśvanātha unabashedly accepts the *rasa* as the constitutive element of all good poetry and drama, hence operating their effective union. His work covers much of the same ground as Vidyānātha's—including both "character" and "plot" within *sāhitya* (chapters III and VI)—but on the whole, the organization is more traditional, showing ten divisions, which are partially those of Mammaṭa (esp. VII and X: *doṣa* and *alaṃkāra*). The work is distinguished only by its

[251] Ibid., p. 240.

[252] See De, S.P.S.A., p. 21.

[253] The English translation by J.R. Ballantyne and P. Mitra (Bibliotheca Indica, 1875) is still standard. It is the Sāhityadarpaṇa that provided P.V. Kane the occasion for his History of Sanskrit Poetics (chapters I, II and X, with Introduction and Notes, Bombay 1910; 2nd ed. 1923 (with the History . . .); 3rd ed. 1951 (reprinted 1961)). See also Satya Vrat, Viśvanātha Kavirāja: His lost works, JOR, 4, Madras, p. 198. V.'s date is the first quarter of the 14th century: Kane, H.S.P. p. 298.

plan; much that is novel and interesting in Vidyānātha is excised in the interest of a greater synthesis.[254]

The notion of *sāhitya*[255] itself (here used for the first time in the sense of "literature" rather than "poetry")[256] probably reflects the considerations that led Vidyānātha and Vidyādhara to speculate on *śayyā* and *pāka*: suitability of word and sense to each other (not just their "conjunction"—as in many earlier definitions, as Mammaṭa's *śabdārthau* and Bhāmaha's *śabdārthau sahitau kāvyam*) marks not only "poetry" but, in this enlarged sense, "brings together' drama as well, under the aegis of a single notion of convention. The term *sāhitya*, probably from Kuntaka (1,17), explaining Bhāmaha's phrase (*anayoḥ*, scil. *śabdārthayoḥ*) appears also in a context that foreshadows this idea of "suitability" (though his main point is still to establish the differentia—the *vakrokti*—of poetic speech): it is glossed as *anyūnānatiriktatvam* ('lacking both deficiency and excess')[257]. Viśvanātha, *sauf erreur*, does not use the term *sāhitya* except in his title and the colophon verse (10,100); elsewhere the usual term *kāvya* is employed (*vākyaṃ rasātmakaṃ kāvyam* (1,3))—even in contexts where clearly the *nāṭya* is intended to be encompassed. *Nāṭya*, we take it, was nothing more than a written variant form of *kāvya*—its formal theory, the structural theory underlying the dramatic *rasa*: *vibhāvas* etc., and the *saṃdhis*, are thus ripe for systematic inclusion in the overall poetic. In this context, the invention of a term for "literature" is no great accomplishment: genre distinctions had in fact been abolished—and Viśvanātha's 'definition' of *kāvya* bears graphic witness to this: for in it are confused the two great genres of classical Sanskrit literature; one becoming the subject of definition *kāvyam* and the other sufficing to define the former (*vākyaṃ rasātmakam*).

Viśvanātha, as has become conventional, discusses earlier definitions of poetry in his preface.[258] The defence of his own definition is quite formal: no other suggested predicate (*saguṇālaṃkāram*, e.g.) can be found invariably associated with *kāvyatvam*, hence the *vyāpti* (invariable concomitance) that ought to underlie every definition is violated. Viśvanātha himself accepts

[254] We do not suggest that the two writers, although contemporaries—but separated by several hundred miles (Viśvanātha hailing from Orissa), were familiar with each other's works; more likely both represent the 'state of the art' in the early fourteenth century; it is Viśvanātha's version, far more traditional in form, that has come to be taken as 'authoritative'.

[255] See V. Raghavan, Śṛṅgāraprakāśa, ch. 8; K. Krishnamoorthy, What is Sāhitya, Mysore Orientalist, 1970, p. 57.

[256] Unless the Sāhityamīmāṃsā is properly attributed to Ruyyaka—which seems dubious on the ground of its content: see Kane, H.S.P., pp. 280–84; the term *sāhitya* may have been coined by Mukula (Raghavan, op. cit., p. 85).

[257] See De, S.P.S.A., p. 18.

[258] See S. Bhattacharya, Viśvanātha Kavirāja and his References to Forgotten Alaṃkāra Writers, JOIB, 13, fasc. 4. Ruyyaka and Abhinavagupta appear to have been the first to think it useful to consult the history of their subject, thus in a way shifting focus of attention from poetry to the definition of poetry (*śāstra*).

consequences of his definition—denying the possibility of the third and lowest type of *kāvya* as accepted by the Dhvanikāra (*citrakāvya*) because it is defined precisely as that *kāvya* lacking *rasa*.[259] Of course the argument itself is self-serving: if *citrakāvya* is admitted as *kāvya*, Viśvanātha's own definition will be *avyāpta*.[260]

Kāvya is located, explicitly, in the area of *vākya*, showing to what extent the drama had ceased to be thought of as a performance; this permits, suggests perhaps, to Viśvanātha a rapprochement *à la śāstra*, with the *vākyaśāstra* par excellence: *mīmāṃsā*.(2,1), and with the *mīmāṃsā-nyāya* notion of the syntactic unit, or *mahāvākya*, construed with the aid of the principles *ākāṅkṣā*, *yogyatā*, and *āsatti* (*vṛtti ad* 2,1). Thus even the śāstraic basis of poetics, its grammatical doctrine of the three powers (*śakti*) of words, is determined explicitly in the śāstraic universe of discourse.

With Viśvanātha, the period of poetics beginning with Mammaṭa, marked by a concern to regularize and codify *alaṃkāravidyā* as a *śāstra*, may be said to have reached its conclusion. Henceforth the subject—academically—has the dimensions of Viśvanātha's treatise: purpose and definition of *kāvya* (1); *vākya* and the powers of words (2); *rasa* and the technique of characterization (3); *kāvya* and the types of *dhvani* (4); *dhvani* established vis-à-vis the other *śaktis* and in reference to other views that limit its primacy (sp. Mahimabhaṭṭa; 5); *nāṭya*, its plot structure (6); *doṣa* (7); *guṇa* (8); *rīti* (9) and *alaṃkāra* (10). Nothing really important is left out; the work defines as marginal what is excluded.

16. *The late theorists*

Oddly, or perhaps perversely, the history of Indian poetics in the period following this synthesis of *kāvya* and *nāṭya* seems again to fall into two distinct traditions—one concentrating almost exclusively on *rasa* (often in a context broader than that of *nāṭya*, to be sure), and one almost as it were fixing on Viśvanātha's summary rejection of *citrakāvya*, seeking to demonstrate again the verbality of poetic diction, its inseparability from the notion of *alaṃkāra* (Appayyadīkṣita, Jagannātha).

The late rasa theorists. These writers and works seem to relate directly to the original Nāṭyaśāstra (via the systematic résumé of Dhanaṃjaya) and do not show the effects of the syncretism that has, by the time of Viśvanātha, integrated *nāṭya* into an overarching poetic.

Somewhat earlier than Viśvanātha is the most important of these writers, Śāradātanaya, author of the Bhāvaprakāśa(na). Referred to above in connec-

[259] SD., 4,1 and *vṛtti ad* 4,14.
[260] So Jagannātha, Rasagaṅgādhara, p. 12 (Benares 2 nd ed.)

tion with its view that there are two Bharatas, the Bhāvaprakāśana is intrinsically one of the interesting books of Indian poetics. In it are developed with grace and critical acumen some of the really puzzling and obscure aspects of Indian dramatic theory. Though Śāradātanaya cannot be said to have been a greatly innovative writer,[261] what we do find is a curiously circumstantial wisdom that infuses many of the dry technicalities of characterization and plot development with a vividness that permits us to situate them in the context of a real performance, and hence understand both their critical significance, and the playability of the dramas.[262] It is as though this alone were sufficient to integrate and to rationalize functionally the many details of the older doctrine, taking the place, almost, of a living tradition of dramatic performance in provoking fruitful speculation.

Following Abhinavagupta in the main, he nevertheless rejects the central tenet of the latter's theory, the functional equivalence of *rasa* and *dhvani*. Much less committed to a theoretical position, he accepts both the expressibility *(vācyatva)* of *rasa*, and the non-immanence of *dhvani* (returning (it seems) to Nāyaka's *bhāvakatvam* and to the notion of *tātparya* as a *vṛtti*.[263] The notion of *bhāva* here becomes both that which links the elements of characterization (*vibhāvas*, *anubhāvas* etc.) with the dramatic effect (a postulate as old as Bharata), as well as the fact that is being developed and brought to a complete state through the intricate engine of the play's action, or plot development. What the *saṃdhis* are, are modes in this statement of *rasa*, through its necessary externals (a sequence of actions and their implicit oppositions).

The Bhāvaprakāśana is the main link we have with the lost traditions of dramatic performance.(!)

The same noteworthy dependence on the *rasa* theory (Viśvanātha can be seen as exporting it to *kāvya*, perhaps) is also seen in several post-Viśvanātha writers; where in addition, the influence of Bhoja is perhaps more discernable; or perhaps it is the increasingly erotic devotionalism of the times, in the prominence given to *śṛṅgāra rasa* among the rest. The Rasārṇavasudhākara of the Recarla King Śiṅgabhūpāla (ca. 1330 A.D.)[264] and the two well-known works of Bhānudatta (of Videha), the Rasamañjarī and the Rasataraṅginī (ca. 1450) are notable more for their completeness than for their incisiveness, and obviously owe most of their inspiration to the Bhāvaprakāśana and to the Śṛṅgāraprakāśa of Bhojadeva.

A completely new turn to the *rasa* theory (in its dramatic context) was given by the Vaiṣṇava theologians of Bengal, notably Rūpa Gosvāmin, who took the preeminence of *śṛṅgāra* among the *rasas* and boldly identified that *rasa*

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[261] "reproducing the substance of . . . Bhoja's work": De, H.S.P., II, p. 266.

[262] See V. Raghavan, Sanskrit Drama in Performance in Proceedings of the Honolulu Conference . . ., passim.

[263] Bhāvaprakāśanam (GOS 45, 1930), Introduction (by K.S.R. Sastri Siromani), p. 14.

[264] JOIB, 7, pp. 25–33 (Kane, H.S.P., p. 433).

with the sentiment of the worshipful Kṛṣṇa *bhakta*, thus in effect turning the real world of religious concerns into a drama, wherein everyone enacts the play of Kṛṣṇa and the *gopīs*.[265] This wholly uncompromising use of an aesthetic doctrine to state a theology, and in effect to state a new relation between the worshipper and his ethical world, is both unparalleled and yet proof of the continuing vitality of aesthetic traditions in India. It is beyond the scope of this essay to deal with Rūpa's work (chiefly the Ujjvalanīlamaṇi in this context) as theology, but it must be noted that the essential seriousness of aesthetics is here stated in terms that develop, while reminding one of, Abhinavagupta's relation of theatre and the universe *(rasāsvāda* and *brahmāsvāda)*. While Abhinavagupta seems content to explore this relation as an analogy (for *rasāsvāda* lasts only as long as the play, and is a glimmering only of *mokṣa*), Rūpa Gosvāmin appears to state the relation as a true equivalence, thus cancelling the separation between the religious domain and the play.[266] These works activate the *rasa* into a principle of being, as well as one of response, and are very likely a mode through which the *rasa* is communicated to contemporary Indians, especially in Bengal. *Rasa* at the same time it is employed to organize all literature (Viśvanātha) and even all life (Rūpa) has with much less distortion also won the domains of the other fine arts, music, dance and painting. These also trace their histories back to Nāṭyaśāstra, and have at no time been wholly free of a *rasa*-influenced context. But no longer adjuncts to the drama, they come to be seen as integral art forms in their own right, and in each a suitable form of the *rasa*-aesthetic is developed to explain the organization and communication of emotion. Indeed in these domains, which do not function through the mediate word, the attractiveness of *rasa* as an explanatory principle is increased. Literature has always been the most difficult area in which to demonstrate the *rasa*, owing perhaps to its essential lack of immediacy; but the imperium of *rasa* was not to be denied. Today, we could broaden even Viśvanātha's syncretism: there is not a single aesthetic or even devotional expression in contemporary India that is not touched by this principle, and indeed were it only hyperbole we would have no qualms in asserting that to be an Indian is to know *rasa*.

The more academic writers after Viśvanātha are concerned almost exclusively with the vexed question of the "powers" of speech, the *vṛttis*, and (from the space devoted thereto) a demonstration anew of the power of *alaṃkāra*. We are invited perhaps to conclude that history moves in circles.

Appayya Dīkṣita, one of the giants of Indian *pāṇḍityam* (var. Appa, Apya, Appaya), was a Tamil brahmin, a noted advaitin, whose family was likely

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265 S.K. De, Vaisnava Faith and Movement in Bengal, Calcutta ²1961; Bhakti Rasa Śāstra of Bengal Vaiṣṇavism, IHQ, 8, p. 643–88; A. Guha, Rasa Cult in Caitanya Caritāmṛta, in Ashutosh Mookerjee Silver Jubilee Volume, III, p. 368.

266 See E. Gerow, Rasa as a Category of Literary Criticism, part 3, Proceedings of the Honolulu Conference, I.

associated with the Śaiva temple at Chidambaram.[267] His approximate dates were (ca. 1520–93)[268], argued on the basis of his patronage by several rulers whose inscriptions have been dated, notably Chinna Bomma of Velūr (Vellore in N. Arcot) and Veṅkaṭa (either Veṅkaṭa of Vijayanagar, or one of Pennakoṇḍa, thus both in southern Andhra[269]).

His works in poetics are three: (a fourth may have been discovered in fragment[270]): one, the (Vṛtti Vārttika, is devoted exclusively to the two 'basic' powers: *abhidhā* (denotation) and *lakṣaṇā* (transference); it is 'poetic' in the sense that the book aims at establishing these two in secure foundation to a poetic expression that involves the third: *vyañjanā*. It is widely presumed that the work is unfinished because it lacks the third chapter on *dhvani*[271]; on the other hand it is also judged a youthful work[272], and if so, it may be complete in terms of its limited aim—not to "prove" again the *dhvani* (what could be regarded as less well established?) but to establish clearly the proper relation between words in their "natural" and grammatical guise, and the "poetic" product.) In a way, the work reads like the Dhvanyāloka backwards: given the *dhvani*, what must we account for in natural language that will establish the latter as a proper foundation for poetic expression?

Appayya's second work, the Kuvalayānanda, is an elaborate commentary on an earlier collection of figures, the Candrāloka of Jayadeva[273], and is largely responsible for its popularity. It contains the largest collection of figures of speech yet compiled (115,—fifteen more than the Candrāloka itself). Used in schools in South India even today, it is the standard handbook on the subject, and it seems proper to judge it as such, elegant in definition and judicious in illustration, rather than an academic work. Appayya's third work Citramīmāṃsā is a delight, being in purpose an effort to rescue *citrakāvya* from the disrepute *(adhamakāvyam)* it has earned at the hands of the *dhvani* theory—but even more as argumentation: a witty discussion of a number of figures to show their intellectual interrelationships (chiefly their relations to simile and its structure); the work provides Appayya an occasion to justify or criticize the formulation of some very good medieval poetry. The work approaches more closely a stance of 'criticism' than any other (save possibly Jagannātha's) known to us. Appayya's aim throughout is to reestablish the claim that imagery itself is delightful *(arthacitra)*—that the process of its apprehension by the cultured mind is a sufficient ground for assigning it 'poetic' status—whether or not the work is infused with the larger, more portentous (now even world-

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267 His grand-nephew was Nīlakaṇṭha Dīkṣita, the well-known satirist (Kaliviḍambaṇam: Kāvyamālā Gucchaka 1).

268 Kane, H.S.P., p. 319.

269 De, H.S.P., I, p. 222.

270 Ibid., p. 225.

271 Or *vyakti*: cf. the *maṅgalaśloka*, p. 1, NSP, ed.

272 De, H.S.P., I, p. 223.

273 1250 A.D.: Kane, H.S.P., p. 292.

cosmic) issues of *dhvani-rasa*. Appayya seems at times almost a sceptic, one of those charming conservatives who delight in showing us how much we lose by taking ourselves (and our psyche) too seriously. The spirit of the classical period seems rekindled in his work.[274]

Apparently struck that a major writer could be so good without identifying the cosmic principle underlying all utterance, Jagannātha,[275] the last of the great *ālaṃkārikas*, a Tailaṅga brahmin, who graced the Moghul court of Shah Jahan, ca. 1620–65 A.D.[276], devotes himself inordinately to *ad hominem* attacks on his predecessor, often seeming to adopt positions only because Appayya has concluded the opposite. One of his works (Citramīmāṃsākhaṇḍana) is entirely devoted to nit-picking Appaya's sometimes dogmatic interpretation of figures and examples.[277]

But the Rasagaṅgādhara, on which his fame securely rests, though often revealing this trait[278], is far more. Indians rank it with the Dhvanyāloka and Kāvyaprakāśa[279]; stylistically and intellectually it is indeed a classic. Returning to the theme that a single principle must determine or inform the content of *kāvya*, Jagannātha nevertheless seems to avoid aligning himself with any of the established points of view: attacking each and rejecting each (especially Mammaṭa and Viśvanātha) in turn, in favour of his own intriguing (and circular) definition: "poetry is words that produce pleasure" (p. 2). He even argues (*sub* Viśvanātha, p. 12) that *rasa* is an improper predicate of poetry inasmuch as *śabdacitra* is admitted to be poetry but can have no *rasa* (by definition). The nominal character of the definition and argument is patent, but Jagannātha's arsenal of arguments is far from trivial. Combining the grace of a poet[280] with the relentlessness of a *naiyāyika*, the result always seems somehow less important than how it was arrived at. The Rasagaṅgādhara, apparently incomplete, is divided into two unequal sections, the first devoted to the types of *kāvya* and to the *rasas*; the second to the types of *dhvani* (hence the discussion of *vṛttis*) and to *alaṃkāra*. This last is broken off in the midst of the discussion of the figure *uttara*, and Nageśabhaṭṭa's commentary also breaks off at that point.[281] Jagannātha's interest in the figures is a function of his

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[274] See RAMARANJAN MUKHERJEE, Contribution of Appaya Dīkṣita to Indian Poetics, Calcutta 1971 for a comprehensive and sympathetic account.

[275] See V.A. RAMASWAMY SASTRI, Jagannātha Paṇḍita, Annamalai Sanskrit Series 8, 1942: "best since Abhinavagupta".

[276] KANE, H.S.P., p. 324.

[277] See R. MUKHERJI (MUKHERJEE ?), A note on the controversy between Appaya and Jagannātha, PAIOC, 24, fasc., 2, p. 261.

[278] Especially in the lively discussion of Bhartṛhari's verse *viśeṣasmṛtihetavaḥ* . . .", Benares ed., pp. 173ff., where he contests Appayya's view that the non-contextual *(aprākāraṇika)* meanings of proto-puns (homonyms) are also produced by the *vṛtti abhidhā*.

[279] Kane, H.S.P., p. 321.

[280] And he was a good one: Bhāminīvilāsa.

[281] KANE, H.S.P., p. 322.

view of poetry: he judges them essential in producing the "pleasureableness" associated with the third *vṛtti: vyañjanā*; he thus returns to Ruyyaka and Kuntaka, speaking of this inherent delight—intellectual in form—(*vicchitti* etc.) as something apart from and complementing the *rasa*—now a mere content or *vyaṅgyārtha* in the poem. To this end, Jagannātha also assigns importance to the notion of "inspiration" or *pratibhā*, that faculty whereby the poet constructs his figurative universe (as something different from the world and its everyday, self-interested construction); thus here also one of the favourite themes of the earlier *ālaṃkārikas* is resurrected.[282] *Pratibhā* is an independent principle, not reducible to training *(vyutpatti)* or practice *(abhyāsa)*, which indeed may function without them (as in the case of genius or prodigy) and is always involved in their highest accomplishments. It is a suitable note on which to end this history of Indian poetics.

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[282] Supra, note 20.

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INDICES

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